Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV12876, Date: 2022-08-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV12876    Hearing Date: August 22, 2022    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED IN PART, SUSTAINED IN PART:

-         Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED as to the FEHA causes of action.

-         Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, as to the IIED cause of action.

-         Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITH 15 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND as to the conspiracy and 42 USC section 1985(3) claim.

Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED.

            On 4/18/2022, Plaintiff Miriam Oguejiofor (Plaintiff) filed suit against Los Angeles Unified School District (the District), Maria Ricario, and James Koontz (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) racial discrimination; (2) racial discrimination; (3) retaliation; (4) failure to prevent discrimination; (5) conspiracy; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

            Now, Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Defendants also move to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Legal Standards

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action.¿ (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) ¿When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.¿ (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power¿(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.)¿ In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.¿ (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿ “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.¿ Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.”¿ (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.)¿ “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿ (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 747.) 

Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer, such as words, phrases, and prayers for damages. (See Code Civ Proc., §§ 435-437.)  A motion to strike can be made to strike irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading or to strike any pleading or part thereof not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or order of the court.  (§ 436.) 

Discussion

Plaintiff alleges six causes of action, three of which are based on alleged violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), two of which are based on alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ civil rights, and one which is a common law cause of action.

            In their demurrer, Defendants argued that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim because her FEHA-based causes of action are time-barred, Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim, and public entities cannot be liable under common law.

            The Court addresses each contention in turn.

            As for the first contention that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred, Defendants conceded in reply that Plaintiff’s FEHA claims are not time-barred and that they mistakenly and incorrectly cited to an outdated version of the Government Code. Accepted as true at the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim for discrimination and retaliation.

As for the second contention, Plaintiff’s two civil rights claims are conspiracy and racial discrimination. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for either.  As to the former, Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and not pled with specificity. As to the latter, under the California Government Tort Claims Act (CGTA), a plaintiff must preliminarily present a claim for monetary damages against a public entity, like the District, before commencing litigation for such claims. Here, Plaintiff has not alleged compliance with the GTCA, and Defendants noted in their motion that Plaintiff did not serve the District with any such claim. While Plaintiff contends she need not exhaust her administrative remedies to file this claim, the cases cited in support are instances here the section 1981 claim was filed in federal court. Plaintiff has not cited any case law which could show that Plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing such a cause of action in state court against a public entity.  Leave to amend will be provided to address the deficiencies identified as to these causes of action.

            Finally, as for the third contention, "[a]s a public entity, the [public entity's] liability must be based on statutory not common law." (Munoz v. City of Palmdale (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 367, 369.) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) is a common law cause of action for which there is no statutory basis; indeed, there is no citation in Plaintiffs Complaint to any statutory authority to bring such a cause of action. Accordingly, this cause of action cannot be alleged against a public entity like the District, and the cause of action fails as a matter of law against it. Moreover, even setting aside this issue, Plaintiff’s allegations appear on their face to fall within the exclusive scope of the workers’ compensation scheme.  

            In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “common law theories of claims are [a] standard part of a plaintiff’s arsenal in a discrimination claim” and cites Rojo v. Kilger (1990) 52 Ca.3d 65, 74 in support. However, Rojo did not involve a claim against a public entity, and Plaintiff did not cite any caselaw wherein a Court found an IIED claim to be supported against a public entity under analogous circumstances. By contrast, Defendants cited Davidson ex rel. Sims v. Santa Barbara High School District (C.D. Cal. 1998).)48 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232 in support of the contention that California Courts have concluded that public school districts are immune from claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  

            Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer is overruled in part, sustained in part. Defendants’ demurrer is overruled as to the FEHA causes of action. Defendants’ demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend, as to the IIED cause of action. Defendants’ demurrer is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend, as to the conspiracy and 42 USC section 1985(3) claim.

Motion to Strike  

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a punitive damages prayer. However, as set forth above, Defendants’ demurrer was overruled as to Plaintiff’s FEHA causes of action. As such, Plaintiff has alleged facts which, accepted as true at the pleading stage, could show “conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).)  

It is so ordered.

Dated:  August    , 2022

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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