Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV12876, Date: 2024-05-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV12876 Hearing Date: May 13, 2024 Dept: 17
County of Los
Angeles
DEPARTMENT 17
TENTATIVE RULING
|
MIRIAM OGUEJIOFOR
vs. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et
al. |
Case
No.: 22STCV12876 Hearing Date: May 13, 2024 |
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
On 4/18/2022, Plaintiff Miriam
Oguejiofor (Plaintiff) filed suit against Los Angeles Unified School District
(the District), Maria Ricario, and James Koontz (collectively, Defendants). On
9/6/2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC), alleging: (1) racial
discrimination; (2) racial discrimination; (3) retaliation; (4) failure to
prevent discrimination; (5) conspiracy to interfere with civil rights; and (6)
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Now, Defendants move for summary
judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Discussion
I.
Discrimination based on Race and National Origin
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that she
was subjected to an adverse employment action based on her race or national
origin, and that the District had non-discriminatory reasons for its actions.
“This so-called McDonnell Douglas test reflects the
principle that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is rare, and that
such claims must usually be proved circumstantially.” (Guz v. Bechtel
National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.) “Under the first step of the McDonnell Douglas test, the plaintiff may
raise a presumption of discrimination by presenting a ‘“prima facie case,”’ the
components of which vary depending upon the type of discrimination alleged.
[Citation.]” (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 1, 31 (“Zamora”).) “Under the second step of the McDonnel Douglas test, ‘the employer may
dispel the presumption merely by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the challenged action. ….’” (Id. at p. 32 [internal citations
removed].) “Under the third step of the test, the ‘plaintiff must ... have the
opportunity to attack the employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for
discrimination, or to offer any other evidence of discriminatory motive.’
[Citation.]” (Ibid.)
However, “[w]hen seeking summary
judgment or summary adjudication in an employment discrimination case, the
burdens established by the McDonnell Douglas framework are altered.”
(Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.) “If the employer
presents admissible evidence either that one or more of plaintiff's prima facie
elements is lacking, or that the adverse employment action was based on
legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors, the employer will be entitled to summary
judgment unless the plaintiff produces admissible evidence which raises a
triable issue of fact material to the defendant's showing.” (Caldwell v.
Paramount Unified School Dist. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 189, 203, as modified
on denial of reh'g (Jan. 17, 1996).)
Therefore, “[t]he ‘employer, as the moving party,
has the initial burden to present admissible evidence showing either [1] that
one or more elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case is lacking or [2] that the
adverse employment action was based upon legitimate, nondiscriminatory
factors.” (Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.)
Although the specific elements of a prima facie
case for discrimination under the FEHA may vary, a plaintiff must generally
prove that “(1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) that he was qualified
for the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he or
she held; (3) that he suffered an adverse employment action, such as
termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and (4) some other
circumstance suggesting discriminatory motive. (Guz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 355; Zamora, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp.
37-38.)
Here, Plaintiff’s racial and national discrimination
claims are based on allegations that she was transferred to a different school
because she is African American and of Nigerian descent.
To show that Plaintiff cannot show that she
suffered an adverse employment action because of her race and/or national
origin, and that she was transferred for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons,
Defendant submitted evidence that:
-
Plaintiff lives in the City of Stevenson
Ranch. (UMF No. 5.)
-
Plaintiff joined the LAUSD’s District
Office of Transition Services (DOTS) and became a Transition Teacher around
2014. (UMF No. 1)
-
DOTS positions have always been
itinerant positions—transition teachers are assigned to different schools based
on the needs of the site or District. (UMF No. 2.)
-
As a transition teacher, Plaintiff was
first assigned to Manual Arts High School, near the University of Southern
California (USC), approximately 40 miles away from Stevenson Ranch. ((UMF No.
6.)
-
After Manual, Plaintiff was assigned to
work at numerous other schools as a transition teacher, including Sherman Oaks
School of Enrichment Studies, Daniel Pearl High School, Valley Alternative
Magnet School, and Independence High School. (UMF No.7.)
-
Plaintiff was assigned to Polytechnic
(Poly) High School as a transition teacher for about four years, including the
2018-2019 school year. (UMF No.8.)
-
By October 2018, Maria Ricario was
Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor. In 2018, DOTS Coordinator, James Koontz, was
Maria Ricario’s immediate supervisor. (UMF Nos. 9-10.)
-
On October 23, 2018, there was a DOTS
staff meeting. (UMF No. 11.)
-
Plaintiff claims that, at the October
23, 2018 meeting, she did not like that DOTS was planning to transfer students
from comprehensive school sites to Lowman Career Transition Center (“CTC”), a
low-functioning school. But Plaintiff acknowledged that this is “always a team
decision.” (UMF NO. 12.)
-
Plaintiff claims that she brought up
the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) at the October 23,
2018 meeting. (UMF No. 13.)
-
Plaintiff claims that, at the October
23, 2018 meeting, in response to Plaintiff’s comments, Maria Ricario said that
she could send Plaintiff to San Pedro. (UMF No. 14.)
-
James Koontz was not present at the
October 23, 2018 meeting. (UMF No. 15.) Plaintiff claims that she complained to
James Koontz about Ricario’s comments at the October 23, 2018 meeting. (UMF No.
16.)
-
In early November 2018, shortly after
Plaintiff complained about Ricario’s comments at the October 23, 2018 meeting,
Plaintiff, James Koontz, and Maria Ricario met to discuss ways to support
Plaintiff. At the meeting between Plaintiff, Koontz, and Ricario, Ricario said
she was going to support Plaintiff more. (UMF Nos. 17-18.)
-
In May 2019, James Koontz gave
Plaintiff a positive performance evaluation. (UMF No. 20.)
-
In or around May 2019, there was an
encounter between Plaintiff and transition teacher Joycelyn Young (who just
recently was reassigned to Poly High School), but according to Plaintiff, they
“didn’t discuss much.” (UMF No. 20.)
-
On August 19, 2019, Joycelyn Young had
a discussion or disagreement with Plaintiff over work-based learning slots for
their students. (UMF No. 21.)
-
On August 26, 2019, Ricario, Young, and
Plaintiff met to discuss the division of tasks. Young wanted to do work-based
learning and was upset that there was no conclusion regarding the work-based
learning slots issue after the meeting. (UMF No. 22.)
-
At the August 26, 2019 meeting, Mrs.
Young was crying and called Plaintiff a “bully.” (UMF No. 23.)
-
After the meeting, Maria Ricario
provided Mrs. Young with information about who to contact if she wanted to file
a formal complaint. Ricario did not say that Young had to file a complaint but
gave her the option to do so. (UMF No. 24.)
-
On or around August 27, 2019, Ricario
sent Plaintiff a letter advising Plaintiff that she was investigating
complaints about Plaintiff’s conduct toward Ms. Young. (UMF No. 25.)
-
Mrs. Young voluntarily filed a formal
complaint against Plaintiff without any pressure from Ricario to do so. (UMF
No. 26.)
-
Ricario never mentioned the October
2018 meeting or any of her previous interactions with Plaintiff to Mrs. Young.
(UMF No. 27.)
-
Mrs. Young’s complaint against
Plaintiff had nothing to do with Plaintiff’s race nor was race ever mentioned
during any of the encounters between Plaintiff and Mrs. Young. (UMF No. 28.)
-
On September 30, 2019, and on October
23, 2019, Plaintiff for the first time made a formal complaint about Ricario
for Ricario’s conduct the at the October 23, 2018 meeting the year before. (UMF
No. 29.)
-
Plaintiff began the 2019-2020 school
year assigned to Poly High School but was then assigned to Lowman CTC at the
end of August 2019 due to the need at Lowman CTC for a transition teacher and
Plaintiff’s negative interactions with Mrs. Young. (UMF No. 30.)
-
At around the same time that Plaintiff
was transferred to Lowman CTC in August 2019, another African American teacher
(Wendy Carter) was also transferred to a different school. Around August 2019,
Wendy Carter was offered and accepted to be transferred from Canoga Park High
School to Hollywood High School because Hollywood High School did not have a
transition teacher at that time. (UMF Nos. 31-21.)
-
While Plaintiff was at Lowman CTC,
Maria Ricario was still Plaintiff’s direct supervisor. (UMF No. 33.)
-
Plaintiff’s credential did not prohibit
her from serving moderate-to-severely disabled students as a transition teacher
at Lowman CTC. The position only required a special education credential, which
Plaintiff had. (UMF No. 34.)
-
Plaintiff’s hours at Lowman were the
same (regular hours). According to Plaintiff, Poly High School and Lowman CTC
are only about five to seven miles apart. (UMF Nos. 35-36.)
-
Plaintiff claims that, at Lowman CTC,
she was subjected to an “unhealthy environment” because she was told to stay in
a particular office that was cold and triggered her asthma. (UMF No. 37.)
-
After Plaintiff complained about her
cold office, Ricario directed Plaintiff to move to Room 19, which was not too
cold for Plaintiff and where they could control the temperature. (UMF No. 38.)
-
Though Plaintiff claims that she was
“threatened” with an early performance review, there is no reason to believe
that such an evaluation would have been negative and no such performance review
was ever completed. (No. 39.)
-
Plaintiff’s 2019 workplace violence
complaint against Maria Ricario and James Koontz was investigated by Dr. Aaron
Jeffery. Dr. Jeffery is African American. Prior to the 2019 investigation, Dr.
Jeffery did not know Plaintiff and had no knowledge about Plaintiff. (Nos.
40-42.)
-
During Dr. Jeffery’s investigation,
Plaintiff informed Dr. Jeffery that she wanted to be moved to another school
where she would not be supervised by Ms. Ricario. At the time of Dr. Jeffery’s
investigation, there was only one opening (at Los Angeles High School) for a
transition teacher that was not supervised by Maria Ricario. (UMF Nos. 43-44.)
-
In January 2020, Plaintiff was
reassigned to work at LA High School as a transition teacher. LA High School is
no more than 40 miles away from the city of Stevenson Ranch. (UMF Nos. 46-47.)
-
Prior to being reassigned to LA High,
Plaintiff requested to go to a comprehensive high school campus and to be
supervised by someone other than Ricario. By reassigning Plaintiff to LA High,
the District granted both of these requests. (UMF No. 48.)
-
Neither Ms. Ricario nor Mr. Koontz made
the decision to transfer Plaintiff to LA High School. (UMF No. 49.)
-
Once Plaintiff was transferred to LA
High School (in January 2020), Ricario was no longer Plaintiff’s supervisor.
(UMF No. 50.)
-
Plaintiff complained about her commute
to LA High School and was then reassigned to Eagle Rock High School (a closer
commute) when an opening came up. (UMF No. 51.)
-
From October 2018 to the present,
Plaintiff has not had a decrease in salary or benefits, nor has she lost any
years of service. (UMF No. 52.)
-
Plaintiff has not had any performance
evaluations at LAUSD since May 2019. (UMF No. 53.)
-
Plaintiff is still presently employed
with the District as a transition teacher. (UMF No. 56.)
-
Plaintiff is not aware of Maria Ricario
making any comments about African Americans or Nigerians. (UMF No. 59.)
-
Plaintiff is not aware of James Koontz
making any comments about African Americans or Nigerians. (UMF No. 60.)
In opposition, Plaintiff submitted additional
evidence that:
-
Plaintiff protested that her students
despite their disabilities were functioning at a higher level and that the
students need a less restrictive environment. Such a transfer would violate the
law (PDMF No. 62.)
-
Following her protestation of the
notice to transfer the students, Ricario threatened to transfer her to San
Pedro which she knew was a great distance from Oguejiofor’s residence in
Stevenson Ranch. (PDMF No. 63.)
-
In May 2019, Oguejiofor received a
positive review in her final evaluation. She was not due for another evaluation
until the 2021-2022 school year. In September 2019, Koontz and Ricario agreed
to conduct another review of Oguejiofor. Koontz set an initial planning
conference for the evaluation for October 10, 2019. Following Oguejiofor’s
protestation, the assessment was canceled. (PMDF No. 64.)
-
While at CTC,
Oguejiofor’s task was different from that of other teachers. She was made to
teach the same students four days a week. While other DOTS teachers would give
about two lessons per year. She was the only DOTS teacher that was barred from
communicating with the teacher coordinator. Although she was not trained to use
the UNIQUE learning system, Oguejiofor was forced to use the system.
Moderate-Severe credentialed teachers are trained to use the system. Oguejiofor
is Mild-Moderate credentialed. The UNIQUE is mandated to be used at CTC. (PMDF
No. 66.)
After review, the only reasonable inference
supported by the evidence is that Plaintiff’s transfer had no connection to her
race or national origin.
In addition
to being a member of a protected class and suffering an adverse employment
action, Plaintiff must show that “some other circumstance suggests
discriminatory motive.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 355.) This
showing must be based upon “the evidence, and cannot be based upon suspicion,
imagination, speculation, surmise, conjecture or guesswork.” (McRae v.
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 377,
389.)
Here, Plaintiff’s
claim is based on an allegation that her August 2019 transfer to Lowman CTC was
based on her race and national origin. To show this, Plaintiff submitted
evidence that the year before, in October 2018, Maria Ricario told her she
could be reassigned to San Pedro. However, even accepting this statement was
made, Plaintiff has submitted no evidence beyond speculation that these
comments were because of her race and/or national origin, or had any connection
to race and/or national origin. Plaintiff acknowledges that she never heard
either Maria Ricario or James Koontz comment about her race or national origin,
or about anyone else who was the same race or national origin as Plaintiff.
(Def’s UMF 59, 60). Moreover, after this conversation in October 2018,
Plaintiff received a positive work review, and was not reassigned to another
school until August 2019 after a complaint was made by another
transition teacher (rather than any Defendant here). Plaintiff was transferred again
in January 2020 due to Plaintiff’s own request not to work under Ricario. Plaintiff
claims that she was nearly subjected to an early performance evaluation
but does not dispute that the evaluation never took place. Moreover, Plaintiff
submits no authority to show that the requirement that Plaintiff use the UNIQUE
learning system, despite lacking training, or the requirement that she teacher
the same students four days week, could amount to an adverse employment action.
More importantly, Plaintiff does not submit any evidence which could
connect these actions to her race or national origin.
While
Plaintiff also alleges that her transfer was connected to her race based on
evidence that another African American teacher was the only other teacher
transferred in August 2019, the Court agrees that this evidence only supports
an inference of correlation not causation. Defendant submitted evidence that
Wendy Carter was reassigned from Canoga Park High School to Hollywood High
School because there was not a transition teacher at Hollywood High School at
the time and because the District felt that she would be a good fit for that
school. (Def’s UMF 31, 32) Accordingly, the District has submitted evidence
that it had a legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for that transfer, and
Plaintiff did not submit any evidence which could show inconsistencies with
that explanation or which could support a reasonable inference that Ms.
Carter’s transfer was connected to her race. Indeed, Plaintiff’s opposition did
not address Ms. Carter at all.
Moreover, the
District has produced evidence of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
its actions. “[I]f nondiscriminatory, [the employer]’s true reasons need not
necessarily have been wise or correct . . . . The ultimate issue is simply
whether the employer acted with a motive to discriminate illegally. Thus,
‘legitimate’ reasons [citation] in this context are reasons that are facially
unrelated to prohibited bias, and which, if true, would thus preclude a finding
of discrimination. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 358)). Even a
“personal grudge” can constitute a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for
an adverse employment decision. (Slatkin v. University of Redlands
(2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157).
Here, Plaintiff alleges she was forcibly
transferred from her worksite. However, Defendant submitted evidence that reassignment
to different sites was not uncommon and even expected for itinerant transition
teachers. Indeed, Plaintiff herself was reassigned to many different schools
before and after her reassignment to LA High School. (Def’s UMF 6, 7, 51).
Moreover,
Plaintiff’s reassignment in August 2019 was precipitated by an incident
involving Plaintiff, wherein Plaintiff was observed as being unprofessional
towards her colleague Joycelyn Young, and, after observing Plaintiff cause Ms.
Young to break down into tears, the District administrators did not believe
that Plaintiff could work with Ms. Young, or any other transition teacher at
Poly High School (which was necessary due to the number of special needs
students at Poly High School). (Def’s UMF 30). Defendant submitted evidence
that Lowman CTC did not have a transition teacher, desperately needed a
transition teacher, and the Lowman principal provided positive feedback about
working with Plaintiff in the past. (Def’s UMF 30)
Similarly,
Plaintiff’s reassignment in August 2020 followed an investigation by Dr. Aaron
Jeffrey (who is himself African American), and was based on Plaintiff’s own
request to be reassigned to a comprehensive high school campus where she would
not be supervised by Ricario. (Def’s UMF 43, 48) LA High was one such high
school with an opening for a transition teacher that accommodated both of
Plaintiff’s requests. (Def’s UMF 48).
Taken
together, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot establish that she suffered an
adverse employment action based on race. Moreover, the Court concludes that Defendant
had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for Plaintiff’s transfers, and
Plaintiff did not submit any evidence which could support a reasonable
inference of pretext. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met her burden to show a
triable issue of material fact exists as to her discrimination claims.
II.
Retaliation
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a
retaliation claim because she cannot establish a causal link between any protected
activity and an adverse employment action.
To
demonstrate retaliation in violation of FEHA, “‘a plaintiff must show (1) he or
she engaged in a “protected activity,” (2) the employer subjected the employee
to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the
employer's action . . . .” (Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 1390, 1408.) Only element (3) is at issue on this motion.5 As with
discrimination, California has adopted the three-stage burden-shifting analysis
of McDonnell Douglas for retaliation. (Morgan v. Regents of
University of California (2000) 88 Cal.App.4th 52, 68.)
Here,
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is based on allegations that on October 23, 2018,
she “made a suggestion in the best interest of her special education students
contrary to what her supervisor wanted done.” (RJN, Exhibit B, Pl’s FAC, ¶ 9) Plaintiff
alleges that in retaliation for she was reassigned from Poly High School to
Lowan CTC in August 2019.
The central
issue is and should remain whether the evidence as a whole supports a reasoned
inference that the challenged action was the product of discriminatory or
retaliatory animus. . . . The employer [is entitled] to summary judgment only
when the employee’s showing . . . is too weak to sustain a reasoned inference
in the employee’s favor.” (Light v.
Department of Parks and Recreation (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 75, 94.)
Here, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff’s evidence does not disclose a triable issue of
material fact.
First, the
Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s comment at the October 23, 2018
meeting is too far removed temporally to Plaintiff’s reassignment in August
2019 and in January 2020 to be causally connected. (See Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc.
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 354 [“To be persuasive evidence, temporal proximity
must be very close”]; see also, Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union
(9th Cir. 2006) 439 F.3d 1018, 1035 [holding that a seven-month gap was too
long to show a causal connection]; Filipovic v. K&R Express (7th
Cir. 1999) 176 F.3d 390, 399 [holding that a four month gap was
counter-evidence of any causal connection].)
The temporal gap in this case (from the
October 2018 meeting to Plaintiff’s August 2019 reassignment to Lowman) is
longer than any of these cases. Moreover, even assuming there was temporal
proximity, Plaintiff cannot rely on temporal proximity alone to overcome the District’s
evidence of legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions. “[T]emporal
proximity […] does not, without more, suffice also to satisfy the secondary
burden borne by the employee[.]” (Loggins v. Kaiser Permanente Internat.
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1112.)
Second, while
Plaintiff filed an EEOC complaint and workplace violence complaint, this took
place in September 2019, after she was had already been assigned in
August 2019. As such, this complaint cannot make the basis of her retaliation claim.
Third, while
Plaintiff argues that she was transferred to an “unhealthy work environment,”
Plaintiff fails to show that assigning Plaintiff to a cold classroom amounts to
an adverse employment action. Moreover, Defendant submitted evidence that after
Plaintiff complained Ricario directed her to move to another room, which
Plaintiff admitted was not too cold and where they could control the
temperature. (Def’s UMF No. 38). Similarly, while Plaintiff contends she was
threatened with “an uncalled for evaluation,” Plaintiff admits that the
evaluation was never completed. (Def’s UMF No. 39.) As such, Plaintiff can
provide no evidence, other than her speculative belief, that such an evaluation
would have been negative had it taken place.
Taken
together, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection
between protected activity and an adverse employment action. Moreover, the
Court finds that Defendant had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for
Plaintiff’s transfers, and Plaintiff did not submit any evidence which could
support an inference of pretext. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met her burden
to show a triable issue of material fact exists as to her retaliation claim.
III.
Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation
Given the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has not
disclosed a triable issue as to her discrimination and retaliation claims, the
Court necessarily concludes that Plaintiff has not disclosed a triable issue as
to her claim for failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation. (Trujillo
v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 289 [“there’s no
logic that says an employee who has not been discriminated against can sue an
employer for not preventing discrimination that didn’t happen . . .”]; Scotch
v. The Art Institute of California-Orange County, Inc. (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 986, 1021 [failure to prevent claim “is dependent on a claim of
actual discrimination”]).
IV.
Conspiracy to
Interfere
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish this
claim because she cannot show there was a conspiracy motivated by invidious
discriminatory animus.
This cause of
action requires: “(1) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are
motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus to (3)
deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to
all, (4) and which results in injury to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of
an overt act committed by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy.
[Citation.]” (Fox v. City of Greensboro (M.D.N.C. 2011) 807 F.Supp.2d
476, 498.)
Moreover, the
law is well-settled that “to prove a section 1985 ‘conspiracy,’ a claimant must
show an agreement or a ‘meeting of the minds’ by defendants to violate the
claimant’s constitutional rights.” (Simmons v. Poe (4th Cir. 1995) 47
F.3d 1370, 1377.)
Here, as set
forth above, the Court concluded that Plaintiff’s evidence fails to support a
reasonable inference that Defendants Koontz or Ricario engaged in any actions
that were “motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory
animus.” Moreover, Defendant’s submitted evidence which established legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for their actions, and Plaintiff’s evidence failed
to support a reasonable inference that those proffered reasons were pretextual.
Plaintiff did
not submit any evidence which could support a reasonable inference other than that
Ms. Young brought a formal complaint against Plaintiff on her own volition
based on the fact that Plaintiff made her feel unwelcome and because she felt
she was in a hostile work environment. (Def’s UMF 26)
In sum, the
Court finds no triable issue of material fact as to this cause of action.
V.
Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)
Defendants argue this claim fails against individuals
Ricario and Koontz because Plaintiff cannot establish that they engaged in
extreme and outrageous conduct.
As set forth above, the Court has found no triable issue
of material fact as to Plaintiff’s discrimination, retaliation, failure to
prevent, or conspiracy claims. Accordingly, the Court finds no reasonable
inference supported by the evidence that Defendants engaged in extreme and
outrageous conduct with the intention of inflicting emotional distress.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is granted.
It is so ordered.
Dated: May
, 2024
Hon. Jon R.
Takasugi
Judge of the
Superior Court
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