Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV13428, Date: 2022-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV13428    Hearing Date: October 17, 2022    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 17

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

MORENA ACOSTA; et al.  

 

         vs.

 

BARNSDALL COURT, LP, et al.

 

 Case No.:  22STCV13428

 

 

 

 Hearing Date: October 17, 2022

 

 

            Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED IN PART, OVERRULED IN PART:

 

-         Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the nuisance cause of action

 

-         Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED as to the IIED cause of action

 

Defendants’ motion to strike is MOOT as to the nuisance causes of action, and DENIED and to the IIED and wrongful eviction causes of action.  

 

            On 4/21/2022, Plaintiffs Morena Acosta, Douglas Acosta, Rebecca Gtierrez, Morena Acosta, and David Gutierrez by and through his guardian Morena Acosta, filed suit against Barnsdall Court, LP and Barker Management, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); (4) negligence; (5) nuisance; and (6) wrongful eviction.

 

            Now, Defendants demur to Plaintiffs’ third and fifth causes of action. Defendants also move to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

 

Discussion

 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged IIED with sufficient specificity, and that their nuisance cause of action is entirely duplicative of the negligence cause of action.

 

            In support of the first contention, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged with sufficient specificity the acts which support this cause of action. However, Plaintiffs allege that throughout their tenancy there were rodents, defective plumbing, dampness, visible mold, and general dilapidation. (Complaint ¶ 17.) Plaintiffs allege that despite repeatedly notifying Defendants of these conditions, Defendants repeatedly failed to remedy the conditions. While Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ allegations at most “amount to simple negligence,” this is a factual determination not properly decided here. As the Court wrote in Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903 , 922:

 

Thus, it is clear that the availability of a remedy for breach of implied warranty of habitability does not preclude a tenant from suing his landlord for intentional infliction of mental distress if the landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress. Whether this is so under the present allegations presents a factual question. It cannot be said as a matter of law that appellant has not stated a cause of action.

           

            As such, the Court concludes at the pleading stage that Plaintiff here has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for IIED.

 

            As for the nuisance claim, Defendants cite El Escorial Owners' Assn. v. DLC Plastering, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337 in support of their contention that California prohibits a nuisance claim arising from the same alleged conduct supporting a negligence claim. There, a homeowner’s association made various claims related to construction defects, including claims for both negligence and nuisance. (Id. at p. 1345.) On appeal, the trial court’s dismissal of the nuisance cause of action was affirmed on the basis that it “was merely a clone of the [negligence] cause of action using a different label.” (Id. at p. 1349.) The court noted that “[W]here negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.” (Ibid.)

 

            Here, Plaintiffs’ negligence and nuisance claims are both premised on a duty owed by Defendants to Plaintiffs to take action to maintain plaintiffs’ apartment in a habitable condition and that Plaintiffs were injured by a breach of that duty (Complaint, ¶ 67, 68, 69, 77, 78, 79). As such, like in El Escorial, the Court finds the nuisance claim to be a “clone of the negligence cause of action using a different label.” (El Escorial, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 1349.)

 

            Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend, as to the nuisance claim, but overruled as to the IIED claim.

 

Motion to Strike

 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a prayer for punitive damages for the IIED, nuisance, and wrongful eviction causes of action.

 

As to nuisance, the Court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to this cause of action without leave to amend. As a result, Defendants’ argument is moot.

 

As to IIED, the Court overruled Defendants’ demurrer given that whether or not Defendants’ conduct, in fact, was extreme and outrageous is a factual determination not properly decided at this stage. Similarly, whether or not Defendants’ eviction of Plaintiffs was performed with malice, oppression, or fraud is a factual determination.

 

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ knowingly allowed conditions dangerous to their health and safety to remain on the property despite repeated requests for help, and wrongfully evicted Plaintiffs. Accepted as true at the pleading stage, these allegations could show Defendants acted with malice, oppression, or fraud.

 

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to strike is moot as to the nuisance causes of action, and denied as to the IIED and wrongful eviction causes of action.  

 

           

 

 It is so ordered.

 

Dated:  October    , 2022

                                                                                                                                                          

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

 

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