Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV17952, Date: 2022-10-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV17952    Hearing Date: October 24, 2022    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Cross-Defendant Devin Arshburn’s demurrer to the XC is SUSTAINED IN PART, OVERRULED IN PART:

-         Cross-Defendant’s demurrer is overruled as to the second cause of action’s allegations concerning TMC as to BPR

-         Cross-Defendant’s demurrer is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend as to the second cause of action’s allegations concerning the separate client and as to Barba’s claim concerning TMC

-         Cross-Defendant’s demurrer is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend, as to the first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action in their entirety.

In light of this ruling, Cross-Defendant’s motion to strike is MOOT.

            On 6/2/2022, Plaintiff Devin Ashburn (Plaintiff) filed suit against BPR Group, LLC (BPR) and Jake Barba (collectively, Defendants), alleging breach of contract.

             On 7/25/2022, BPR and Jake Barba filed a cross-complaint against Devin Ashburn for: (1) breach of contract; (2) interference with contractual relationship; (3) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (4) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage; and (5) slander.

            Now, Cross-Defendant demurrers to the Cross-Complaint. Cross-Defendant also moves to strike portions of the XC.

Discussion

I.                   Breach of Contract

Cross-Defendant argues that Cross-Complainants have failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of contract because they do not allege any contractual provision has been breached.

           The Court agrees. Plaintiff alleges that “Ashburn breached his implied obligations under the Agreement by: interfering with BPR’s business; making slanderous statements about BPR and Barba to BPR clients; making slanderous statements about BPR and Barba to TMC and its members; attempting to and successfully interfering with BPR’s lease and Barba’s membership with TMC; interfering with the sale of a separate car which was provided on loan to Ashburn to a different BPR client; and attempting to have the police baselessly retrieve the vehicle which was being built.” (XC ¶ 46.) However, the fact that these alleged acts took place while there was a contract in place does not transform these acts into breaches of contract. To state a claim for breach of contract, Cross-Complainant must allege that Cross-Defendant breached an express term of the contract. Cross-Complainant has not alleged any facts which could show that the Build Agreement contained these terms.

           Based on the foregoing, Cross-Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend.

II.                Interference with Contractual Relationship

Cross-Defendant argues that Cross-Complainants have failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for this cause of action.

“The elements which a plaintiff must plead to state the cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations are: (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126 (1990).

Here, Cross-Complainants allege interference with two different relationships: (1) their contractual relationship with TMC and (2) their relationship with a BPR client.

As for the contract with TMC, Cross-Complaints allege that: (1) BPR had a lease with TMC which provided for BPR to maintain an office at TMC. Barba was likewise a member of TMC and spent a significant amount of his time at the office at TMC.; (2) Ashburn was aware of this lease; (3) Ashburn purposefully interfered with BPR’s lease, by making numerous heinous and utterly false statements concerning BPR and Barba’s integrity to the president of TMC and numerous members of TMC.; and (4) as a result of this interference, BPR lost its lease with TMC, Barba lost his membership in TMC, and Cross-Complainants have suffered damages.

As for the contract with the BPR client, Cross-Complainants allege that: (1) BPR had a separate contractual agreement to sell another one-of-a-kind custom car to a separate BPR client; (2) With said client’s authorization, Ashburn was provided with said car on loan; (3) Ashburn failed to return said vehicle for sometime and interfered with the sale of said car; (4) Additionally, Ashburn contacted said client and his family and made numerous heinous and utterly fabricated statements concerning Cross-Complainants; (5) As a direct and proximate result of the actions taken by Ashburn, Cross-Complainants have suffered damages in an amount according to proof at trial.

The Court agrees and disagrees in part with Cross-Defendants.

The allegations concerning TMC are sufficient for BPR to state a claim for interference with a contractual relationship (though the Court agrees that Barba has not, given that he does not allege he was a party to the contract). Contrary to Cross-Defendants’ contentions, Cross-Complainants allege a binding contractual agreement and allege that they were deprived the benefits of that agreement after Cross-Defendants made numerous false statements concerning BPR and Barba’s integrity to the president and members of TMC. Given that this cause of action is not subject to heightened pleading standards, these allegations, accepted as true at the pleading stage, are sufficient.

However, the Court agrees that the allegations regarding the separate BPR client are insufficient. While Cross-Complainants allege they had a contract with a separate client and that they suffered damages as a “result of the actions taken by Ashburn,” they do not allege what form of damages they suffered. As a result, Cross-Complainants have not alleged facts which could show an actual breach or disruption of this contract based on Cross-Defendants ‘alleged statements to the client.

           Based on the foregoing, Cross-Defendants’ demurrer to the second cause of action is overruled as to the TMC allegations, and sustained, with 15 days leave to amend, as to the separate BPR client allegations.

III.            Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage has five elements: (1) the existence, between the plaintiff and some third party, of an economic relationship that contains the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentionally wrongful acts designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s action. Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. Am. Asphalt S., Inc., 2 Cal. 5th 505, 512 (2017).

Cross-Defendants argue that Cross-Complainant fails to sufficiently plead that Ashburn intentionally engaged in an independent wrongful act designed to disrupt an economic relationship belonging to Cross-Complainants. In support, they cite Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 376, 393, holding that “[A] plaintiff seeking to recover for an alleged interference with prospective contractual or economic relations must plead and prove … that the defendant … engaged in conduct that was wrongful by some legal measure other than the fact of interference itself.”

Here, Cross-Complainants allege that Cross-Defendants “interfered with Cross-Complainants’ prospective economic relationships by reaching out to the president of TMC, various members of TMC and clients of BPR,” made “heinous and entirely fabricated statements concerning Cross-Complainants” and intentionally interfered with the prospective business and economic opportunities which were presented to Cross-Complainants….” (XC ¶¶ 62-63)

Given that Cross-Complainants do not allege any specific statements made by Cross-Defendants that could show slander, the Court agrees that, as alleged, Cross-Complainants have not allege any wrongful conduct other than the fact of interference itself.

           Based on the foregoing, Cross-Defendants’ demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend.

IV.             Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

Cross-Complainants’ fourth cause of action relies on the same allegations used to support their third cause of action. For the same reasons, the Court finds those allegations insufficient to state a claim for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.

           Based on the foregoing, Cross-Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend.

V.                Slander

The tort of defamation “involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal. 4th 683, 720)

“The general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.” (Gilbert v. Sykes (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 13, 31.)

Here, as noted by Cross-Defendant, Cross-Complainants do not identify any statement allegedly made by Ashburn. Rather, Cross-Complainants merely allege in a conclusory fashion that they made “numerous egregious, slanderous and readily false statements regarding BPR and Barba, the validity of the BPR business and the integrity of Barba.” (XC ¶ 31.) Such allegations are insufficient to state a claim for slander.

Based on the foregoing, Cross-Defendants’ demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained, with 15 days leave to amend.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  October    , 2022

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

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