Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV19099, Date: 2023-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV19099    Hearing Date: April 17, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

            Defendant’s demurrer to the FAC is SUSTAINED, WITH 20 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to strike is MOOT.

On 6/10/2022, Plaintiff Naiisha Y. Foster (Plaintiff) initiated this suit against Stephanie Wilson. On 12/20/2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) alleging: (1) breach of contract/breach of quiet enjoyment/warranty of habitability; (2) tortious breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (3) negligence; (4) private nuisance; (5) fraud; (6) unfair business practices; and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

            Now, Defendant demurs to the FAC in its entirety. Defendant also moves to strike portions of the FAC.

Discussion

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for each of her nine causes of action.

            As to the first cause of action, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has improperly consolidated three distinct causes of action into one. In anticipation of further motion practice, the Court notes that the Statute of Frauds requires that an interest in property for leases exceeding one year must be in writing, or qualify for an exception. (Bed Bath and Beyond of La Jolla, Inc. v. La Jolla Village Square Venture Partners (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 867, 874.) Here, it is unclear from the pleadings if Plaintiff alleges a month-to-month rental agreement or an agreement of over a year. Assuming the lease was to rent the property for a time exceeding one year, it is covered by the statute of frauds. However, if it was a month-to-month agreement it could have been possibly performed in full in under a year and thus would not be subject to the Statute of Frauds. Plaintiff must allege facts which address this uncertainty. Given that the warranty of habitability and covenant of quiet enjoyment claims are derivative of the breach of contract cause of action, they necessary fail as a result of the FAC’s uncertainty. However, assuming Plaintiff can allege a valid lease, Plaintiff’s allegations for the breach of the warranty of habitability and covenant of quiet enjoyment are sufficient at the pleadings stage to state a claim (though they must be alleged as distinct causes of action). While Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged that Plaintiff did not know about the defect at the time of occupancy, or allege that Defendant knew of the defect and failed to address it in a reasonable time, Plaintiff’s FAC clearly does contain such allegations. By just one way of example, Plaintiff alleges that:

 The Subject Property was the subject of a severe and persistent spider and termite infestation that caused Plaintiff to inhale and ingest dead termite body parts, termite feces, termite urine and allergens. Spiders invaded Plaintiff's living area, appliances, furniture, and continuously crawled on and bit Plaintiff according to proof. The infestation at the Subject Property caused Plaintiff bodily injury, emotional distress and property damage. Defendants knew that the Subject Property was infested with spiders and termites yet did nothing to legitimately abate this obvious and serious health threat. Defendants intentionally and/or negligently failed to properly abate and eradicate the infestation at the Property to save money and increase Defendants' cash flow and net income from Defendants' operation and management of the Subject Property.

            (FAC ¶ 20.)

            The Court accepts-well pled allegations at the pleading stage. As such, assuming Plaintiff can resolve the uncertainties in the FAC and show a valid lease existed, these allegations will be sufficient to show a breach of implied warranty of habitability and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.  

            As to the second cause of action, it derives from an underlying landlord-tenant relationship. As such, the uncertainty over whether or not Plaintiff has a valid lease renders this claim uncertain as well. However, assuming Plaintiff is able to allege sufficient facts to show a valid lease agreement exists,  Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support this cause of action. Plaintiff alleges that there was a spider and termite issue which invaded Plaintiff’s living area and caused her bodily injury. (See Complaint ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges that she notified Defendant of the need for pest treatment, yet the infestation continued unabated. (See Complaint ¶ 21.) These allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to support the second cause of action.

As for the third cause of action, this cause of action is duplicative. Plaintiff has not identified any duty owed to Plaintiff that is distinct from the duties already embraced by the first and second causes of action.

As for the fourth cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged facts which could show private nuisance, nor does Plaintiff allege facts which could show that Defendant participated in the creation of the nuisance. In support, Defendant cites City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Superior Court (2004) 119 Cal. App. 4th 28, 38: “liability for nuisance does not hinge on whether the defendant owns, possesses or controls the property, nor on whether he is in a position to abate the nuisance; the critical question is whether the defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.” The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has not alleged facts which could show that Defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance. The only facts alleged which could show Defendant created or assisted in the nuisance was the shutting off of internet services which Plaintiff alleges interfered with her ability to watch entertainment on her tv. However, Plaintiff has not shown that this rises to the level of an actionable nuisance.

            As to the fifth cause of action, Defendant argues that this claim fails for the same reasons as the preceding claims. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knowingly misrepresented that the unit was a legal rental unit, that the unit lacked permits, and that she was harmed as a result. At the pleading stage, this is sufficient to state a claim for fraud. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)

As for the sixth cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts which could show reasonable reliance and harm. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that she relied upon Defendant’s representations about the condition of the house and about foster care rules in making her decision to move into the house. The fact that Plaintiff vacated the unit due to the unknown, unabated conditions is sufficient to show harm.

As for the seventh cause of action, abandonment of premises by the tenant within a reasonable time after the wrongful act of the landlord is essential to enable the tenant to claim a constructive eviction. (Veysey v. Moriyama (1921) 184 Cal. 802, 805.) Here, Plaintiff alleges that the conditions were such that she “could not continue living at the Subject Property” and that she was “constructively evicted” but does not actually allege that she ever actually abandoned the premises. Given this uncertainty as to whether or not Plaintiff vacated the premises, she has failed to allege facts which could show constructive eviction.

As for the eighth cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts which could show extreme and outrageous conduct. However, Plaintiff alleges that there was a pest infestation so severe she was forced to move out and suffered bodily injury. This is sufficient at the pleading stage to state a claim for IIED.

Given the uncertainty as to whether or not a valid lease agreement exists, and given that all causes of action stem from the lease and tenant-landlord relationship,  the Court must sustain Defendant’s demurrer as to all causes of action. The analysis provided as to the sufficiency of each cause of action is only provided as a guide for future motion practice in the event Plaintiff is able to allege facts to show a valid and enforceable lease agreement exists.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained, with 20 days leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

            Defendant argues Plaintiff has not alleged facts which could support a prayer for punitive damages. As set forth above, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer, with leave to amend, as to all causes of action. Accordingly, this motion is moot. However, in anticipation of future motion practice, the Court notes that it did conclude that Plaintiff had likely alleged fraud with sufficient facts to state claim if she could allege sufficient facts to show a valid and enforceable lease agreement existed.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to strike is moot.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  April    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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