Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV20384, Date: 2023-10-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV20384    Hearing Date: February 20, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action is DENIED.

On 6/22/2022, Plaintiff Jennifer Montzingo (Plaintiff) filed suit against Ai Ai Leung, Patrick Lau, and AP Development, LTD (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) housing discrimination; (2) violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act; (3) general negligence; (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (6) violation of privacy; (7) unlawful entry into dwelling; (8) unlawful termination of utility by landlord; (9) unlawful obstruction of access to property; and (10) breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. 

            On 12/08/2023, Plaintiff moved for summary adjudication of her seventh cause of action.

Discussion  

            Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to summary adjudication of her claim for unlawful entry into dwelling.

      Civil Code section 1954 provides:

 A landlord may enter the dwelling unit only in the following cases:

(1) In case of emergency.

(2) To make necessary or agreed repairs, decorations, alterations or improvements, supply necessary or agreed services, or exhibit the dwelling unit to prospective or actual purchasers, mortgagees, tenants, workers, or contractors or to make an inspection pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1950.5.

(3) When the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the premises.

(4) Pursuant to court order.

                  …

(b) Except in cases of emergency or when the tenant has abandoned or surrendered the premises, entry may not be made during other than normal business hours unless the tenant consents to an entry during other than normal business hours at the time of entry.

(c) The landlord may not abuse the right of access or use it to harass the tenant.

(d) (1) Except as provided in subdivision (e), or as provided in paragraph (2) or (3), the landlord shall give the tenant reasonable notice in writing of his or her intent to enter and enter only during normal business hours. The notice shall include the date, approximate time, and purpose of the entry. The notice may be personally delivered to the tenant, left with someone of a suitable age and discretion at the premises, or, left on, near, or under the usual entry door of the premises in a manner in which a reasonable person would discover the notice. Twenty-four hours shall be presumed to be reasonable notice in absence of evidence to the contrary. The notice may be mailed to the tenant. Mailing of the notice at least six days prior to an intended entry is presumed reasonable notice in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

(3) The tenant and the landlord may agree orally to an entry to make agreed repairs or supply agreed services. The agreement shall include the date and approximate time of the entry, which shall be within one week of the agreement. In this case, the landlord is not required to provide the tenant a written notice.

As used in Civil Code section 1954, “normal business hours” means objectively reasonable hours under the facts and circumstances of the case, keeping in mind the right of tenants to quiet enjoyment and the right of landlords to sell their property (Dromy v. Lukovsky (2013) 219 CA4th 278, 286.)

In support, Plaintiff submitted evidence that:

-         Plaintiff occupied a rental property owned by Defendant from 1/3/2020-9/30/2020. (SS ¶¶ 1.)

-         Plaintiff rented one bedroom at the Property. The Property contained three other bedrooms, one of which was already rented out to another tenant when Plaintiff moved in, and the other two bedrooms of which were held out to the public to be available for rent. (SS ¶ 4.)

-         Plaintiff paid rent ($1,900 for the months of January, February and March 2020), but became unable to pay rent beginning in April 2020. (SS ¶ 7.)

-         Over the course of Plaintiff’s occupancy, she shared the Property with two other housemates who each rented their own separate rooms from Defendant Leung. Plaintiff was never on a lease agreement as a co-tenant with any other housemates, as each tenant had their own agreement at different rental rates per room. (Ibid.)

-         Defendant Leung entered the property twenty-six times in violation of Civil Code section 1954. (SS ¶¶ 12-48.)

-         Plaintiff repeatedly advised Defendant of Plaintiff’s right to receive reasonable notice of Defendant’s intention to enter during normal business hours. (Ibid.)

Plaintiff’s evidence supports a reasonable inference that Defendant Leung repeatedly violated Civil Code section 1954. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Defendants to disclose a triable issue of material fact.

In opposition, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s “dwelling” within the meaning of Civil Code section 1954 was only her room, and does not cover the scope of the common areas of the house.

The Court rejects this interpretation of section 1954 for several reasons. First, the only legal support provided by Defendant in support is Chun v. Del Cid (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 806, 81. However, that cases did not in any way address section 1954. Rather, that case addressed whether a single-family residence fell within the single-family dwelling exemption to the Rent Stabilization Ordinance of the City of Los Angeles (L.A. Mun. Code, §151.00 et seq.)

Moreover, the language of Civil Code section 1954 itself indicates that applies to the entirety of the subject property: “a structure or part of a structure used as a home, residence, or sleeping by one person who maintains a household or by two or more persons who maintain a common household” (Civ. Code §§ 1940; 1954, emphasis added). Defendant has not offered any persuasive argument as to why Plaintiff’s home or residence would be limited to the place where she slept, and would not include spaces such as a kitchen or bathroom. Under Defendant’s interpretation, a landlord would not need to notify a tenant if they intended to enter to repair the kitchen or the bathroom at any time and for any duration of time, but would have to give advanced notice if they intended to enter Plaintiff’s bedroom.

Having concluded that Section 1954 applied to the entire Rental Property, the only question remaining is whether or not there is a triable issue of fact as to whether or not Defendants’ entries to the property were lawful.

      The Court concludes that there are triable issues as this claim. Defendants submitted evidence that certain repairs were requested by Plaintiff herself. For example, Defendants submitted evidence that:

LAU and LEUNG were asked by Plaintiff to fix the locks and front door keypad. (UMF No. 12). Plaintiff asked them to change the refrigerator filter. (UMF No. 14). Plaintiff needed help accessing the shared WiFI. (UMF No. 18). Plaintiff requested that LEUNG intervene with a dispute over Ramin Rouhani. (UMF No. 19).

            (Opp., 14: 14-17.)

            Defendants also submitted evidence that on certain instances other tenants consented to their entry, or expressly requested their presence. (SS ¶¶ 31, 33, 35, and 36.)

            Given that no notice of entry is required under Section 1954 where a tenant is present and consents to the entry, or where there has been an oral agreement to make repairs, there are triable issues as to whether or not the alleged 26 unlawful entries were all in violation of section 1954. Moreover, given that the quantity of unlawful entries is relevant to Plaintiff’s prayer of punitive damages and emotional distress damages, such triable issues prevent adjudication here.

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for summary adjudication of the seventh cause of action is denied.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  February    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.