Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV35324, Date: 2023-08-23 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV35324    Hearing Date: March 7, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to her Form Interrogatories is GRANTED.  Amended responses are due within 10 days.  The Court declines to award sanctions as part of this motion.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to her RFPs is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART, consistent with the ruling set forth below. Accordingly, the Court declines to award sanctions as part of this motion.

On 11/4/2022, Plaintiff Jane Doe C.J. filed suit against Doe #1 (a public entity) and Doe #2 alleging personal injuries and damages from childhood sexual abuse.

            On 10/10/2023, Plaintiff moves to compel further responses From Defendant to her Form Interrogatories and her Requests for Production (RFPs). For ease, the Court has consolidated its analysis into a single ruling.

Discussion

I.                   Form Interrogatories

Plaintiff argues that good cause exists to compel Defendant to submit further responses to Form Interrogatory No. 4.1.

Form Interrogatory No. 4.1 requests:

At the time of the INCIDENT, was there in effect any policy of insurance through which you were or might be insured in any manner (for example, primary, pro-rata, or excess liability coverage or medical expense coverage) for the damages, claims, or actions that have arisen out of the INCIDENT? If so, for each policy state:

(a) the kind of coverage;

(b) the name and ADDRESS of the insurance company;

(c) the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of each named insured;

(d) the policy number;

(e) the limits of coverage for each type of coverage contained in the policy;

(f) whether any reservation of rights or controversy or coverage dispute exists between you and the insurance company; and

(g) the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the custodian of the policy.

                        Defendant provided the following response:

Responding Party, a municipality, runs a self-insured risk management program which has excess coverage pursuant to Government Code Section 990.

            The Court agrees that Defendant’s response is clearly incomplete, and the information is discoverable. (See CCP § 2017.210.)

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further response from Defendant to her Form Interrogatories is granted.  The Court declines to award sanctions.

II.               RFPs

Plaintiff argues that good cause exists to compel Defendant to submit further responses to RFP Nos. 11-11, 15-28, 31, 33-45, 47, 50, and 51.

After review, the Court agrees in part.

RFP Nos. 1-11,15-25, 31, 33-36, 47, 50 and 51 pertain to Defendant Chester William’s employment and personnel records. More specifically:

RFP No. 1 requests Williams’s personnel file. Plaintiff requested other documents related to Williams’s employment, which may or may not be contained in a personnel file: No. 2 (employment docs); No. 3 (informal / confidential personnel files); No. 4 (background screenings); No. 5 (complaints during employment); No. 6 (complaints regardless of date); No. 7 (responses to complaints re: Williams); No. 8 (investigations of misconduct); No. 9 (employment status); No. 10 (docs to/from CCTC); No. 11 (CCTC investigations); No. 15 (Williams’s statements); No. 16 (criminal investigative reports); No. 17 (performance reviews); No. 18 (student complaints); No. 19 (complaints by students’ parents); No. 20 (mandated reporter training); No. 21 (training harassment / misconduct); No. 22 (warnings); No. 23 (board meetings); No. 24 (disciplinary action); No. 25 (student teacher evaluations); No. 31 (investigative reports by agencies); No. 33 (docs to law enforcement); No. 35 (statements by admin / teachers); No. 36 (statements by students); No. 47 (correspondence w/ Williams re: sexual misconduct); No. 50 (meetings re: complaints); and No. 51 (meetings with Plaintiff’s parents re: Williams).

            In opposition, Defendant objects to these requests, citing Defendant’s privacy rights. Public employees have a legally protected right of privacy in their personnel files and the information contained therein. (Teamsters Local 856 v. Priceless, LLC (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1512.)

            However, “a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad” and statutes governing discovery “must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure . . . .” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541; quoting Greyhound Corporation v. Superior Court (1961) 58 Cal.2d 355, 377.) Moreover, a public employee’s right to privacy is not inviolable, and may be intruded upon where a compelling need and appropriate tailoring has been shown. (Teamsters, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1514.)

Here, William’s personnel file is central to Plaintiff’s sexual abuse case which alleges that the District “knew or should have known of the dangerous propensities of the employee who injured plaintiff” or that the District did not take “reasonable measures to guard pupils against harassment and abuse from foreseeable sources.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist. (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 861, 871, 878.) Indeed, as noted by Plaintiff, “[t]here is no better evidence than Williams’s personnel file, including but not limited to information pertaining to background checks performed on him, complaints made against him, or the District’s investigations into him, for Plaintiff to prove that the District was negligent in this regard.” (Motion, 5: 18-21.) As such, Plaintiff’s interest in the file outweighs the privacy interest at stake here. The Court finds William’s personnel file is discoverable, though the Court does grant Defendant’s request that it be produced subject to a Protective Order.

Moreover, in opposition, Defendant agreed to provide further responses to RFP Nos. 39 and 43, as for the years 1987 and 1988. The Court agrees this production reflects an appropriate temporal scope. This leaves only Defendant’s arguments as to: (1) RFP Nos. 26, 27,28,37, 38; (2) RFP Nos. 40-42; (3) RFP No. 44; and (4) RFP Nos. 45-46.

As to RFP Nos. 26, 27, 28, 37, 38, Defendant argues that “[t]he District has conducted a diligent search and reasonable inquiry in an effort to comply, but have been unable to locate Plaintiff C.J.’s records. This is what the responses set forth. Accordingly, it is unclear what more Plaintiff wants. Plaintiff may not like Defendant’s response, but Defendant submits that its response is proper and code-compliant.” (Opp., 5: 2-5.)  The Court agrees that Defendant’s response is sufficient.

As to RFP Nos. 40-42, Defendant argues that these requests are overbroad:

-         Request No. 40 seeks, “Any and all employee rosters or similar WRITINGS which contain, set forth, list, or identify the names of administrators, teachers, coaches, employees, and/or staff assigned to the SCHOOL 1982 through 1993.”

-         Request No. 41 seeks “Any and all DOCUMENTS showing the identity of YOUR superintendents during the TIME PERIOD.” The TIME PERIOD is defined as January 1, 1982 through December 31, 1993.

-         Request No. 42 seeks “All DOCUMENTS identifying CHESTER WILLIAM’s supervisors and/or superiors between 1982 through 1993, inclusive.”

The Court agrees. As for Request No. 40, this seeks each and every document, without limitation, for 11 years (which actually encompasses 13 school years [1981-1982 through 1993-1994] that contains the name of a teacher, administrator, coach, employee or staff member. Not only is such a request overly burdensome, but it is also overly broad given that the alleged conduct took place in either 1987 or 1988.

As for Request No. 41, the scope of this request is so broad that “thousands (possibly millions) of potential documents come within the purview of the request.” (Opp., 5: 21-23.) For example, any correspondence District-wide identifying the superintendent from 1982 and 1993 would fall within this request. The Court limits the scope to the years of 1987 and 1988 and directs the party to meet and confer as to an appropriate scope of documents narrower than “all” documents.

As for Request No.42, the scope of this request is so broad that it would require production of all documents for an 11-year period which named any individual who was higher in LAUSD’s chain of command above a teacher level. The Court accepts Defendant’s proposed scope of this request which limits it to Principals and/or Assistant Principals (i.e., administrators) for the years of 1987 and 1988.

As for Request No.44, this seeks “[a] copy of each school yearbook for the SCHOOL from 1982 through 1993.” In response, Defendant indicated that they do not have school yearbooks from 1982 to 1993. Plaintiff contends that this response is silent as to whether the yearbooks were “destroyed, lost, etc.” Defendant is to supplement its response to make it as complete as possible.

Finally, as for Request Nos. 45-46, Request No. 45 requires reporting misconduct and No. 46 concerns employee handbooks. Defendant produced bate-stamped documentation in response. The Court finds the responses to be code-compliant.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to her RFPs is granted in part, denied in part, consistent with the ruling set forth above. Accordingly, the Court declines to award sanctions at this time.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  March    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.