Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV36359, Date: 2023-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV36359    Hearing Date: March 25, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

            Defendant Yassine Amallal’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

            Background:

            On June 5, 2023, Plaintiff Christopher Dixon filed suit against 26 Center Distribution, LLC dba “Dura Trucking” (“26 Center”), Simon Bouzaglou, and Yassine Amallal, alleging: (1) whistleblower retaliation; (2) wrongful termination; (3) non-payment of earned wages; (4) failure to reimburse business expenses; (5) failure to pay overtime wages; (6) failure to provide duty-free meal periods; (7) failure to provide duty free rest periods; (8) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (9) deficient pay penalties; and (10) waiting time penalties.

            Amallal moved for summary judgment on the grounds that he was not Plaintiff’s employer as a matter of law and could not be held liable as an “other person acting on behalf of an employer.” On November 22, 2023, the Court denied Amallal’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court found that there “is a triable issue as to whether [Amallal] exercised sufficient oversight or influence over 26 Center’s operations or policy as to have risen to the level of an ‘other person acting on behalf of an employer.’ There is also a triable issue of material fact as to whether or not he exercised adequate discretion and authority to be said to have acted as a managing agent.” (11-22-2023 Minute Order, p. 7.)

            Party’s Request:

            Defendant Amallal moves for reconsideration of the Court’s November 22, 2023 order denying Amallal’s motion for summary judgment. 

Legal Standard

            Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 provides, in pertinent part:¿¿¿¿ 

¿¿¿ 

            “(a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make an application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.¿¿¿ 

¿¿ 

            (e)¿This section specifies the court’s jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.”¿¿¿ 

            Additionally, if a court believes one of its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should be able to correct that error no matter how it came to acquire that belief. (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108) (see also, In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303–04 [The “trial court’s inherent authority to correct its errors applies even when the trial court was prompted to reconsider its prior ruling by a motion filed in violation of section 1008.”].)

Discussion

            Defendant Amallal seeks reconsideration of the November 22, 2023 Order denying his motion for summary judgment.

            Amallal contends that the Court incorrectly determined there was a genuine dispute as to whether he was a “managing agent” of Defendant 26 Center. Amallal contends that to be a managing agent, an individual must be an employee of the entity in question. Amallal contends that the Court found that he met his burden of proving he was not an employee of 26 Center, yet nevertheless found that a genuine dispute of fact still existed as to whether he was a managing agent.

            In opposition, Plaintiff contends that reconsideration is not merited on procedural grounds. Plaintiff contends Amallal simply seeks a different interpretation of the law than what the Court determined on November 22, 2023. Plaintiff also contends that Amallal fails to state new facts, circumstances, or law and by doing so fails to meet the jurisdictional requirements for a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff also contends Amallal fails to include a declaration showing reasonable diligence by providing a satisfactory explanation for not presenting the new or different information at the first hearing. Substantively, Plaintiff contends reconsideration is not merited because, as the Court determined on November 22, 2023, Plaintiff did submit evidence creating a triable issue of material fact as to whether Amallal was an employee of 26 Center because he exercised control over wages and hours.

            In reply, on the procedural issue, Amallal contends that Plaintiff fails to acknowledge the precedent of In re Marriage of Barthold, where the California Supreme Court held that “the trial court’s inherent authority to correct its errors applies even when the trial court was prompted to reconsider its prior ruling by a motion filed in violation of section 1008.” (In re Marriage of Barthold (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1303-04.) Amallal further contends that, at a hearing on January 17, 2024, the Court indicated its willingness to reconsider this matter based on Amallal’s motion. (Lauritsen Decl., ¶ 2, Ex. A at 12-13.)

            The Court will Consider the Motion for Reconsideration

            Procedurally, the Court finds that it may properly consider Amallal’s motion for reconsideration based on the Court’s inherent authority to correct erroneous rulings, pursuant to Barthold and Le Francois, supra.

            The Motion for Reconsideration is Denied

            Substantively, the Court finds that there are insufficient grounds to reconsider or alter its denial of Amallal’s motion for summary judgment on November 22, 2023.

            Labor Code section 558.1 which was enacted in January of 2016, provides: 

•    Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any provision regulating minimum wages or hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, or violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7, 1193.6, 1194, or 2802, may be held liable as the employer for such violation. 

•    For purposes of this section, the term “other person acting on behalf of an employer” is limited to a natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the employer, and the term “managing agent” has the same meaning as in subdivision (b) of Section 3294 of the Civil Code.

•    Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the definition of employer under existing law. 

            Civil Code section 3294(b) provides: “(b) An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”            

            Amallal relies on the Supreme Court of California case, White v. Ultramar, Inc., which held that “the Legislature intended the term ‘managing agent’ to include only those corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decision making so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 567.) Amallal contends this means that the definition of “managing agent” has two elements: (1) the person charged must be a “corporate employee”; and (2) the person’s decisions must determine corporate policy. Amallal contends there is no genuine dispute as to the first element.

            Amallal contends that in his attempt to create a triable issue of material fact, Plaintiff provided no evidence to rebut Amallal’s evidence that Amallal was never employed by 26 Center. Amallal contends that while he submitted evidence that he did not sign Plaintiff’s checks, was not a signatory on the 26 Center bank accounts, did not hire or fire Plaintiff, and had no apparent role in the determination of Plaintiff’s work schedule or pay rate, Plaintiff merely asserted vague generalities that do not rise to the level of evidence, such as that Amallal was referred to as a “partner” or “jefe”.

            The Court disagrees with Amallal regarding his characterization of Plaintiff’s evidence as vague generalities. Plaintiff submitted evidence that Defendant not only approved the policy of misclassifying Plaintiff as an independent contractor, but attempted to convince Plaintiff to accept being an independent contractor on multiple occasions and refused to give Plaintiff his most recent paycheck unless he signed a release of his claims for unpaid wages and expense reimbursement per Plaintiffs rights as an employee in California. (Dixon Decl. to MSJ, ¶¶ 8-13.) Plaintiff submitted emails from employees like his supervisor at 26 Center who specifically asked Amallal to approve Plaintiff’s payment of wages at different times throughout his employment, and evidence that Amallal provided advice, support, and oversight for 26 Center when he was meeting with Plaintiff to attempt to influence Plaintiff into accepting his classification as an independent contractor and release his claims against 26 Center, Bouzaglou, Pixior, Amallal and Amallal’s other companies. (Dixon Decl. to MSJ, ¶ 13; Exhibits 4, 5, 23, and 24; Exhibit 8: Amallal Depo., 126:18-24.)

            To employ “means: (a) to exercise control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment relationship.” (Martinez v. Combs (2010) 49 Cal.4th 35, 64.) Plaintiff’s evidence discussed above demonstrates that Amallal excercised control over the wages, hours or working conditions of Plaintiff. Thus, by the very authority Amallal relies on in its motion, Plaintiff creates a triable issue of fact as to whether or not Amallal was an employee. As the Court determined in the November 22, 2023 order, this evidence supports a reasonable influence that Amallal was a corporate employee of 26 Center, and, thus, a triable issue of material fact as to whether Amallal was a managing agent. 

            Accordingly, Defendant Amallal’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

Dated:  March 25, 2024

Hon. Jon R. Takasugi

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.