Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV37821, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV37821    Hearing Date: January 28, 2025    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 17

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

SYLVIA GATES CARLISLE

 

         vs.

 

BEAVER MEDICAL GROUP, P.C., et al.

 

 Case No.:  22STCV37821

 

 

 

 Hearing Date: January 28, 2025

 

Plaintiff’s motion to quash is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART. The Requests are narrowed to January 1, 2020, to present. At this time, requests related to billing records (Request Nos. 6, 7), and notes/recording/videos from sessions (Request No. 5) are quashed.

 

On 12/5/2022, Plaintiff Sylvia Gates Carlisle (Plaintiff) filed suit against Beaver Medical Group, P.C., Optum, Inc., UnitedHealth Group, Inc., Epic Management Services, LLC, and Raymond Chan (collectively Defendants). On 1/30/2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) alleging: (1) whistleblower retaliation; (2) race discrimination; (3) gender discrimination; (4) failure to prevent and/or remedy harassment, discrimination, or retaliation; (5) retaliation; (6) defamation; (7) adverse actions in violation of public policy; (8) wage theft; (9) failure to pay all wages due at termination; (10) breach of contract; and (11) violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200.

 

            On 12/13/2024, Plaintiff moved to quash Defendants’ record subpoena directed to Eugenia Foster. 

 

Discussion

 

            Plaintiff seeks to quash or modify the subpoena issued by Defendants to Plaintiff’s therapist, Eugenia Foster, for production of personal medical records of Plaintiff.

 

            Plaintiff argues that the requests are overbroad and invasive with respect to their time period and the documents requested, and Defendants have provided no compelling need for such an extensive violation of Plaintiff’s right to medical privacy.

 

            After review, the Court agrees in part and disagrees in part.

 

            Defendants’ requests seek records from January 1, 2017 to present, and contain no limitations or narrowing on the type of emotional injuries being targeted by the request.

 

            First, as to the temporal scope, Defendants agreed to modify their subpoena to limit it to records from January 1, 2020, to present. Plaintiff contends this is still overbroad as Plaintiff only began treatment for emotional injuries caused by Defendants in 2021. However, Defendants are entitled to see records prior to the alleged emotional injuries, so that they are able to discern whether or not the alleged emotional injuries can be linked to other, preexisting causes.

 

            In support, Defendants cite cases like Vinson v Superior (1987) Court, 43 Cal.3d 833, 842. As the California Supreme Court explained there, medical records revealing alternative causes of stress other than those alleged by a plaintiff are relevant to mental distress claims. (Because plaintiff alleged a “causal link between her mental distress and defendants’ conduct, plaintiff implicitly claims . . . it was not caused by a preexisting mental condition, thereby raising the question of alternative sources of distress.”).

 

            The Court agrees with Defendants that they are entitled to explore alternative sources of distress. However, the Court also agrees that a claim of emotional distress does not allow the defendant employer to engage in a “fishing expedition” seeking all other potential stressors in a plaintiff’s life. This was confirmed in Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1379. In Tylo, the employer defendant argued “that because [the plaintiff] is seeking emotional distress damages in her suit, they have a right to discover ‘other stressors that might have caused or contributed to [the plaintiff’s] alleged emotional injuries.’” (Id. at 1386 (italics in original).) The Court disagreed and refused to allow the employer to inquire into the nature of plaintiff’s marital relationship and her husband’s medical history (which were alleged alternative sources of distress). (Id. at 1388.) It reasoned that because the plaintiff “has tendered her psychological condition in this litigation only as it relates to termination of the employment contract...discovery is limited to those injuries resulting from termination of the contract.” (Id.) The Tylo court continued: “Before the [defendant] can obtain information regarding emotional distress from the marital relationship, [it] must first identify the specific emotional injuries which [plaintiff] claims resulted from termination of the contract and then demonstrate there is a nexus between damages from termination and those which may arise out of the marital relationship.” (Id.) In short, Tylo held that a defendant’s unsubstantiated claim of “alternative stressors” does not entitle it to invade the depths of a plaintiff’s private life by a fishing expedition that might turn up some information that may help the employer in the case.

 

            As applied here then, the Court must find a way to balance Defendants’ right to explore alternative stressors, with Plaintiff’s right not to have her personal medical history excavated as a fishing expedition for alternative stressors. It is unclear how Defendants could identify specific alternative stressors without discovery predating Plaintiff’s treatment for injuries allegedly caused by Defendants. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges broad emotional distress “Plaintiff has suffered injury to her personal, business and professional reputation including suffering embarrassment, humiliation, severe emotional distress, anguish, fear, suspension, announcement of her termination, termination, harm to her employability, and significant economic loss in the form of lost wages and future earnings, all to Plaintiff’s economic, emotional, and general damage in an amount according to proof. Defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in causing that harm.” (FAC ¶ 85.) As such, the Court cannot identify any limiting principle by which to limit the types of treatment records or the subject of the treatment records at this time

 

            Rather, the Court finds that all requests should be narrowed to January 1, 2020. Moreover, the Court finds that, at this time, requests related to billing records (Request Nos. 6,7), and notes/recording/videos from sessions (Request No. 5)  are overbroad and insufficiently relevant. In other words, the other records requested should provide Defendant a sufficient opportunity to identify specific alternative stressors.  

 

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion to quash is granted in part, denied in part. The Requests are narrowed to January 1, 2020, to present. At this time, requests related to billing records (Request Nos. 6,7), and notes/recording/videos from sessions (Request No. 5) are quashed.

 

 

It is so ordered.

 

Dated:  January    , 2025

                                                                                                                                                          

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.