Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 22STCV39600, Date: 2023-04-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV39600    Hearing Date: April 26, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant’s demurrer to the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action is SUSTAINED IN PART, MOOT IN PART:

-          Defendant’s demurrer is MOOT as to the third cause of action.

-         Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITH 15 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND as to the fourth cause of action.

-         Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the fourth and fifth causes of action.  

            Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED.

On 10/15/2020, Plaintiff Whitney Rolland Reed II (Plaintiff or Mr. Reed) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County Sherriff’s Department, Sheriff Alex Villanueva, Sergeant Rodriguez, Sergeant L. Raymond, Deputy D. Auner, Deputy Hussainian, Deputy M. Salomon, and Deputy J. Stern. On 1/3/2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) alleging: (1) breach of mandatory duties; (2) failure to summon medical care; (3) negligence; (4) violation of the Bane Act; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

            Now, Defendant County of Los Angeles (Defendant or CLA) demur to Plaintiff’s third, fourth, and fifth causes of action. Defendant also move to strike portions of the Complaint.

Discussion

I.                   Negligence

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for negligence because in California, a public entity is not liable for an injury arising from an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815.)

The Court agrees. A common law negligence claim may not be asserted against Defendant. (Doe v. Los Angeles Cnty. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. (2019),37 Cal. App. 5th 675, 686.) However, as clarified in Plaintiff’s opposition, the third cause of action is only asserted against the Individual Defendants, and is not asserted against Defendant.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to the third cause of action is moot.

II.                Violation of the Bane Act

Defendant argues Plaintiff cannot state a claim for violation of the Bane Act because there are no facts alleged to suggest Defendants interfered with Plaintiff’s rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion.

Here, Plaintiff’s claim is based on allegations that “Defendants intentionally and/or recklessly refused to monitor, act upon repeated instances of inmate violence upon Plaintiff, to remove or transfer him to a safer location out of general population or take such action(s) as would reasonably protect the hapless plaintiff from foreseeable harm.” (FAC ¶ 36.)

 Government Code Section 844.6 provides that “a public entity is not liable for: (1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner…[OR] (2) An injury to any prisoner,” and several courts have concluded that Civil Code section 52.1 does not abrogate other specific immunity provisions of the Government Code. (See e.g. Towery v. State of California (2017) 14 Cal. App. 5th 226, 235.)

However, there is an exception to section 844.6 that creates limited public-entity liability when (1) the public employee knows or has reason to know of the need for immediate medical care; and (2) fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. (Gov. Code § 845.6.)

Here, Plaintiff argues that he has shown the coercion element because Defendant purposefully chose to have Plaintiff remain amongst the general population of inmates at the MCJ, including members of the gang that maimed him. (FAC  ¶ 25-27.) Plaintiff also argues that the limited exception to liability applies here because after Plaintiff was initially attacked, they kept him amongst the general population of the jail rather than removing him for care and mental health treatment.

However, noticeably absent from Plaintiff’s opposition is any case law which could show that this conduct—i.e., officers decision to keep Plaintiff amongst the general population—rises to the level of coercion contemplated by the Bane Act. As Plaintiff himself notes, “[t]he essence of a threats, intimidation, or coercion claim is that defendants tried to or did prevent plaintiff from doing something she had the right to do under the law.” (Austin B. v. Escondido Union School. Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 883.) Plaintiff did not cite any case law which could show that Defendants tried to prevent or did actually prevent Plaintiff from doing something he had the right to do, nor has he provided an analogous circumstances wherein the Court could conclude that this conduct constitutes coercion.

Plaintiff will be afforded an opportunity to allege facts which could show that Defendant engaged in coercive conduct as required to state a claim under the Bane Act. Plaintiff must also allege facts which could show that Plaintiff required immediate medical care which he was denied after he was attacked. A contention that Defendant did not provide the appropriate care by failing to remove him from the general population is different, as a matter of law, from a failure to provide the immediately necessary medical care contemplated by the section 845.6 exception.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained, 15 days leave to amend.

III.             IIED

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for IIED because a public entity is not liable for an injury arising from an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee except as provided by statute. (Gov. Code § 815.) Moreover, Government Code section 844.6 expressly provides that “a public entity is not liable for: (1) an injury proximately caused by any prisoner; (2) an injury to any prisoner.” Plaintiff’s claims are based on injuries allegedly sustained while he was a prisoner, and thus the County appears to be immune from liability under section 844.6.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that a public entity can be liable for infliction of emotional distress and cites Delta Farms Reclamation Dist. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal. 3d 699,710 in support. However, that case did not involve any analysis of section 844.6 or its applicability to prisoner injuries. As such, the Court finds the case to be easily distinguishable.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained, without leave to amend.

Motion to Strike

            Defendant argues that “any allegations purporting to impose liability on the County for the breach of a mandatory duty by failing to comply with California Building Code Title 24 § 1231.2.22 (2018) should be stricken because no such legal duty exists, and the County has statutory immunity. Additionally, any allegations which are premised upon decisions relating to Plaintiff’s housing assignment while in custody should be stricken because the County has statutory immunity.” (Motion to Strike, 2: 8-13.)

            The Court agrees.

            First, California Building Code, Title 24, Section 1231.1 (2018) (Section 1231.1) requires an inmate or sound actuated audio monitoring system. However, Section 1231.1 did not exist at the time when MCJ, the facility in question here was built, and the statute does not apply retroactively. (See RJN, Certificate of Occupancy for MCJ). In opposition, Plaintiff argues that “before the time of the attacks on Mr. Reed, Los Angeles County had adopted the California Building code that requires inmate- or sound-actuated audio monitoring system.” (Opp., 4: 17-19.) However, this misunderstands Defendant’s argument. Defendant does not argue that section 1231.1 did not exist at the time of the attack and thus cannot be applied retroactively. Defendant argues that the jail itself did not exist at the time that section 1231.1 was enacted and there was nothing retroactive in the statute to require pre-statute buildings to come into conformity with the statute rules. Defendant also notes that Title 24 does not require facilities that predate its enactment to comply with its regulations, and cites Californians for Disability Rts. v. Mervyn's LLC (2008) 165 Cal. App. 4th 571, 586 in support. Plaintiff did not cite anything legal authority in opposition that could show otherwise.

Second, to the extent that Defendant’s liability is placed on the discretionary decision as to Plaintiff’s housing assignment while in custody, Government Code section 820.2 immunizes public employees from liability for injuries resulting from the exercise of discretion.  Moreover, Government Code section 856 provides that neither a public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of his employment is liable for any injury resulting from determining (1) Whether to confine a person for mental illness or addiction or (2) The terms and conditions of confinement for mental illness or addiction. Under Government Code section 845.6, both a public entity and its employees are immune from claims based on injuries to prisoners caused by a failure to provide medical care, except when an employee, acting within the scope of his employment, fails to provide medical care to a prisoner and has reason to know that need for medical care is immediate. (Lawson v. Superior Ct. (2010) 180 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1384.) Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant failed to provide immediately necessary care. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to summon the proper care after he was attacked because it chose to keep him among the general population rather than remove him due to mental illness. Plaintiff did not present any case law to show that this falls within the scope of immediate medical care contemplated by the exception. Rather, case law suggests that it refers to immediately necessary life-saving care. 

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to strike is granted.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  April    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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