Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV03331, Date: 2023-08-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV03331    Hearing Date: March 25, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

            Defendant Mehran Abshah’s motion for a protective order is DENIED.

            Background:

            On February 15, 2024, Plaintiffs Dariush Eghbali, Dariush Eghbali Inc., and Boniad Ayeneh Inc. dba Ayenah Foundation filed a complaint for defamation against Defendants Nader Rafiee, Oitn, Mehran Abshah, IPN TV, and Does 1-100. Eghbali is a principal and sole shareholder of Eghbali Inc. and the president of Ayenah. Oitn stands for Omid Iran TV. Rafiee is a principal and officer of Oitn. Abshah is a principal and shareholder of IPN. Eghbali is a Persian artist/vocalist and social activist.

            Party’s Request:

            Defendant Abshah moves for a protective order confirming the automatic stay of all proceedings, including discovery, as to Abshah, while the appeal of the anti-SLAPP motion is pending.

Legal Standard

            Courts have considerable discretion in granting and crafting protective orders. (Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588.) 

            “It is well established, in California and elsewhere, that a court has both the inherent authority and responsibility to fairly and efficiently administer all of the judicial proceedings that are pending before it, and that one important element of a court's inherent judicial authority in this regard is ‘the power . . . to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance.’” (People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131, 1146, citing Landis v. North American Co. (1936) 299 U.S. 248, 254-255.) 

            Code of Civil Procedure section 916 states, “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters¿embraced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.”¿ (Code Civ. Proc., § 916,¿subd. (a).)¿ An appeal from an order denying an anti-SLAPP motion divests the trial court of jurisdiction to conduct any “further trial court proceedings on the merits upon the causes of action affected by the motion.”¿ (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino¿(2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 186.)¿  

            Under California law, trial court proceedings are to be stayed on all matters that are embraced in or affected by an appeal. (Id. at p. 189.) “[A] proceeding affects the effectiveness of the appeal if the very purpose of the appeal is to avoid the need for that proceeding. In that situation, the proceeding itself is inherently inconsistent with a possible outcome on appeal and therefore must be stayed... ” (Id. at p. 190.)

Discussion

            Defendant-Appellant Mehran Abshah (“Abshah”) seeks a protective order to preserve any waiver of objections as to discovery and to confirm the automatic stay remains in place. (Motion, p. 3:11-12.)

            Abshah filed an anti-SLAPP motion staying all discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (g).) The anti-SLAPP motion was denied. (Lewis Decl., ¶ 4.) Abshah filed a timely appeal on October 26, 2023. (Lewis Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) The appeal has not been briefed and is still pending decision. Notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal and automatic stay of all proceedings as to Abshah, Plaintiffs have served written discovery on Abshah. (Lewis Decl., ¶ 7.) Despite meet and confer efforts, Plaintiffs refused to withdraw the discovery or acknowledge the stay. (Lewis Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. 2.)  The appeal is likely to conclude no earlier than the end of 2024. (Lewis Decl., ¶ 6.) On December 1, 2023, counsel for Eghbali served discovery requests to Abshah. (Lewis Decl., ¶ 7.) On December 4, 2023, counsel for Abshah responded stating there was a stay on all discovery pending the appeal and asked counsel for Eghbali to confirm in writing that they would withdraw their discovery requests. (Lewis Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. 2.) On December 4, 2023, Eghbali’s counsel replied requesting authority that after denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, the appeal stays discovery. (Lewis Decl., ¶ 9, Ex. 2.) Counsel for Abshah responded that same day providing authority for the proposition that the appeal stays discovery. (Lewis Decl., ¶10, Ex. 2.) On December 8, 2023, counsel for Eghbali replied, “[w]e disagree that this demonstrates that after denial of the anti-SLAPP motion, that an appeal stays discovery.” (Lewis Decl., ¶ 11, Ex. 3.)

            In opposition, Plaintiffs do not dispute that the pendency of an appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion stays “all further court proceedings,” as stated in Varian.  However, they contend that discovery does not fall under the category of “all further court proceedings,” and that Plaintiffs should be allowed to continue to conduct discovery while the appeal is pending.

            In reply, Abshah relies on language from Varian, in which the Supreme Court of California stated that the purpose of the stay of further proceedings in Section 916 “is to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided.” (Varian, supra at 189.) Abshah argues that a stay on discovery preserves the status quo until appeal is decided, which is what the Varian Court sought to achieve. Abshah further argues that it brought the anti-SLAPP in part to avoid the costs of litigation and burdensome discovery.

            Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that there is no authority to support staying discovery pending the appeal of a denial of an anti-SLAPP motion. The parties both rely on Varian.  In Varian, the Court stated that “section 916 stays all further proceedings on the merits during the pendency of an appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Varian, supra, at 186.) Abshah provides no authority for his position that discovery requests can be considered “proceedings on the merits.” In Varian, the trial court held trial and issued a judgment. Thus, whether discovery could proceed was not at issue. Considering the lack of authority for Abshah’s request, the Court finds that Abshah has not demonstrated good cause exists to issue a protective order prohibiting discovery pending the appeal of Abshah’s anti-SLAPP motion.

            Accordingly, Defendant Abshah’s motion for a protective order is DENIED.

Dated:  March 25, 2024

Hon. Jon R. Takasugi

Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.