Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV04929, Date: 2023-12-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV04929    Hearing Date: December 1, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED.

            Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED.

On 3/6/2023, Plaintiff Hsiu Ping Wang (Plaintiff) filed suit against General Motors, LLC (GM). On 8/14/2023, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) alleging: (1) fraud; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) Business and Professions Code section 17200; (4) breach of express warranty; (5) breach of implied warranty; (6) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Civil Code section 1793.2(b).

            Now, GM demurs to the first, second, and third causes of action of the FAC. GM also moves to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages.

Discussion

GM argues that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which could support the claims sounding in fraud (i.e, the first, second, and third causes of action.)

After review, the Court disagrees.  

The requisite elements of a fraud cause of action are: (1) a representation, usually of fact, which is false; (2) knowledge of its falsity; (3) intent to defraud; (4) justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation; and (5) damage resulting from that justifiable reliance.  (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal. App. 3d 59, 72-73 (Stansfield).)

“In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.”  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th at p. 645.) “Causes of action for intentional and negligent misrepresentation sound in fraud and, therefore, each element must be pleaded with specificity.  [Citations.]”  (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166.) The specificity requirement extends to each and every element. (Moncada v. West Coast Quartz Corp. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 768, 776). Consequently, “a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant … the names of the persons who made the representations, [and] their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation….”  (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.)

Previously, the Court sustained GM’s demurrer, writing, “If Plaintiff does not allege he decided to purchase the Subject Vehicle in reliance on specific representations by specific individuals at GM, then Plaintiff cannot allege fraud based on misrepresentation. Rather, Plaintiff’s claim would sound only in concealment.” Now, Plaintiff alleges that “In reliance on the representations made by Defendant Manufacturer through its advertisements and publications and those of the salesperson who was authorized to speak on behalf of Manufacturer that the Vehicle’s range on a single charge was 259 miles, that it could be charged at home indoors, that it was safe, and that Manufacturer would repair any defects in the Vehicle during the express warranty period at no charge, Plaintiff decided to lease the Vehicle.” (Complaint ¶ 8.) This is sufficient at the pleading stage to state a claim for fraud based on misrepresentation, given that Plaintiff’s FAC sets forth the specific alleged misrepresentations made in advertising that he allegedly relied upon. 

The Court also finds Plaintiff’s allegations as to concealment to be sufficient. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew of the defective high voltage battery pack in the Subject Vehicle, and that it concealed this fact because it knew it would sell more vehicles and would discourage Plaintiff from seeking replacement or repair of the defective Battery. (Complaint ¶¶ 28, 34.) In support, Plaintiff alleges facts which could show that Defendant was aware of the defective batteries plaguing Chevrolet Bolt vehicles as early as 2017, based on customer satisfaction notices issued, new software updates issued, the issuance of multiple recalls, the receipt of at least four claims alleging that the battery pack in Chevrolet Bolt vehicles had caused a fire, and Defendant’s identification of at least a dozen battery-related allegations of fire involving 2017-2019 Bolt vehicles, (Complaint ¶¶ 14-23.) At the pleading stage, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim for fraudulent concealment. While Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations as to knowledge and intent are conclusory, it would place a nearly insurmountable hurdle on plaintiffs if they were required to allege specific facts to show things like knowledge and intent without the benefit of discovery . This evidence is contemplated by the discovery process. Rather, at the pleading stage, Plaintiff must allege facts which could reasonably show that Defendant possessed the requisite knowledge, based on the available facts. 

As to the second cause of action, Plaintiff, as discussed above, has adequately alleged facts which could show Defendant negligently misrepresented material facts.

            As to the third cause of action, Defendant argues that this claim fails because the first and second causes of action are insufficiently supported. As set forth above, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation. Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts here to show that Defendant engaged in unlawful conduct.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

Motion to Strike

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages should be struck because Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant engaged in malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct. 

            As set forth above, the Court overruled Defendant’s demurrer. Accordingly, Plaintiff has necessarily alleged facts which could show Defendant engaged in fraudulent conduct. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3).) 

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to strike is denied.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  December    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.