Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV13771, Date: 2024-03-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV13771    Hearing Date: March 27, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 17

 

LWL CO., INC., a California Corporation

 

                               Plaintiff,

         vs.

 

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A Delaware Corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, 

 

                               Defendants.

 Case No.:   23STCV13771

 

 

 

 Hearing Date: March 27th, 2024

 

            Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is granted as to RPD Nos. 9, 17, 27, 37-60, and 70. The Motion is denied as to RPD Nos. 1, 14, 15, and 16.

             

Background -

 

Procedural History

            On June 14, 2023, LWL Co., Inc., (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint against Ford Motor Company (Defendant) for two causes of action: (1) Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act and (2) Breach of Express Warranty under the Song-Beverly Act. After Plaintiff propounded Requests for Production on October 2, 2023, responses were received on November 17, 2023. (Declaration of David N. Barry, ¶¶ 3-6.) After meet and confer efforts failed, Plaintiff filed the motion now before the Court, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents Nos. 1, 9, 14-17, 27, 37-60, & 70 (the Motion). Defendant opposes the Motion, and Plaintiff files a reply.   

 

Factual Background

            On July 10, 2022, Plaintiff purchased a 2022 Ford F-150 (the Subject Vehicle) which was a new motor vehicle under the Song-Beverly Warranty Act (the Act). (Complaint, ¶¶ 6-7.) The purchase was accompanied by written and implied warranties. (Id.) After purchase, Plaintiff alleges that the Subject Vehicle began to show defects and nonconformities such as (a) paint chipping, (b) the illumination of the “Check Engine” warning light, (c) a damaged windshield, (d) recalls, and (e) the illumination of the “Wrench” warning light.

 

            Plaintiff alleges that they took the Subject Vehicle to the Defendant’s authorized repair facilities on at least two occasions, but that Defendant failed conform the Subject Vehicle to warranty. Plaintiff then filed suit.   

 

Discussion -

 

Legal Standard

            The propounding party may bring motions to compel further responses to interrogatories or requests for production if it believes (1) the responses received are evasive, or (2) incomplete, or (3) if the objections raised are meritless or too general. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.300(a), 2031.310(a).) A respondent has the burden to justify objections in response to a motion filed to compel further responses. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)  

 

Analysis

            Plaintiff argues that the responses to the Requests for Production (RPDs) by Defendant are a mix of non-code compliant responses, and unmeritorious objections. Defendant contends that not only are their responses code-compliant, but they also responded in full to Plaintiff’s requests and only objected based on meritorious grounds. For reasons explained below, the Court grants the Motion in part, and denies the Motion in part.

           

a)      Request for Production No. 1

            RPD No. 1 requests all repair orders pertaining to the Subject Vehicle. Here, the Motion is denied because Defendant represents that they have already responded. Plaintiff mischaracterizes Defendant’s response arguing that “Defendant responded to this Request stating that it will only comply in part.” (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement, 6:18-19.) Plaintiff continues arguing that “Defendant, as the responding party, must explain the ground for any objection and identify ‘with particularity’ the documents or things that will be withheld…” (Id. at 6:20-22.) First, Defendant responded that they would comply with this request in whole by producing service and repair records for the Subject Vehicle. (Id. at 5:17-18.) And second, the response did not contain an objection. Plaintiff fails to identify what must be further produced. Accordingly, the Motion is denied as to RPD No. 1.

 

b)     Request for Production No. 9

            RPD No. 9 requests all recall documents relating to the Subject Vehicle, including technical service bulletins (TSBs). Although Defendant complies, Defendant describes their own compliance as partial. However, Defendant does supply Plaintiff with TSBs, General Service Bulletins (GSBs), and Special Service Messages, (SSMs). (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement, 8:23-25.) The parties contentions surround Defendant’s objection, which argues that the RPD is overly broad and fails to provide reasonable particularity. The Court disagrees. RPD No. 9 reads as follows: All recall DOCUMENTS regarding, pertaining, or relating to the SUBJECT VEHICLE, including but not limited to, service bulletins and/or technical service bulletins.” (emphasis added) Defendant does not explain how supplying TSBs, GSBs, and SSMs fulfills this request. Although the TSBs, GSBs, and SSMs are relevant to the request, the request was specific to documents pertaining to recalls, which are voluntarily issued with the purpose to inform customers to return their vehicles to their dealerships. Additionally, “recall documents” is sufficiently particular to place Defendant on notice as to what documents Plaintiff is seeking with this request. Defendant fails to make clear their legal grounds for their partial compliance which specifically omitted recalls. Defendant also failed to specify why this part of the request was not complied with in violation of CCP § 2031.210(a)(2). Therefore, the Motion is granted as to RPD No. 9.

 

c)      Request for Production Nos. 14-17

            RPD Nos. 14-17 all request communications: 14 requests communications regarding the Subject Vehicle, 15 requests communications between Plaintiff and Defendant, 16 requests communications between Defendant and independent dealers, and 17 requests manuals and publications.  

 

            Defendant complies in part with RPD No. 14, providing communications between its dealers, Field Service Action history for the Subject Vehicle, claim history, and service and repair records. Beyond this, Defendant objects as the request is overly broad, and the Court agrees. Requesting communications with the only parameter being that the communications surround the Subject Vehicle fails to be reasonably specific. Therefore, the Motion is denied as to RPD No. 14.

 

            Similarly, Defendant complies in part with RPD No. 15, but objects as to the request being unduly burdensome. Although the Court disagrees, it will deny the Motion as to RPD No. 15 as many if not all of these communications are equally accessible by Plaintiff.

 

            Defendant complies with RPD No. 16 in part, supplying the same documents as it does in RPD No. 14, but arguing that any further compliance is unduly burdensome because per Herremans v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145957, "The relationship between automobile manufacturers and their dealers has been examined by a host of courts throughout the country, all of which have agreed that dealers are not 'agents' of manufacturers". Defendant argues that independent dealers are their own legal entities, and that Defendant may not have knowledge of every repair, report, nor communication made by the independent dealer. The Court agrees and denies the Motion as to RPD No. 16.

 

            Defendant states they comply with RPD No. 17 in part; however, the Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual was withheld despite a protective order and agreement that Defendant would produce it. (Plaintiff’s Separate Statement, 22:1-4.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff must show good cause for this discovery. Plaintiff has done so. A Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual is highly likely to contain details about the warranty, how it functions, and the procedures in utilizing the warranty, as well as its limits. Plaintiff cites Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611 in arguing that for discovery purposes information is relevant if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case. In a suit for violation of the Act, the Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual falls squarely within this definition. The Motion is granted as to RPD No. 17.

 

d)     Request for Production No. 27

            Defendant refuses to comply with RPD No. 27 and objects on the basis that the requests is overly broad and that the documents may not be within Defendant’s Possession. The Court disagrees and finds these objections meritless. RPD No. 27 requests all documents related to any damage sustained by the Subject Vehicle prior to its sale to Plaintiff. The Subject Vehicle is a new 2022 Ford F-150, purchased on July 10, 2022. It is highly likely that if the Subject Vehicle suffered any damage as a new vehicle, Defendant would have been aware of it, as Plaintiff was the first and only purchaser. Defendant in an attempt to respond to this RPD then provided a pre-delivery service record for a 2020 Ford F-150, but this is not the Subject Vehicle Plaintiff purchased. Moreover, Defendant fails to explain how such a report is outside of Defendant’s possession nor how this specific request is overly broad. The Motion is granted as to RPD No. 27.  

 

e)      Request for Production Nos. 37-60

            RPD Nos. 37-60 all request documents regarding customer complaints for vehicles of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle relating to the same issues the Plaintiff experienced. Defendant objects arguing that not only is the request overly broad, but that the experiences of other customers lack relevance to Plaintiff’s allegations, and is contrary to Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216 (“Calcor”). The Court disagrees.

 

            First, Calcor is inapplicable here. In Calcor, the plaintiff served a motion to compel on a nonparty requesting broad categories of documents and other materials without identifying specific documents. Additionally, the plaintiff included almost three pages of definitions and another three pages of instructions, the Court denied the motion. (Calcor Space Facility, supra at 216). The definitions and instructions here take up one page. The deficiencies present in Calcor are absent here.

 

            Second, with regard to the relevance of other customer complaints to Plaintiff’s allegations, Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967 (“Doppes”) is instructive. In Doppes a customer brought an action against an automobile manufacturer for a violation of the Act. The plaintiff there requested several documents, including customer complaints of an unpleasant odor. (Doppes, supra, at 973.) The auto manufacturer refused to bring any documents concerning customer complaints of the odor. (Id.) In response the plaintiff filed a motion to compel further, and the Doppes Court granted the motion and ordered the auto manufacturer to produce the requested documents. (Id. at 973-974.) The similarities to the instant case are clear. The customer complaints regarding the odor in Doppes related to the specific subject vehicle at issue, they were additionally relevant as to whether the issue had arisen in other vehicles and relevant as to how the auto manufacturer handled the issues. Documents related to issues with vehicles not belonging to the Plaintiff, but are of the same year, make, and model hold relevance. Therefore, the Motion is granted as to RPD Nos. 37-60.    

 

f)      Request for Production No. 70

            RPD No. 70 requests any documents related to Defendant’s investigation into whether Plaintiff’s vehicle should be repurchased or replaced. Defendant objects, arguing (1) that Plaintiff did not contact Defendant with a request to repurchase the Subject Vehicle, and (2) that any documents seeking this information post-date the filing of Plaintiff’s complaint and fall under attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product privilege. The Court disagrees.

 

            With regard to Plaintiff’s supposed requirement that they make a request to have Defendant repurchase the Subject Vehicle, this is a misunderstanding of obligations under the Act. Nowhere in the Act is there an obligation that the consumer contact the manufacturer to repurchase the Subject Vehicle. “Rather, the Act creates an affirmative duty upon the manufacturer or its representative to provide restitution or replacement when a covered defect, i.e. a “nonconformity”, is not repaired after a reasonable number of attempts.” (Krotin v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 294, 302, internal citation removed.)

 

            With regard to Defendant’s claim that the documents fall under attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product privilege, Defendant failed to provide a privilege log pursuant to CCP § 2031.240(c)(1). Therefore, the Motion is granted as to RPD No. 70.      

 

Conclusion -  

 

            Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is granted as to RPD Nos. 9, 17, 27, 37-60, and 70. The Motion is denied as to RPD Nos. 1, 14, 15, and 16.

 

 

Dated:  March 27, 2024

                                                                                                                                               

Hon. Jon R. Takasugi

Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.