Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV18775, Date: 2025-04-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV18775    Hearing Date: April 28, 2025    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

            On 8/82023, Plaintiff Arturo Topete (Plaintiff) filed suit against Felix Chevrolet, LP renamed as DTFC (Defendant), alleging: (1) unpaid vacation; (2) wages not timely paid; (3) unfair business practices; (4) wrongful termination; (5) failure to prevent discrimination; (6) intentional misrepresentation; (7) negligent misrepresentation; and (8) retaliation.

            On 2/4/2025, Defendant moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Discussion

            Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff waived his right to bring these claims, and there is no triable issue as to any cause of action.

            Defendant submitted evidence that on 2/2/2023, Plaintiff signed a Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement (the Agreement) in exchange for, among other terms, monetary consideration from his former employer, Felix. (UMF 59-61). In reliance on Plaintiff’s acceptance of the terms in the Agreement, his full release of claims (including each of the causes of action raised in this Complaint), and his signed acknowledgement, Felix paid the monetary consideration in the form of a severance check. (UMF 63). Plaintiff cashed that severance check. (Id).

            In opposition, Plaintiff does not deny signing the Agreement. Rather, Plaintiff argues that he was defrauded into signing the agreement because “no one told Plaintiff he had 45 days to agree when others were also terminated— his termination agreement only said 21 days to review and said nothing about repudiating the agreement within 7 days.” (Opp., 2: 25-27.)

            However, the general rule is that when a person with the capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he is bound by its contents. (Skrbina v. Fleming Companies, Inc. 45 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366.)

In Skrbina, supra, the plaintiff attempted to sue his former employer after signing a release in exchange for severance benefits. There, the California Court of Appeal held:

By his own admission, he read the release, then signed it ‘willingly’ to obtain the benefits provided in return for his signature. He has offered no evidence that defendants told him the release does not encompass employment discrimination claims or that he asked anyone’s advice as to whether it did. If he signed the release on the mere unspoken belief that the release did not encompass such claims, despite express language in the release to the contrary, he may not now rely on his unspoken intention not to waive these claims in order to escape the effect of the release.

(Skrbina, supra, at 1366).

            Here, Plaintiff had twenty-one days after receipt of the Agreement on 12/19/2022 to review, sign, and return it. Plaintiff signed (on 2/2/2023) and returned the Agreement after 16 days on 2/4/2024.

            Moreover, Defendant submitted evidence establishing that Plaintiff had notice that the dealership was being sold, and that he was not taken by surprise. Indeed, Defendant submitted evidence that Plaintiff had been aware of the sale as far back as October 2022 and was actively making plans for no longer being employed at Felix. (UMF 34-37). For example, on 10/27/2022, Plaintiff emailed Ms. Osgood about cashing out his 401K in light of the sale of the dealership. (UMF 37).

The Agreement states:

 “[Plaintiff] hereby waives, releases, and forever discharges, and agrees that, [Plaintiff] will not in any manner institute, prosecute or pursue, any and all complaints, claims, charges, liabilities, claims for relief, demands, suits, actions or causes of action……. With respect to any event, matter, claim damage or injury arising out of Plaintiff’s employment relationship with [Felix].” (SVDE Ex. 2, ¶ 2).

            As such, Plaintiff’s claims, which arise out of his employment relationship with Defendant, all fall within the scope of the Agreement. Plaintiff also executed a “Receipt of All Wages” Acknowledgement at the time of his termination confirming that “no additional compensation or benefits [were] due.” (UMF 57).

            In opposition, Plaintiff indicated that his deposition was only just taken on 4/3/2025, and at the time of filing the opposition, Plaintiff had yet to receive a transcript of the deposition. As such, Plaintiff argues that it is possible that there is additional evidence unavailable to Plaintiff at this time that are essential to justify opposition. However, Plaintiff’s counsel has available all facts available to Plaintiff himself, and as noted by Defendant in reply, “Deposition transcript notwithstanding, Plaintiff could have submitted a declaration attesting to any contradicting facts.” (Reply, 4: 1-2.) Plaintiff failed to submit any declaration that would present admissible evidence to raise a triable issue of material fact.

            Moreover, the evidence that Plaintiff did submit is defective for several reasons: (i) it was untimely filed, (ii) it does not include a table of contents in violation of CRC Rule 3.1350(g) which states that if evidence in opposition exceeds 25 pages, it must be separately bound and must include a table of contents, and (iii) there is no declaration establishing the admissibility of any of the evidence to oppose Defendant’s motion. (CRC Rule 3.1350(g).). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s papers are devoid of any citation to the evidence.

            Finally, even considering Plaintiff’s evidence, it is insufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact or to defeat Defendant’s motion.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  April    , 2025

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.