Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV18950, Date: 2023-11-27 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV18950    Hearing Date: November 27, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED.

            On 8/9/2023, Plaintiffs Estefania Maruri, Melanie Stafania Maruri, Abraham Maruri (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against Peter A. Wissner, as trustee of the Peter A. Wissner Revocable Trust dba Cedros Garden Associates, alleging: (1) negligence; (2) constructive eviction; and (3) breach of LAMC section 45.33.

            Now, Defendant Cedros Garden Associates (Defendant) demurs to Plaintiffs’ Complaint.

Discussion

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims are insufficiently pled.

            After review, the Court disagrees.  

            As for the first cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for negligence because “Plaintiffs only formulaically recite the elements of negligence without any substantive supporting facts. The singular allegation that the Defendant “failed to provide Plaintiffs with a safe and functional stove” is not sufficient to plead a compensable injury for purposes of negligence because it is devoid of any details of the nature of the consequential damage sustained. Defendant, nor this Court, at this point has any means to ascertain whether the stove caused the fire damage, whether the pot or pan may have been defective, or whether the Plaintiffs caused the damage by their own negligence, carelessness, or inattention.” (Demurrer, 6: 7-13.)

However, at the pleadings stage, the Court accepted well-pled allegations as true. Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant owed them a duty of care by virtue of their tenant-landlord relationship with them, that Defendant failed to provide Plaintiffs “with a safe and functional stove, failing to train their workers to maintain or repair appliance properly, [as well as] failing to maintain Plaintiffs’ stove,” and that as a result of that failure there was a kitchen fire which caused significant damage to the kitchen. Questions as to whether or not there were intervening causes or contributory negligence are contemplated by the discovery phase, and involve determinations of fact.

            As for the second cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs cannot establish constructive eviction because an essential element of a constructive eviction claim is that the tenant has vacated the premises, or the landlord has breached some other covenant upon which the covenant to pay rent is dependent. (Petroleum Collections Inc. v. Swords (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 841, 847.) Here’s Plaintiffs constructive eviction is based on allegations that “Defendants’ conduct in causing the fire which ravaged the Property, and then failing to make the Property habitable again, amounted to a constructive eviction of Plaintiffs, in that Defendants’ actions forced Plaintiffs to surrender possession of their apartment and move elsewhere.” (Complaint ¶ 23.) The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiffs’ initial inability to return to the apartment could not constitute a constructive eviction. This is because after the May 4, 2023 fire, the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety issued red tags on the door of the Plaintiffs’ unit pursuant to Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) section 91.8905. The red tag indicated that the occupancy of the units was prohibited and that “unauthorized entry or occupancy is a misdemeanor.”

However, contrary to Defendant’s contention, Plaintiffs do allege that their inability to return to the apartment and their constructive eviction was the result of intentional conduct by Defendant. More specifically, they allege that:

After the fire, Defendants had numerous legal responsibilities under LARSO: find temporary housing for Plaintiffs, obtain a tenant habitability plan from the City of Los Angeles, and repair Plaintiffs’ unit so they could resume their tenancy. Defendants failed to do any of these. Instead, Defendants served Plaintiffs a notice claiming that Plaintiffs had to move out because the Property had been “seriously impaired” by the fire. This was not a valid reason for eviction under LARSO, which lists numerous just causes for eviction; further, assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiffs’ home was permanently uninhabitable, Defendants failed to pay Plaintiffs permanent relocation assistance. Defendants never fixed Plaintiffs’ unit, so Plaintiffs eventually had to surrender possession and leave.

As a result of Defendants’ failure to maintain their Property, which caused the fire described above, and their subsequent failure to remediate the fire damage, provide temporary relocation assistance, and otherwise assist Plaintiffs and preserve their LARSO tenancy, Plaintiffs sustained considerable damages, all of which this action hopes to redress.

            (Complaint ¶¶ 8-9.)

            Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were denied relocation assistance and that Defendants failed to remediate the fire damage are sufficient at this stage. Whether or not Defendant did, in fact, fail to perform these services, and whether they were barred by the Department of Building and Safety from repairing the building in a timely manner, are factual questions not properly decided at this stage.

            As for the third cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot state a claim from LAMC section 45.33 because they have not alleged facts which could show harassment. However, the definition of “tenant harassment” under section 45.33 includes “[f]ailing to perform and timely complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by Federal, State, County, or local housing, health, or safety laws; or failure to follow applicable industry standards to minimize exposure to noise, dust, lead paint, asbestos, or other building materials with potentially harmful health impacts.” Accordingly, Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts at this stage to state a claim for tenant harassment.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  November    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

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