Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV19134, Date: 2024-02-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV19134    Hearing Date: February 16, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

            On 12/18/2023, Plaintiff Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP filed suit against Defendants County of Los Angeles (County), Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (the Sheriff’s Department), and former Los Angeles County Sheriff Alex Villanueva (Villanueva), in his official capacity (collectively, Defendants), alleging:  (1) breach of contract; (2) services rendered/quantum meruit; (3) promissory estoppel; and (4) open book account.

            Now, Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Factual Background

            This action arises out of fees allegedly owed to Plaintiff incurred during its representation of Villanueva in 2019.

Discussion

            Defendants argue that each of Plaintiff’s causes of action is barred by California’s Government Claims Act, forfeited under California’s compulsory counterclaim statute, and is unsupported by sufficient facts in Quinn’s complaint to state a valid claim as a matter of law.

            As to the first contention, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts which could show compliance with the Government Claims Act’s requirement that claims against a public entity be presented in a timely manner and in accordance with specific procedures before any lawsuit is filed.

            As to the second contention, Defendants argue that County of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, No. 21STCV42264 (Super. Ct.) (“County v. Quinn”) addressed the same threshold questions here, and Plaintiff failed to raise these claims as counterclaims as required by CCP section 426.30.

            After review, the Court agrees.

To prevent “piecemeal litigation” like this action, California’s compulsory cross-complaint statute provides that any cause of action “related” to a complaint must be brought as a cross-complaint or else not brought at all. (CCP § 426.30; see also id. § 426.10(c); Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 51 Cal. App. 5th 556, 564.) California courts require that section 426.30 “be liberally construed to advance its purpose.” (Heshejin v. Rostami (2020) 54 Cal. App. 5th 984, 993.) As a result, the statute requires “only a logical relationship” between the two claims, not “an absolute identity of factual backgrounds.” (Align Tech., Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal. App. 4th 949, 960) (quoting Currie Med. Specialties, Inc. v. Bowen (1982) 136 Cal. App. 3d 774, 777). In the case of a breach of contract, “any claims the defendant has against the plaintiff based on the same contract generally must be asserted in a cross-complaint.” (Frog Creek Partners, LLC v. Vance Brown, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal. App. 4th 515, 538.)

Here, Plaintiff’s entire complaint logically relates to Defendants’ December 2021 complaint for declaratory judgment. (Currie Medical, supra, 136 Cal. App. 3d at 777.) The threshold legal issue in that action and in this case is the same: whether the purported retainer agreement between Quinn Emanuel and Villanueva was a valid contract. Indeed, Judge Fujie already ruled on that question in the declaratory judgment action, finding that the purported retainer agreement was invalid and could not bind the County Defendants. As such, to allow this claim to go forward here would not only lead to an unnecessary “duplication of time and effort,” but could also lead to conflicting rulings. It would also complicate Plaintiff’s appeal of Judge Fujie’s ruling which is actively pending. (See City of Hanford v. Superior Court (1989) 208 Cal. App. 3d 580, 587–88) (“[P]ermitting leave to file a cross-complaint after judgment has been entered on the complaint does not further the purpose for cross-complaints,” and “allowing a party to assert cross-complaints while a case is pending on appeal[] could create chaos with the appellate process.”). 

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that Plaintiff here was denied leave to amend to file a cross-complaint by Judge Fujie, after Judge Fudgie concluded that Plaintiff had acted intentionally and in bad faith in its delay to move for such leave. More specifically, Judge Fujie found Plaintiff, “made a strategic and calculated decision not to preserve [its] rights,” and “to the extent there is any potential forfeiture it was [Quinn Emanuel’s] deliberate decision that caused it.” (Portnoi Decl. Ex. Q.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that its claims were not compulsory due to the nature of the declaratory judgment action, citing CCP section 426.60(c). However, section 426.60(c) provides that the rule of forfeiture “does not apply where the only relief sought is a declaration of the rights and duties of the respective parties in an action for declaratory relief.” (emphasis added.) Here, on its face, Defendants’ complaint sought additional relief, including an order preliminarily and permanently enjoining the pending arbitration, as well as and costs of suit. (Portnoi Decl., Ex. I) As noted by Defendants in reply, other Courts have concluded that section 426.60(c) did not apply where plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. (See e.g. AEG Holdco LLC v. Vazquez (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2021)  2021 WL 4859975, at *10 (applying California law and finding section 426.60(c) did not apply where plaintiff sought both declaratory and injunctive relief); 4 Witkin, California Procedure (6th ed. 2023), Pleading § 42 (“Another basis distinction is between the cause of action…and the remedy or relief sought.”) San Diego Unified Sch. Dist. v. County of San Diego (2009) 170 Cal. App. 4th 288, 305 (same).

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  February    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.