Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV23118, Date: 2025-05-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV23118    Hearing Date: May 21, 2025    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 17

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

ELENA GONZALES

                          

         vs.

 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.

                                         

 Case No.:  23STCV23118 

 

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  May 21, 2025

 

 

            Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an FAC is DENIED.

 

            On 9/25/2023, Plaintiff Elena Gonzalez (Plaintiff) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles (Defendant), alleging: (1) employment discrimination (religious); (2) retaliation; (3) failure to engage in the interactive process; and (4) failure to prevent.

 

            On 4/2/2025, Plaintiff moved for leave to file a first amended complaint (FAC).

 

Discussion

 

            Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to dispense with the third cause of action, and to instead assert a new claim for failure to accommodate. Plaintiff argues that good cause exists to grant leave because:

 

Plaintiff’s Proposed First Amended Complaint comes roughly 18 months after the original pleading, and it merely swaps out a legally flawed cause of action— failure to engage in the interactive process (for which Plaintiff has no standing)—for a failure-to-accommodate claim, which Plaintiff is indeed entitled to pursue. [See Exhibit 1]. This newly alleged cause of action arises from precisely the same factual nucleus already before the court. The only genuine difference is the substitution of a proper FEHA religious-discrimination corollary in place of a cause of action confined to disability-discrimination cases. These “new” allegations amount to nothing more than “the addition of matters essential to make the original cause[s] of action complete.” [Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 565].

 

            (Motion, 4: 1-9.)

            Plaintiff then argues that “this case still stands at a relatively early procedural posture” and thus no prejudice will result if leave to amend if granted. (Motion, 4: 10-12.)

 

            However, Plaintiff’s characterization of the procedural posture in this case is demonstrably false. As noted by Defendant in opposition, Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit in September 2023, the Parties have engaged in extensive written and oral discovery, the Parties have mediated, a motion for summary judgment on the Complaint is set for July 1st, and trial in this action is approximately two and one-half months from the hearing on this Motion to add a new cause of action.

 

            Moreover, while Plaintiff argues that the first cause of action for religious discrimination necessarily encompasses the new cause of action for religious accommodation, the statutory schemes and jury instructions applicable to each cause of action make clear otherwise.

 

            Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action for Religious Discrimination is used when a Plaintiff alleges disparate treatment under FEHA and is codified in Government Code §12940(a) and CACI 2500. As applied to this case, the elements of this claim are:

 

1. Defendant employed Plaintiff;

2. Defendant discharged Plaintiff;

3. Plaintiff’s religion was “a substantial motivating reason” for Plaintiff being discharged; and Plaintiff was harmed; and

4. Defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm.

 

(CACI 2500.)

 

By contrast, a cause of action for religious discrimination based on a failure to accommodate is codified in Government Code §12940(l) and CACI 2560. It requires proof of the following elements:

 

1. Defendant employed Plaintiff;

2. Plaintiff has a “sincerely held religious belief”;

3. Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious belief “conflicted with a job requirement;”

4. Defendant “knew of the conflict between Plaintiff’s religious beliefs and the job requirement;”

5. Defendant did not explore available reasonable alternatives of accommodating Plaintiff, including excusing Plaintiff from duties that conflict with Plaintiff’s religious beliefs or permitting those duties to be performed at another time or by another person, or otherwise reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs OR that Defendant terminated Plaintiff in order to avoid having to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs; and

6. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the conflicting job requirement was a substantial motivating reason for Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff.

 

(CACI 2560.)

 

As such, a comparison of the two claims indicates that Plaintiff is seeking to make a material change, even if they are both stem from acts of religious discrimination.

 

The liberal policy of amendment will generally not prevail if the opposing party is prejudiced by the amendment. [Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487]. “Prejudice can include the time and expense associated with opposing a legal theory that a plaintiff belatedly seeks to change.” [Payton v. CSI Elec. Contractors, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 832, 849]. Denial of a request to amend may thus be “appropriate when an unreasonable delay in seeking amendment prejudices the defendant” [Id.].

 

            Here, for the reasons set forth above, Defendant has shown that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment would severely prejudice Defendant. Plaintiff has not adequately explained why counsel did not discover the improper framing of legal theories until three months before trial, and after extensive discovery. As such, the Court finds inadequate justification for the prejudice that would result.

 

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend to file an FAC is denied.

 

It is so ordered.

 

Dated:  May    , 2025

                                                                                                                                                          

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.  

 





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