Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV25626, Date: 2024-02-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV25626    Hearing Date: March 4, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

            On 10/20/2023, Plaintiff Mural Media, LLC 401 K. Plan (Plaintiff) filed an unlawful detainer action against Linda J. Maultsby (Defendant).

            On 1/31/2024, Defendant demurred to Plaintiff’s Complaint.

            On 2/20/2024, Plaintiff opposed.

Discussion 

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed on the following grounds: (1) The Plaintiff does not have standing or legal capacity to sue; (2) There is another action pending between the Plaintiff and Defendant on the same cause of action; (3) The court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer cause of action because the Defendant was not served with any of the pre-requisite notices to quit and the pre-requisite notice is fatally defective on its face; and (4) The complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and is uncertain.

            After review, the Court finds Defendant’s demurrer should be sustained, without leave to amend.   

            As to the first contention, the Court disagrees with Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff lacks capacity and standing. For the purposes of a demurrer, the Court must assume the truth of the allegations in the pleading. Here, Plaintiff alleges that it is the owner of the real property at issue. (Verified Complaint, ¶ 1.) That allegation is sufficient at the pleading stage for Plaintiff to show that it has standing for an unlawful detainer cause of action regarding this real property. Furthermore, Defendant Linda Maultsby’s arguments that Plaintiff lacks the capacity to sue based on fictitious personhood, real-parties-in-interest, and trusts are unpersuasive, and Defendant did not advance any contention that Plaintiff lacks the capacity to sue based on its current corporate standing.

However, as to the second contention, Defendant argues that:

This unlawful detainer action was filed on October 20, 2023 against the Defendant based upon a notice to vacate premises, dated August 24, 2023 for the subject property located at 2757 South Mansfield Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90016. However, the Plaintiff filed another unlawful detainer action against the Defendant (L.A.S.C. No. 23STCV21245) on September 1, 2023 based upon the same notice to vacate premises, dated August 24, 2023, which is also still pending. (See Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A 

            (Demurrer, 5: 3-8.)

In support, Defendant cites CCP section 430.10, subdivision (c) which allows for a demurrer where “[t]here is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.”

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that:

Defendant first notes that there is another unlawful detainer action concerning the same property that is the subject of this case. However, Defendant makes no effort to explain what relevance that has to these demurrers; in other words, Defendant makes no effort to explain how the existence of the other unlawful detainer complaint somehow means that the complained filed in this action fails to state sufficient facts to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. In truth, it has no relevance or import to these demurrers. This case is based on Defendant’s failure to allow Plaintiff to inspect the real property that is the subject of this case, as required by the Civil Code. The other case is based on Defendant holding over in possession of the property at a foreclosure sale. The two cases are not, in any way, duplicative cases. As a result, this argument must be disregarded.

            (Opp., 3: 2-11.)

            However, a review of the Complaints reveal otherwise. Both cases are brought by the same Plaintiff against the same Defendant based on the same notice for the same cause of action, i.e., unlawful detainer. The Complaints seek identical relief: return of the same Unit, and damages for unlawful detention of the Property of at least $106.67 per day. Under Plaintiff’s logic, Plaintiff could file separate lawsuits against a tenant to recover damages to the unit, failure to timely pay rent, and failure to obey by a Notice to Quit. This would not only run directly counter to interests of judicial economy, but could lead to conflicting rulings.

            Third, Defendant contends that the three-day notice to quit the property was defective and thus the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.

After review, the Court agrees. Notably, on 2/28/2024, the Court overseeing Case No. 23STCV21245 (the other unlawful detainer case seeking involving the same parties, same property, and same notice to quit) reached the same conclusion in response to Defendant Jaccoma Maultsby’s demurrer there. This not only compounds the Court’s confidence in its conclusion here, but highlights the risk of conflicting ruling created by filing two separate cases based on the same 3-day notice. 

As part of its Complaint, Plaintiff attached a copy of the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale, recorded and filed in the Official Records of the Recorder’s Office for Los Angeles County, California. (Complaint, Exh. 1.) The Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale purportedly shows, among other things, that “Mural Media LLC 401K Plan” owns an undivided 47.618% interest in the real property at issue. (Id.) The Verified Complaint further alleges that “Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan” is the “owner of the real property.” (Complaint, ¶ 1.) (Notably, the Verified Complaint omits any mention of the other current owners of the real property, who appear to collectively own more than 50% of the real property.)

However, the actual “notice” provided to Defendants states that “the new legal owner of this Property is Real Time Resolutions, Inc.,” not “Mural Media LLC 401K Plan.” (Complaint, Exh. 2, p. 1.)

“It is true that where the purchaser at a trustee’s sale proceeds under section 1161a of the Code of Civil Procedure he must prove his acquisition of title by purchase at the sale . . . .” (Cheney v. Trauzettel (1937) 9 Cal.2d 158, 159, citations omitted.) “In an action for unlawful detainer, section 1161a therefore necessarily requires proof that the property was ‘duly sold . . .’ and that ‘the title under the sale has been duly perfected.’” (Seidell v. Anglo-California Trust Co. (1942) 55 Cal.App.2d 913, 920, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 1161a.)

Here, the “notice” was defective because it did not give proper notice to the occupants of the real property that the real property had in fact been sold. Even if the occupants saw the notice and had the insight to check the Official Records of Los Angeles County to determine if a nonjudicial foreclosure had occurred and been recorded, they would have seen Mural Media LLC 401K Plan — not Real Time Resolutions, Inc. In order words, the occupants would have had no notice or reason to believe that the actual owner of their real property was seeking repossession of the premises that they lived in. Plaintiff admits that a mistake was made, calling it a “typo.” (Opposition, p. 3:2–10.)

Still, Plaintiff argues that the notice is fine because “other parts of the Notice to Vacate correctly identify Plaintiff as the owner of the subject property and the party that was issuing the Notice to Vacate.” (Id., emphases omitted.)

The Court disagrees.

First, the notice does not make it clear that Plaintiff is the property owner. Only at the very end of the notice is the name “Mural Media, LLC 401k Plan” listed, and even then, it is not clarified in any way that would indicate this entity is the actual owner of the real property.

Second, unlawful detainer proceedings are “limited in scope and demand strict adherence to the statutes’ procedural requirements.” (Stancil v. Super. Ct. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 390.) Unlawful detainer cases filed pursuant to CCP section 1161 are regularly dismissed for even the most minute defects in notice. (ESA Mgmt., LLC v. Jacob (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 3, holding that a notice that did not include the amount of rent due or any information to permit the tenant to cure the default made the notice “fatally defective.”) In situations like this one, where the statute requires a “three-day written notice to quit the property” in situations where “the property has been sold,” anything less than notice to current occupants that the actual current owner is seeking repossession does not comply with CCP section 1161a and is “fatally defective.” Because the three-day notice is fatally defective, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter. (CCP § 1161a, subd. (b).) Therefore, the Court cannot grant leave to amend because such leave would be futile. (Am. Nat’l Bank of Santa Monica v. Johnson (124 Cal.App.Supp. 783, 787.)

Finally, while not raised by either party, the Court also finds Plaintiff’s notice to be ambiguous or incomplete in two other regards.

First, rather than state that it is a Three-Day Notice to Quit, Plaintiff wrote an ambiguous notice that requires the individuals who receive the notice to figure out whether they are subject a three-, thirty-, or ninety-day notice to quit the property. While it may not be an issue for an occupant to receive more time than legally required (for example, ninety days when only sixty days is required), it would be highly prejudicial to occupants to be forced out of their homes after three days if they were mistakenly under the belief that they had sixty days because of a notice’s fundamental ambiguity. Individuals subject to Notices to Quit should not be left to decipher such Notices, particularly given the stakes involved. As a result, the Court holds doubt as to whether or not the Notice’s ambiguous language could survive a strict application of the language of CCP section 1161a.

Second, “[i]n an action regarding residential real property based on Section 1161a, the plaintiff shall state in the caption of the complaint ‘Action based on Code of Civil Procedure Section 1161a.” (CCP § 1166, subd. (c).) Plaintiff has not complied with this procedural requirement. Instead of listing the required language in the caption of the Complaint, Plaintiff has only written the following in the footer: “Verified Complaint for Unlawful Detainer Under CCP § 1161a.” Again, unlawful detainer proceedings are “limited in scope and demand strict adherence to the statutes’ procedural requirements.” (Stancil, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 390.) Unlike the failure to attach certain documents, the statute does not explicitly include the right to amend for failure to include the required caption statement. (See CCP § 1166, subd. (d)(2) [“If the plaintiff fails to attach the documents required by this subdivision, the court shall grant leave to amend the complaint for a five-day period in order to include the required attachments.”].) Given the explicit requirement to amend for document omissions, the Court presumes that the Legislature knew how to require such amendments and chose not to require them for caption omissions.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  March    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

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