Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV26920, Date: 2024-05-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV26920    Hearing Date: May 15, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED.

            On 11/2/2023, Plaintiff Elliot Boyd (Plaintiff) filed suit against Ford Motor Company and South Bay Ford, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) violation of subdivision (d) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (2)  violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (3) violation of subdivision (A)(3) of Civil Code section 1793.2; (4) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability; (5) negligent repair; and (6) violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

            Now, Defendants move for a judgment on the pleadings.

Discussion

            Defendant moves for a judgment on the pleadings arguing: (1) Plaintiffs first four causes of action are barred because the Subject Vehicle is used; (2) the fifth cause of action is barred by the economic loss doctrine; and (3) Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action fails because the Song-Beverly claims are invalid.

            After review, the Court agrees.

            As to the first contention, on 10/30/2020, Plaintiff purchased a used 2019 Ford Mustang VIN 1FATP8UH0K5172290, from South Bay Ford with 20,472 miles. (Complaint ¶ 10; Ross Decl., Exh. B.)

The plain language of Song-Beverly indicates that the remedies it provides are available only against an automobile manufacturer by purchasers of new motor vehicles that are not conformed to an express warranty. Section 1793.2, subdivision (d)(2) provides that when a manufacturer does not repair a new motor vehicle to conform to an express warranty after a reasonable number of attempts, the buyer may opt to have the vehicle replaced or may obtain restitution for its cost (the replacement/restitution remedy). This section further defines the “new motor vehicles” to which the Act applies in Section 1793.22(e), which includes, in relevant part “a dealer-owned vehicle and a ‘demonstrator’ or other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty.” Cal.Civ.Code § 1793.22(e) (emphasis added). A separate section of the Song-Beverly Warranty Act relates to sales of used vehicles. Specifically, Section 1795.5 of the Act is titled “Used goods; obligation of distributor or retail seller; maintenance of service and repair facilities; duration of warranties” and states in part:

Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a) of Section 1791 defining consumer goods to mean “new” goods, the obligation of a distributor or retail seller of used consumer goods in a sale in which an express warranty is given shall be the same as that imposed on manufacturers under this chapter except: (a) It shall be the obligation of the distributor or retail seller making express warranties with respect to used consumer goods (and not the original manufacturer, distributor, or retail seller making express warranties with respect to such goods when new) to maintain sufficient service and repair facilities within this state to carry out the terms of such express warranties.

(Cal. Civ. Code, § 1795.5 [emphasis added].)

            This interpretation is support by case law. In Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 921, the court held that, as a general matter, “defective used cars are addressed by a separate section of the Act § 1795.5,” distinct from the new motor vehicle provisions, and acknowledged that the Song-Beverly Warranty Act “treats new motor vehicles somewhat differently from used motor vehicles.” In that case, the plaintiff purchased a used car from a third party and subsequently sued the manufacturer under the Song-Beverly Act, alleging that the manufacturer had breached its express warranty. (Dagher, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 910–11.) The Court found that “even though its written warranty had not yet expired” plaintiff had no recourse under the Act against the manufacturer because the Act “restrict[s] the types of sellers and goods, as well as buyers, that qualify for its protection.” (Id. at 926.) An original buyer’s statutory rights, or standing to pursue those rights, are not transferred to a later owner, even when the express warranty protections are transferred. (Id. at p. 927.)

Similarly, in Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 339, the Court explained that, under section 1795.5, “[t]he same protections generally apply to sale of used goods accompanied by an express warranty, except that the distributor or retail seller is bound, as opposed to the manufacturer, and the duration of the implied warranty of merchantability is much shorter.” (Id. at p. 336.) As the Kiluk court noted, in the context of used vehicles the “manufacturer is generally off the hook” for claims under Song-Beverly. (See id. at p. 339.) 

            In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should refrain from retroactively applying Rodriguez v. FCA (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209 and follow Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112 instead. However, in Jensen, the subject vehicle was a “demonstrator” BMW with only 7,000 miles on the odometer, and was leased directly from a BMW dealership, wherein the dealership advised the plaintiff she would receive an additional warranty from the manufacturer of 36,000 miles on top of the 7,000 miles already on the odometer and was provided a warranty booklet. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs purchased the vehicle used, did not purchase a demonstrator that sold directly to an FCA dealership, and did not receive a new warranty extension by FCA at the time (nor could they have because Plaintiffs purchased from a dealership unaffiliated with FCA). Accordingly, the Court declines to follow Jensen rather than Rodriguez.

            As for the second contention, the Court agrees that the negligent repair cause of action is barred by the economic loss rule. Under the Economic Loss Rule, “[w]here a purchaser's expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought is not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suffered only economic losses.” (Robinson Helicopter Co. Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988.) Here, Plaintiffs allege only economic losses, and do not allege any personal injuries or property damage. Accordingly, their claim appears to be barred by the economic loss rule on its face.

            As for the third contention, a failure to state a warranty claim under state law “necessarily constitute[s] a failure to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss.” (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 832.) Given the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of express and implied warranty under the Song-Beverly Act against Ford as a matter of law, this claim necessary fails as well.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings is granted.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  May    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.