Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV26987, Date: 2024-04-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV26987 Hearing Date: April 3, 2024 Dept: 17
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 17
TENTATIVE RULING
|
DEBBIE MEJICANOS,
an individual; HELI SANTAMARIA, an individual; JORDY SANTAMARIA, a minor by
and through his Guardian Ad Litem, DEBBIE MEJICANOS; ALLAN QUINTANILLA, an individual;
DERICK QUINTANILLA, an individual; and GESSEL ROSALES, an individual vs. CAMILLE
MONTENEGRO, an individual and as Trustee of THE MONTENEGRO LIVING TRUST; NOE
PINA, an individual; PINA REALTY, INC., A California Corporation; and DOES 1
through 20, inclusive; |
Case
No.: 23STCV26987 Hearing Date: April 3, 2024 |
The Court DENIES the motion to strike.
Brief Background
On
November 2, 2023, Plaintiffs Debbie Mejicanos, Heli Santamaria, Jordy
Santamaria, a minor by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, Debbie Mejicanos;
Allan Quintalla, Derick Quintalla, and Gessel Rosales (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) filed their Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court
against Defendants Camille Montenegro, Pina Realty, Inc., and Noe Pina,
(collectively “Defendants”). On November 6, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their First
Amended Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court. On January 22, 2024,
the parties stipulated for an Order allowing Plaintiffs to correct certain
issues with their operative complaint and file a Second Amended Complaint. On
January 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint. No trial has
been scheduled in this action.
On
February 27, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to strike.
On
March 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition.
March
26, 2024, Defendants filed their reply.
Party’s
Request
Defendants
Camille Montenegro, Pina Realty, Inc., and Noe Pina, (collectively
“Defendants”) move to strike portions of the operative Second Amended Complaint
filed by Plaintiffs Debbie Mejicanos, Heli Santamaria, Jordy Santamaria, a
minor by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, Debbie Mejicanos; Allan Quintalla,
Derick Quintalla, and Gessel Rosales (collectively “Plaintiffs”), which seeks
damages arising from alleged uninhabitable conditions of the property located
at 5317 Templeton St., Los Angeles, CA 90032 (the “Property).
Legal Standard
Code
of Civil Procedure § 435(b)(1), which provides in part that “[a]ny party,
within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of
motion to strike the whole or any part thereof…” Id. Code of Civil
Procedure § 436 states that “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to
Section 435, or at any time at its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper:
(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any
pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or any order of the
court.” Id. As used in § 436, “irrelevant matter” has the same meaning
as the phrase “immaterial allegation,” as used in Code of Civil Procedure §
431.10(b). Code Civ. Proc. § 431.10(c). Section 431.10(b)(3) defines
“immaterial allegation” as a “demand for judgment requesting relief not
supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.” Id.
“[A] motion to strike is generally used to reach defects in a pleading which
are not subject to demurrer.” (Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989)
216 Cal. App. 3d 340, 342.) The adequacy of a claim for punitive damages,
attorney fees, or false, misleading, or slanderous language may be challenged
by motions to strike. (Code Civ. Proc. §431.10(b); Grieves v. Superior Court
(1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.) Finally, a motion to strike is the proper
vehicle for attacking a claim for damages where the claim sued upon does not
support such an award. (Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 214-215.)
Meet and Confer
Requirement
“Before filing a
motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and
confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is
subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an
agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the
motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).)¿
Defendants’
motion is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration as required by Code of
Civil Procedure section 435.5. (Mot., Kintzele Decl., ¶ 5.)¿
Discussion
Defendants seek to strike the request for punitive
damages from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. Specifically, Defendants
seek to strike from Plaintiffs’ Complaint Paragraph 85, Paragraph 135,
Paragraph 141, Paragraph 156, Paragraph 169, Paragraphs 175-177, and
Plaintiffs’ prayer for exemplary and punitive damages.
In
opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the allegations of the complaint are
sufficient to show malice, oppression, and therefore support an award of
punitive damages. Plaintiffs also argue that punitive damages are available to
tenants for a landlord’s willful or grossly negligent misconduct. In the
alternative, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend if the Court were to grant
Defendants’ motion.
In
reply, Defendants argue that the Stoiber test is inapplicable and misstated
because that involved a court’s inquiry at the summary judgment stage and not a
motion to strike. Moreover, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs make allegations
that Defendants failed “repeatedly” or that the conditions of the property
“continued to deteriorate,” yet Plaintiffs refer only to the same one instance
of the same thing occurring as support. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not rise to
the level of alleging “wanton and willful” or “evil intentioned” facts that
could remotely justify a punitive damages award. Defendants also argue that
Plaintiffs failed to address the factual and legal issues raised in defendant’s
motion to strike. Lastly, Defendants’ argue that Plaintiffs’ should not be
granted leave to amend because this would be their third-amended complaint.
These arguments are without merit.
Here,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts demonstrating
Defendants acted fraudulently, oppressively, maliciously, or with “evil motive.”
Defendants accurately note that the Complaint contains conclusory allegations
merely stating that Defendants acted fraudulently, oppressively, or
maliciously.
However,
these conclusory statements are not the only allegations supporting punitive damages.
The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff “Despite multiple attempts to notify
the Defendants of these issues, including phone calls, text messages, and
emails commencing on or around March 2023, the Defendants failed to undertake
timely and adequate repairs.” (Complaint ¶26) The Complaint further states “Defendants
were previously aware of these uninhabitable and dangerous conditions and were
notified of the conditions by Plaintiffs throughout their tenancy and given
ample opportunity to cure the conditions at the Subject Property but failed to
do so properly.” (Complaint ¶ 30.)
Under
California law, a landlord’s failure to repair can support a claim for punitive
damages.¿(Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920.) In Stoiber,
the Court found that the tenant had pled sufficient facts to support her prayer
for exemplary damages because she alleged that the landlord had actual
knowledge of defective conditions in the premises, including leaking sewage,
deteriorated flooring, falling ceiling, leaking roof, broken windows, and other
unsafe and dangerous conditions, and that the landlord failed to repair them.¿(Id.)
Defendants’ reliance on State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, is
misguided. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. the dispute arose
between an insurer and insured arising in the reversal of punitive damages, it
was not a tenant-landlord situation. (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 419.)
Therefore
these allegations are sufficient to allege malice supporting a request and prayer
for punitive damages.
Accordingly,
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages from the
Complaint is DENIED.
Dated: April 3, 2024
Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
Judge of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must
send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org
by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org. If a party submits
on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must
identify the party submitting on the tentative.
If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this
tentative as the final order. If the department
does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the
tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed
off calendar. For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213)
633-0517.