Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV26987, Date: 2024-04-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV26987    Hearing Date: April 3, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 17

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

DEBBIE MEJICANOS, an individual; HELI SANTAMARIA, an individual; JORDY SANTAMARIA, a minor by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, DEBBIE MEJICANOS; ALLAN QUINTANILLA, an individual; DERICK QUINTANILLA, an individual; and GESSEL ROSALES, an individual 

 

         vs.

 

CAMILLE MONTENEGRO, an individual and as Trustee of THE MONTENEGRO LIVING TRUST; NOE PINA, an individual; PINA REALTY, INC., A California Corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive;

 

 Case No.:   23STCV26987

 

 

 

 Hearing Date: April 3, 2024

 

            The Court DENIES the motion to strike.

 

            Brief Background

 

On November 2, 2023, Plaintiffs Debbie Mejicanos, Heli Santamaria, Jordy Santamaria, a minor by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, Debbie Mejicanos; Allan Quintalla, Derick Quintalla, and Gessel Rosales (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed their Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court against Defendants Camille Montenegro, Pina Realty, Inc., and Noe Pina, (collectively “Defendants”). On November 6, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court. On January 22, 2024, the parties stipulated for an Order allowing Plaintiffs to correct certain issues with their operative complaint and file a Second Amended Complaint. On January 25, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint. No trial has been scheduled in this action.

 

On February 27, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to strike.

 

On March 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition.

 

March 26, 2024, Defendants filed their reply.

           

Party’s Request

 

Defendants Camille Montenegro, Pina Realty, Inc., and Noe Pina, (collectively “Defendants”) move to strike portions of the operative Second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Debbie Mejicanos, Heli Santamaria, Jordy Santamaria, a minor by and through his Guardian Ad Litem, Debbie Mejicanos; Allan Quintalla, Derick Quintalla, and Gessel Rosales (collectively “Plaintiffs”), which seeks damages arising from alleged uninhabitable conditions of the property located at 5317 Templeton St., Los Angeles, CA 90032 (the “Property).

 

Legal Standard

 

Code of Civil Procedure § 435(b)(1), which provides in part that “[a]ny party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof…” Id. Code of Civil Procedure § 436 states that “[t]he court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time at its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or any order of the court.” Id. As used in § 436, “irrelevant matter” has the same meaning as the phrase “immaterial allegation,” as used in Code of Civil Procedure § 431.10(b). Code Civ. Proc. § 431.10(c). Section 431.10(b)(3) defines “immaterial allegation” as a “demand for judgment requesting relief not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross-complaint.” Id. “[A] motion to strike is generally used to reach defects in a pleading which are not subject to demurrer.” (Pierson v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal. App. 3d 340, 342.) The adequacy of a claim for punitive damages, attorney fees, or false, misleading, or slanderous language may be challenged by motions to strike. (Code Civ. Proc. §431.10(b); Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.) Finally, a motion to strike is the proper vehicle for attacking a claim for damages where the claim sued upon does not support such an award. (Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 214-215.)

 

Meet and Confer Requirement  

 

“Before filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that resolves the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5, subd. (a).)¿ 

 

Defendants’ motion is accompanied by a meet and confer declaration as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5. (Mot., Kintzele Decl., ¶ 5.)¿

 

Discussion

 

            Defendants seek to strike the request for punitive damages from Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint. Specifically, Defendants seek to strike from Plaintiffs’ Complaint Paragraph 85, Paragraph 135, Paragraph 141, Paragraph 156, Paragraph 169, Paragraphs 175-177, and Plaintiffs’ prayer for exemplary and punitive damages.

 

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to show malice, oppression, and therefore support an award of punitive damages. Plaintiffs also argue that punitive damages are available to tenants for a landlord’s willful or grossly negligent misconduct. In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek leave to amend if the Court were to grant Defendants’ motion.

 

In reply, Defendants argue that the Stoiber test is inapplicable and misstated because that involved a court’s inquiry at the summary judgment stage and not a motion to strike. Moreover, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs make allegations that Defendants failed “repeatedly” or that the conditions of the property “continued to deteriorate,” yet Plaintiffs refer only to the same one instance of the same thing occurring as support. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not rise to the level of alleging “wanton and willful” or “evil intentioned” facts that could remotely justify a punitive damages award. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs failed to address the factual and legal issues raised in defendant’s motion to strike. Lastly, Defendants’ argue that Plaintiffs’ should not be granted leave to amend because this would be their third-amended complaint. These arguments are without merit.

 

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged specific facts demonstrating Defendants acted fraudulently, oppressively, maliciously, or with “evil motive.” Defendants accurately note that the Complaint contains conclusory allegations merely stating that Defendants acted fraudulently, oppressively, or maliciously.  

 

However, these conclusory statements are not the only allegations supporting punitive damages. The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff “Despite multiple attempts to notify the Defendants of these issues, including phone calls, text messages, and emails commencing on or around March 2023, the Defendants failed to undertake timely and adequate repairs.” (Complaint ¶26) The Complaint further states “Defendants were previously aware of these uninhabitable and dangerous conditions and were notified of the conditions by Plaintiffs throughout their tenancy and given ample opportunity to cure the conditions at the Subject Property but failed to do so properly.” (Complaint ¶ 30.)  

 

Under California law, a landlord’s failure to repair can support a claim for punitive damages.¿(Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920.) In Stoiber, the Court found that the tenant had pled sufficient facts to support her prayer for exemplary damages because she alleged that the landlord had actual knowledge of defective conditions in the premises, including leaking sewage, deteriorated flooring, falling ceiling, leaking roof, broken windows, and other unsafe and dangerous conditions, and that the landlord failed to repair them.¿(Id.) Defendants’ reliance on State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, is misguided. In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. the dispute arose between an insurer and insured arising in the reversal of punitive damages, it was not a tenant-landlord situation. (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell (2003) 538 U.S. 408, 419.)

 

Therefore these allegations are sufficient to allege malice supporting a request and prayer for punitive damages.  

 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages from the Complaint is DENIED.

 

 

 

 

Dated:  April 3, 2024

                                                                                                                                               

Hon. Jon R. Takasugi

Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.