Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 23STCV30116, Date: 2024-04-03 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV30116 Hearing Date: April 3, 2024 Dept: 17
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT
17
TENTATIVE RULING
|
MICHAEL DEEMING
vs. AIDS HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, a California non-profit
organization; GOLDEN HILLS TOWERS, LLC, a California limited liability company;
and DOES 1 TO 50 inclusive. |
Case
No.: 23STCV30116 Hearing Date: April 3, 2024 |
Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED
in part, OVERRULED in part:
Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, with leave to amend,
as to the second, third, fifth causes of action. Plaintiff is ordered to file a
third amended complaint within 20 days of this order.
Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first,
fourth, seventh, eighth causes of action.
Defendant’s motion to strike is
GRANTED with leave to amend.
On December 8, 2023, Plaintiff Michael
Deeming filed a complaint against AIDS
Healthcare Foundation, Golden Hills Towers, LLC, and DOES 1 through 50 , alleging: (1) negligence; (2) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (3) breach of the implied warranty of
habitability; (4) tortious breach of
implied warranty of habitability; (5) private
nuisance; (6) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (7) violation
of civil code, section 1942.4; and (8) violation of the UCL.
Defendant AIDS
Healthcare Foundation (Defendant)
now demurs to Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety for uncertainty and failure
to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Legal
Standard
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the
complaint states a cause of action.¿ (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
740, 747 (Hahn).) ¿When considering demurrers, courts read the
allegations liberally and in context.¿ (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water
and Power¿(2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.)¿ In a
demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading
or via proper judicial notice.¿ (Donabedian
v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)¿ “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and
not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.¿ Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the
face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.”¿ (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 902, 905.)¿ “The
only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it
stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”¿ (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at
p. 747.)
Meet
and Confer
Before filing a demurrer,
“the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone
with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the
purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve
the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” (emphasis added, CCP §
430.41(a).)
Here, on February 8, 2024, Defendant’s counsel met and
conferred telephonically with Plaintiff’s counsel but were unable to resolve
the dispute. (Schwartz Decl. ¶ 3.) Thus, the meet and confer requirement was
satisfied.
Discussion
I.
First Cause of Action - Negligence
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s first cause of action is
vague, ambiguous, and uncertain. (Not. of Mot. p. 3.) Plaintiff argues that there
is no uncertainty because both sets of defendants engaged in the same conduct.
(Opp. p. 5.)
“The elements for negligence cause of action are duty,
breach, causation and damages.” (County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318.)¿ “Ordinarily, negligence may be
alleged in general terms, without specific facts showing how the injury occurred,
but there are limits to the generality with which a plaintiff is permitted to
state his cause of action, and the plaintiff must indicate the acts or
omissions which are said to have been negligently performed. He may not
recover upon the bare statement that the defendant’s negligence has caused him
injury.” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 527
[Internal quotations and ellipses omitted].) “However, there is no
requirement that plaintiff identify and allege the precise moment of the injury
or the exact nature of the wrongful act.” (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 740, 747 [internal brackets omitted].)
The complaint alleges duty as follows “Defendants owed
Plaintiff the duty to exercise reasonable care in the ownership, operation,
management, and control of the Property. . . ”, “Defendants had a duty to
Plaintiff to maintain the Property in habitable conditions imposed by state,
and local laws . . .” and “Defendants, owed a duty to Plaintiff to act as a
reasonable owner, landlord, and property manager by maintaining the Property in
a sanitary, safe, and habitable condition, making repairs.” (Complaint ¶¶ 30-32.)
The complaint also alleges breach as “Defendants. . . failed to properly
operate and manage the Property as required by law, and thereby breached duties
owed to Plaintiff, including the duties stated above, such as adequately
eradicating the vermin infestation and the mold growth at the Property.
Defendants’ violation of applicable statutes, ordinances, and regulations
constitutes negligence per se.” (Complaint ¶ 33.) The complaint also alleges
causation as “a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ breaches of duty,
Plaintiff has suffered and continue to suffer damages in an amount in excess of
the jurisdiction of this court and in the amount to be proven at trial.”
(Complaint ¶ 34.)
These facts are not uncertain because both Defendants are
alleged to have committed the same acts. For instance, both sets of Defendants
failed to make repairs to the Property, allowed the Property to become overrun
with vermin and other substandard conditions and they ignored the hazards at
the Property and Apt. 510. A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only
where the complaint is so bad that a defendant cannot reasonably respond
because he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or
denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v.
Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)
Therefore, the Court overrules Defendant’s demurrer as to
negligence.
II.
Second Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendant argues that this cause of
action fails because Plaintiff fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action and it is uncertain. (Not. of Mot. p. 3.) Plaintiff argues that it is not
uncertain and provides examples showing that the cause of action is sufficiently
pled.
The elements of a cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress are “(1) extreme and
outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless
disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff
suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendant’s extreme and
outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the severe emotional
distress.” (Crouch v. Trinity Christian Center of Santa Ana, Inc., (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 994, 1007).
The complaint alleges “[t]he acts
and omissions. . . induc[ed] Plaintiff to rent the dwelling that contain[ed]
the defects. . . which Defendants had intentionally failed to identify, abate,
and repair in an effective manner was outrageous and beyond all boundaries of
decency and reasonable in a civilized society. Defendants knew that
intentionally failing to identify, abate, and repair the housing defects would
expose Plaintiff to deplorable conditions including exposure to vermin
infestations and mold conditions. This was intentionally done to cause harm to
Plaintiff as Defendants knew that a reasonable tenant, including Plaintiff,
would suffer severe emotional distress and Plaintiff did suffer such distress
in having to live with such defects and uninhabitable conditions. Despite this
knowledge, Defendants took no steps to change their actions. (Complaint ¶ 38.) “Defendants’
conduct would cause a reasonable person severe emotional distress and caused
Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.” (Complaint ¶ 39.) The complaint
further alleges “Defendants at all times acted with reckless disregard of the
probability of causing Plaintiff severe emotional distress. . .” and “[a]s the
direct and proximate result of defendants’ outrageous conduct, Plaintiff has
suffered severe emotional distress in an amount in excess of the jurisdictional
limits of this Court. Plaintiff has suffered emotional distress, chronic toxic
stress, and related physical symptoms or bodily injury including, but not
limited to, multiple scars caused by bed bugs bites, depression, and anxiety
attacks due to the vermin infestation in the Property. Defendants’ conduct was
a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s emotional distress and related
physical symptoms.” (Complaint ¶¶ 40-41.)
These alleged facts are insufficient
to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress
because they are conclusory.
Plaintiff’s
reliance on Stoiber v. Honeychuck and Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments
is misplaced. For instance, the Court of Appeal noted that an appellant was not
limited to an action against her landlord for breach of warranty of
habitability and could sue in tort for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 922 .) The
court went on to conclude that whether the landlord’s intentional and willful
failure to remediate uninhabitable conditions was “extreme and outrageous”
remained a factual issue that could not be resolved on appeal as a matter of
law. (Ibid.)¿Thus, while conclusory allegations of a failure to repair
will not establish extreme and outrageous conduct, specific allegations that
the landlord knowingly allowed uninhabitable conditions to continue will suffice
under certain circumstances.¿¿¿However, similar facts are not alleged here. For
instance, in the complaint, Plaintiff alleges “At all relevant times, Defendants had actual and/or constructive notice
of the following defects yet failed to take timely or reasonable steps to abate
and/or remedy the defects”
which is not specific as to how Defendants knew about the issues. (Complaint ¶
23.) Further in Newby, the court of found there was outrageous behavior
when “the evidence showed that after the plaintiff tenant organized
opposition to rent increases, the landlord shouted at the tenant and insulted
her, directed her to vacate the premises. The plaintiff was also told if she
did not leave ‘. . ., [w]e [will] handle this the way we do down South.’” (Id. at 921-922.) Again, here, Plaintiff was not threatened with bodily
harm.
However, the Court will grant
Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. It is not yet persuaded that there is
no reasonable possibility that Plaintiff can cure the defect identified above.
Because “[l]eave to amend is liberally allowed,” the Court will grant Plaintiff
leave to file a first amended complaint. (See, e.g., Kempton v. City of Los
Angeles (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1348.)
Based on the
foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional is sustained
with leave to amend.
III.
Third Cause of Action – Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of implied warranty of
habitability and is uncertain. Plaintiff argues that Defendant AIDS Healthcare
Foundation stepped into the shoes of the prior landlords GHT when it purchased
the subject property and thus were bound by the express and implied terms of
the rental agreements pertaining to Plaintiffs' occupancy of the Property which
is the contractual basis for Plaintiff’s implied warranty of habitability
claims.
To state a claim for the breach of implied warranty of
habitability, plaintiff must show “the existence of a material defective
condition affecting the premises' habitability, notice to the landlord of the
condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the
condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency,
and resulting damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.)
The complaint alleges “Plaintiff was tenant of Defendants and occupied a
dwelling unit at the Property.” (Complaint ¶ 46.) The complaint further alleges
“[a]t all relevant times, Defendants knew that the dwelling rented by Plaintiff
was unsafe, untenantable and/or uninhabitable. Nevertheless, Defendants
warranted that the untenantable unit was fit for habitation and collected rents
from Plaintiff in dereliction of their duties and in breach of the implied
warranty of habitability.” (Complaint ¶ 47.) The complaint also alleges
“Defendants breached the implied terms of the Plaintiff’s Lease, by failing to
provide Plaintiff with a habitable dwelling free from vermin, and other
material housing defects. Plaintiff has nonetheless complied and performed his
obligation under his respective lease except as excused by Defendants’ breach
of the implied warranty of habitability and/or by law. Defendants’ breach of
warranty of habitability makes the Property has a lesser rental value than that
which was demanded by Defendants.” (Complaint ¶ 49.) The complaint also states,
“Plaintiff complained to Defendants and/or their agents shortly after
discovering the various defects mentioned. . . Defendants intentionally ignored
or refused Plaintiff’s requests to make repairs in Apt. 510 . . . .” (Complaint
¶¶ 26-27.)
Nevertheless, these alleged facts
are insufficient to state a cause of action for breach of implied warranty of
habitability because they are conclusory. The allegations contain conclusory
statements that do not present sufficient specific information regarding the
defects, when and how they were reported to Defendants, and whether Defendants
had an opportunity to remedy these conditions. However, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. It
is not yet persuaded that there is no reasonable possibility that Plaintiff can
cure the defect identified above. Because “[l]eave to amend is liberally
allowed,” the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint.
(See, e.g., Kempton v. City of Los Angeles (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1344,
1348.)
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s
demurrer to the third cause of action for breach of implied warranty of
habitability is sustained with leave to amend.
IV.
Fourth Cause of Action – Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of
Habitability
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege
sufficient facts to state a claim for tortious breach of implied warranty of
habitability and is uncertain. Defendant also argues that there is no private
right of action. Plaintiff argues that
this cause of action in tort is evidenced and further supported where a
defendant is in violation of the affirmative standard characteristics of
uninhabitable living conditions as stated in Civil
Code Sec. 1941.1, Health and Safety Code, Sec. 17920.3 and 17920.10 as alleged
in Plaintiff’s complaint. (Complaint ¶¶ 57, 65; Opp. 8.) Plaintiff further
argues that “[f]rom the moment Defendant AID Healthcare Foundation (AHF)
stepped into the shoes of the prior owners at the time they purchased the
subject property on October 13, 2021, from that moment on, AHF had all of the
rights, responsibilities, and obligations as landlords of the subject property
and to Plaintiff.” (Opp. 8.) In reply,
Defendant argues that it is well-settled that Civil Code section 1942.4 and
negligence serve to enforce breaches of the implied warranty of habitability
and Plaintiff here alleges both. Moreover, there is no private right of action
for these on their own.
Defendant’s
arguments are without merit because a warranty of habitability “is implied by
law in residential leases in this state.”¿(Green v. Superior Court
(1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 637.) This warranty “imposes upon the landlord the
obligation to maintain leased dwellings in a habitable condition throughout the
term of the lease.” (Peterson v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1185,
1204.) Further, the warranty “does not require that a landlord ensure that
leased premises are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but it does
mean that ‘bare living requirements' must be maintained.” (Green at
637.) A landlord’s “failure to substantially comply with applicable building
and housing code standards which materially affect health and safety would
constitute a breach of the warranty of habitability.” (Smith v. David
(1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 101, 109.)¿¿
Here,
the Complaint alleges that the property suffered from vermin infestation, mold
contamination, dysfunctional plumbing systems, crumbling, cracked and/or
deteriorating walls, ceilings, and/or flooring in the rental units and common
areas, common areas in disrepair and posing a hazardous condition. (Complaint ¶¶
22(a-f).)
Accordingly,
Defendants’ demurrer to the fourth cause of action is overruled.
I.
Fifth Cause of Action – Private Nuisance
Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action
for private nuisance is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff argues
that this cause of action is not barred by the statute of limitations because
he took occupancy in April 2014 and the Defendant’s acts and omissions
continued until December 8, 2023.
Generally, the statute of limitations for a nuisance
cause of action is three years when the claim is for injury to real property,
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 338(b). If the nuisance is
continuing, every repetition of the wrongful act may create further liability
and the statute of limitations will not be calculated from the date of the
original intrusion. (Phillips v.
Pasadena (1945) 27 Cal.2d 104, 107-108.)
Here, Plaintiffs allege that the defective conditions were not remedied,
thus, the nuisance was continuing and the statute of limitations does not bar
the instant action.
Therefore,
accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true at the pleading stage, Plaintiff’s
fifth cause of action does not appear time-barred on its face.
Uncertainty
Defendant argues that the cause of action is uncertain.
A¿special demurrer to a complaint¿is appropriate when¿the
grounds of¿the pleading are uncertain, ambiguous, or
unintelligible.¿(Code¿Civ.¿Proc.¿§ 430.10(f) and¿Beresford Neighborhood
Assn. v. City of San Mateo¿(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) Courts
typically disfavor¿demurrers¿based on uncertainty, which the court strictly
construes¿even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects.¿(Khoury¿v.¿Maly’s¿of
California, Inc.¿(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿A demurrer for
uncertainty may be sustained when a defendant cannot reasonably determine to
what he or she is required to respond.¿For example, when a plaintiff joins
multiple causes of action as one, fails to properly identify each cause of
action, or fails to¿assert¿which party each cause of action¿applies to when
there¿are multiple defendants, a complaint is uncertain.¿(Williams v.
Beechnut Nutrition Corp.¿(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)¿
Upon review of the complaint, the Court does not find it
so uncertain that Defendant cannot reasonably determine to what it is required
to respond. Any uncertainty may be resolved through
discovery. Accordingly, the demurrer on grounds of uncertainty is
overruled.
Failure
to State Sufficient Facts
Defendant also argues that the complaint fails to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Additionally, Defendant
argues that because no new facts are asserted in the negligence and nuisance
cause of action, they are duplicative, and nuisance should be stricken.
Plaintiff further argues that his nuisance and negligence
claims are not redundant, and Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to
differentiate both cause of actions and one is not merely a reiteration of the
other and Plaintiffs would be barred recovery should the court strike its
nuisance claim in the event that Plaintiffs cannot succeed on their negligence
claim.
To state a claim for private nuisance, a plaintiff must
plead (1) that the defendant interfered with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of
the plaintiff’s property; (2) that “the invasion of the plaintiff's interest in
the use and enjoyment of the land was substantial, i.e., that it cause[d] the
plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage”; (3) “the interference was
unreasonable, i.e., it must be ‘of such a nature, duration or amount as to
constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the
land.” (Chase v. Wizman (2021) 71
Cal. App. 5th 244.)
On review of the Complaint, the Court finds that the
nuisance cause of action is not duplicative of the negligence cause of action,
as it alleges that Defendants “intentionally failed to comply with the law
governing tenantability and repair defective and hazardous conditions.”
(Complaint, ¶ 70.) Despite the fact that the nuisance cause of action relies on
the same facts as the negligence cause of action, the allegation of intentional
conduct is enough to allege nuisance as a separate claim. Nonetheless, it is
axiomatic that negligent conduct cannot simultaneously be intentional conduct,
and the Complaint does not allege any factual allegations supporting the conclusory
allegation that Defendants engaged in intentional conduct.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer to the fifth
cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.
II.
Sixth Cause of Action - Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
Defendant
argues that the sixth cause of action for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment is uncertain.
A¿special demurrer to a complaint¿is appropriate when¿the
grounds of¿the pleading are uncertain, ambiguous, or unintelligible.¿(Code¿Civ.¿Proc.¿§
430.10(f) and¿Beresford Neighborhood Assn. v. City of San Mateo¿(1989)
207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) Courts typically disfavor¿demurrers¿based on
uncertainty, which the court strictly construes¿even when the pleading is uncertain
in some respects.¿(Khoury¿v.¿Maly’s¿of California, Inc.¿(1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿A demurrer for uncertainty may be sustained when a
defendant cannot reasonably determine to what he or she is required to
respond.¿For example, when a plaintiff joins multiple causes of action as one,
fails to properly identify each cause of action, or fails to¿assert¿which party
each cause of action¿applies to when there¿are multiple defendants, a complaint
is uncertain.¿(Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp.¿(1986) 185
Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)¿
The complaint alleges “Defendants engaged in actions and
omissions that interfered with Plaintiff’s peaceful and quiet enjoyment of Apt.
510 due to the lack of adequate vermin extermination, water leaks repairs and mold
exposure, and other substandard living conditions.” (Complaint ¶ 78.) The
complaint further alleges “[i]n renting to Plaintiff and failing to effectively
remediate the Property’s housing defects mentioned herein in this complaint,
Defendants breached the implied warranty of quiet enjoyment and Civil Code,
Section 1927.” (Complaint ¶ 79.) The complaint further alleges “Plaintiff did
not receive the benefit of his rental payments when Plaintiff paid rent and did
not receive a dwelling that was free from unreasonable disturbances and health
hazards.” (Complaint ¶ 80.)
Therefore, the Court does not find it so uncertain that Defendant
cannot reasonably determine to what it is required to respond. Any uncertainty
may be resolved through discovery.
Accordingly, the demurrer on grounds of uncertainty is
overruled.
III.
Seventh Cause of Action – Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.2
Defendant
argues that the cause of action for Violation of Civil Code Section 1942.2 is
uncertain.
A¿special demurrer to a complaint¿is appropriate when¿the
grounds of¿the pleading are uncertain, ambiguous, or
unintelligible.¿(Code¿Civ.¿Proc.¿§ 430.10(f) and¿Beresford Neighborhood
Assn. v. City of San Mateo¿(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) Courts
typically disfavor¿demurrers¿based on uncertainty, which the court strictly
construes¿even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects.¿(Khoury¿v.¿Maly’s¿of
California, Inc.¿(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿A demurrer for
uncertainty may be sustained when a defendant cannot reasonably determine to
what he or she is required to respond.¿For example, when a plaintiff joins
multiple causes of action as one, fails to properly identify each cause of
action, or fails to¿assert¿which party each cause of action¿applies to when
there¿are multiple defendants, a complaint is uncertain.¿(Williams v.
Beechnut Nutrition Corp.¿(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)¿
Civil Code
Section 1942.4 provides, in pertinent part, that a landlord may not collect
rent, increase a tenant's rent, or issue a three day notice to pay rent or quit
if (i) the subject dwelling lacks any of the affirmative characteristics listed
in Civil Code, Section 1941.1 or is declared substandard under and pursuant to
Health & Safety Code, Section 17920.3 because conditions listed in that
section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property,
safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the building; (ii) a
public officer has notified the landlord of his or her obligation to abate or
repair the substandard conditions; (iii) the subject defects have not been
abated within 35 days; (iv) the delay is without good cause; and (v) the
subject defects were not the fault of the tenant.
The complaint
alleges “ Plaintiff is informed and
believes and thereon alleges that representatives of the Los Angeles Department
of Public Health, City of Los Angeles Housing Department, and/or other
responsible government agencies, and/or other responsible government agencies
have inspected the Property and expressly informed Defendants in writing that
the Property is substandard and violates applicable law. Plaintiff is further
informed and believes and thereon alleges that Defendants failed to timely
abate all such defects prior to the deadlines imposed by said government
agencies and without good cause. In so doing, Defendants have violated Civil
Code, Section 1942.4.” (Complaint ¶ 87.)
Therefore, the Court does not find it so
uncertain that Defendant cannot reasonably determine to what it is required to
respond. Any uncertainty may be resolved through discovery.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer based
on uncertainty to the seventh cause of action is overruled.
IV.
Eighth Cause of Action – Violation of the UCL
Defendant argues that the
cause of action is uncertain. Plaintiff argues that it is sufficiently pled.
A¿special demurrer to a complaint¿is
appropriate when¿the grounds of¿the pleading are uncertain, ambiguous, or
unintelligible.¿(Code¿Civ.¿Proc.¿§ 430.10(f) and¿Beresford Neighborhood
Assn. v. City of San Mateo¿(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1180, 1191.) Courts
typically disfavor¿demurrers¿based on uncertainty, which the court strictly
construes¿even when the pleading is uncertain in some respects.¿(Khoury¿v.¿Maly’s¿of
California, Inc.¿(1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)¿A demurrer for
uncertainty may be sustained when a defendant cannot reasonably determine to
what he or she is required to respond.¿For example, when a plaintiff joins
multiple causes of action as one, fails to properly identify each cause of
action, or fails to¿assert¿which party each cause of action¿applies to when
there¿are multiple defendants, a complaint is uncertain.¿(Williams v.
Beechnut Nutrition Corp.¿(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.)¿
To successfully plead a UCL claim for unfair
business practices, a plaintiff must allege facts justifying relief in the form
of protecting the public from unfair business practices or deceptive
advertising. (Day v. AT&T Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 325, 331-332.)
A plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant engaged in a business
practice that was either unlawful (i.e., is forbidden by law) or unfair (i.e.,
harm to victim outweighs any benefit) or fraudulent (i.e., is likely to deceive
members of the public).¿(Albillo v. Intermodal Container Services, Inc.
(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 190, 206.)¿
The complaint alleges “[i]n
violation of Business & Professions Code, Section 17500, in connection with
business, Defendants made or disseminated statements which were untrue or
misleading, and which Defendants knew (or by the exercise of reasonable care
should have known) to be untrue or misleading, including but not limited to
proclamations and statements to Plaintiff that Plaintiff was obliged to pay
rent for an untenantable and/or uninhabitable dwelling, for the purpose of
extracting monies from Plaintiff and increasing their “take” of rent without
providing proper accommodations.” (Complaint ¶ 93.) The complaint further
alleges “Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that
Defendants’ illegal and unfair business practices have been adopted and
implemented for the purpose of maximizing their net income and profits from
such properties. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that
Defendant regularly fail to repair and maintain the Property they own and
control, engage in conduct designed to cover up and hide illegal defects (i.e.,
Painting over mold), mislead housing and health inspectors to avoid the
issuance or further prosecution of code violations, and failed to post required
notices.” (Complaint ¶ 94.)
Since the Court has overruled Defendants’ demurrer
to the seventh cause of action, this argument is moot.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Demurrer to the eighth
cause of action is overruled.
MOTION TO
STRIKE
Defendant moves to strike the following portions of Plaintiff’s
complaint including a prayer for punitive damages.
1) Paragraph 14, Page 4, line 8; “…tortious and other wrongful…”
2) Paragraph 18, Page 4, line 20; “…tortious and other wrongful…”
3) Paragraph 24, Page 6, line 11; “…intentionally and/or…”
4) Paragraph 35 in its entirety, Page 8, lines 9-17; “Defendants'
conduct described above was willful, wanton, intentional, despicable, malicious
and initiated with malice and with the intent to knowingly take advantage of,
oppress, and injure Plaintiff. Defendants at all times acted with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights of safety of. Plaintiff. Defendants were at
all times aware that there was a high probability that their intentional and/or
negligent failure to repair and maintain the Property would injure Plaintiff
and cause him personal injury, emotional distress and property damage.
Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages
under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294 and Taylor v. Superior Court
(1979) 24 Ca1.3d 890.”
5) Paragraph 38 in its entirety, Pages 8-9, lines 27-9; “The acts
and omissions of Defendants, directly or through their agents, in inducing
Plaintiff to rent a dwelling that contains the defects mentioned herein, which
Defendants had intentionally failed to identify, abate, and repair in an
effective manner was outrageous and beyond all boundaries of decency and
reasonable in a civilized society. Defendants knew that intentionally failing
to identify, abate, and repair the housing defects would expose Plaintiff to
deplorable conditions including exposure to vermin infestations and mold
conditions. This was intentionally done to cause harm to Plaintiff as
Defendants knew that a reasonable tenant, including Plaintiff, would suffer
severe emotional distress and Plaintiff did suffer such distress in having to
live with such defects and uninhabitable conditions. Despite this knowledge,
Defendants took no steps to change their actions.”
6) Paragraph 41, Page 9, line 15; “…outrageous…”
7) Paragraph 42 in its entirety, Pages 9-10, lines 23-3;
“Defendants' conduct described above was willful, wanton, intentional,
despicable, malicious and initiated with malice and with the intent to
knowingly take advantage of, oppress, and injure Plaintiff. Defendants at all
times acted with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of safety of.
Plaintiff. Defendants were at all times aware that there was a high probability
that their intentional and/or negligent failure to repair and maintain the
Property would injure Plaintiff and cause him personal injury, emotional
distress and property damage. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of
punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294
and Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Ca1.3d 890.”
8) Paragraph 59,
Page 12, line 9; “…materially defective, illegal, non-complying, and…”
9) Paragraph 60, Page 12, lines 14-15; “Defendants knowingly and
intentionally preyed on and took advantage of Plaintiff in failing to repair
and maintain Apt. 510 during Plaintiff's tenancy”
10) Paragraph 61,
Page 12, line 19; “…intentional and…”
11) Paragraph 65 in its entirety, Page 13, lines 8-16; “Defendants'
conduct described above was willful, wanton, intentional, despicable, malicious
and initiated with malice and with the intent to knowingly take advantage of,
oppress, and injure Plaintiff. Defendants at all times acted with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights of safety of. Plaintiff. Defendants were at
all times aware that there was a high probability that their intentional and/or
negligent failure to repair and maintain the Property would injure Plaintiff
and cause him personal injury, emotional distress and property damage.
Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages
under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294 and Taylor v. Superior Court
(1979) 24 Ca1.3d 890.”
12) Paragraph 73, Page 14, lines 15-22; “Plaintiff is further
entitled to an award of exemplary damages, because the acts of Defendants were
intentional, despicable, in that they were in knowing violation of law.
Defendants had actual knowledge of the defective conditions in the premises,
including a vermin infestation, and other unsafe and dangerous conditions, and
failed and refused to adequately remediate the conditions even though legally
obligated to do so. Defendants' refusal to comply with the law governing their
duties to their tenants was willful, and done in order to increase their own
profits, intentionally oppressing the Plaintiff, and knowingly cause Plaintiff
physical injury, annoyance, fear and mental suffering.”
13) Paragraph 74 in its entirety, Pages 14-15, lines 23-4;
“Defendants' conduct described above was willful, wanton, intentional,
despicable, malicious and initiated with malice and with the intent to
knowingly take advantage of, oppress, and injure Plaintiff. Defendants at all
times acted with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights of safety of.
Plaintiff. Defendants were at all times aware that there was a high probability
that their intentional and/or negligent failure to repair and maintain the
Property would injure Plaintiff and cause him personal injury, emotional
distress and property damage. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of
punitive and exemplary damages under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294
and Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Ca1.3d 890.”
14)
Paragraph 82 in its entirety, Page 16, lines 4-12; “Defendants' conduct
described above was willful, wanton, intentional, despicable, malicious and
initiated with malice and with the intent to knowingly take advantage of,
oppress, and injure Plaintiff. Defendants at all times acted with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights of safety of. Plaintiff. Defendants were at
all times aware that there was a high probability that their intentional and/or
negligent failure to repair and maintain the Property would injure Plaintiff
and cause him personal injury, emotional distress and property damage.
Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of punitive and exemplary damages
under and pursuant to Civil Code, Section 3294 and Taylor v. Superior Court
(1979) 24 Ca1.3d 890.”
15)
Paragraph 95 in its entirety, Page 19, lines 2-3; “Defendants' illegal conduct
and conspiracy to violate applicable law occurred throughout Plaintiff's
tenancy.”
16) From
the Prayer for Relief, Paragraph 2 in its entirety, Page 19, line 18; “For
punitive and exemplary damages according to proof”
17) From
the Prayer for Relief, Paragraph 5 in its entirety, Page 19, line 26; “For
punitive and exemplary damages according to proof”
18) From
the Prayer for Relief, Paragraph 10 in its entirety, Page 20, line 12; “For
punitive and exemplary damages according to proof”
19) From
the Prayer for Relief, Paragraph 13 in its entirety, Page 20, line 18; “For
punitive and exemplary damages according to proof”
20) From
the Prayer for Relief, Paragraph 16 in its entirety, Page 20, line 25; “For
punitive and exemplary damages according to proof”
The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion: (1)
strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading;
or (2) strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in
conformity with the laws of California, a court rule, or an order of the
court.¿¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subds.(a)-(b).)
Punitive Damages
Defendants contend that the complaint lacks allegations of malice
or any facts that indicate intent to harm or injure Plaintiff. ¿“The mere
allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an
award of punitive damages.¿¿[Citation.]¿¿Not only must there be circumstances
of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to
support such a claim.¿¿[Citation.]” (Grieves v. Superior Court¿(1984)
157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166, fn. omitted.)
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants’ conduct was “willful, wanton,
intentional, despicable, malicious and initiated with malice and with the
intent to knowingly take advantage of, oppress, and injure Plaintiff” are conclusory and do not identify facts to support
punitive damages.¿¿(Complaint ¶¶ 35,42,65,74,82.) Further, Plaintiff did not
provide any facts showing how Defendants were put on notice of the issues.
Under California law, a landlord’s failure to repair can support a
claim for punitive damages.¿(Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d
903, 920.) In Stoiber, the Court found that the tenant had pled
sufficient facts to support her prayer for exemplary damages because she
alleged that the landlord had actual knowledge of defective conditions in the
premises, including leaking sewage, deteriorated flooring, falling ceiling,
leaking roof, broken windows, and other unsafe and dangerous conditions, and
that the landlord failed to repair them.¿(Id.)
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to strike allegations
relating to punitive damages with leave to amend.
It is
so ordered.
Dated: April 3, 2024
Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
Judge of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must
send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org
by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court
website at www.lacourt.org. If a party submits
on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must
identify the party submitting on the tentative.
If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this
tentative as the final order. If the department
does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the
tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed
off calendar. For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213)
633-0517.