Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 24STCV07978, Date: 2024-11-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV07978    Hearing Date: November 18, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.  

            On 3/28/2024, Plaintiff Lawndale Holdings, LLC (Plaintiff) initiated this action. On 6/12/2024, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) against Robert A. Juhasz, as personal representative of the Estate of Ida Lydia Nazon, alleging: (1) specific performance of California Residential Purchase Agreement; (2) breach of fiduciary duty by broker; and (3) quiet title.

             On 6/12/2024, Plaintiff substituted Doe #1 for Lawndale Lot, LLC, Doe #2 for Vimvi California Corporation, Doe #3 for Loan Funder, LLC, and Doe #4 for Cameron Samimi.

             Now, Loan Funder, LLC (Doe #3 or Defendant or Loan Funder) demurs to Plaintiff’s FAC. On 10/15/2024, Vimvi California filed a joinder to Loan Funder’s motion.

Discussion 

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim against it because the basis of the Defendant’s liability is vague and uncertain.

            After review, the Court agrees. 

            California Rules of Court (CRC) rule 2.112 requires that each separately stated cause of action must specifically state “[t]he party or parties to whom it is directed.” (CRC rule 2.112, subd. (4).)

            Here, none of Plaintiff’s three causes of action name Defendant here as one of the parties to whom it is directed. The first cause of action names Defendants Juhasz, Lawndale Lot, LLC, and Cameron Samimi; the second cause of action names Defendant Vimvi California Corporation, and the third cause of action names Defendants Judasz, Landale Lot, LLC, and Cameron Samimi.

            Given that Defendant here is not named as a party against whom against claim is directed, it has no ability to discern what the allegations are against it. Without notice of the claims against it, it cannot prepare a defense.

            However, setting aside this procedural defect, there are also substantive defects.

            As for the first cause of action for specific performance of the Purchase Agreement, this Agreement is alleged to be between Plaintiff and Defendant Juhasz. Given that Defendant is neither a party to the Purchase Agreement nor bears any legal obligation related to the Purchase Agreement, there is no reason to believe Plaintiff could state a viable claim against Defendant here under this cause of action if leave to amend was granted. The same goes for joining Defendant Vimvi.

            As for the second cause of action, this claim is for Breach of Fiduciary duty and is asserted against the Real Estate Broker, Defendant Vimvi. Given that Plaintiff does not allege any facts which could show that Defendant Loan Funder owed a fiduciary duty, there is no reason to believe a viable claim could be stated if leave to amend were granted. However, Defendant Vimvi’s joinder, which contained no substantive argument as to this point, is insufficient to show that this claim is insufficiently pled against it.

Finally, as for the third cause of action, pursuant to CCP section 761.020, a cause of action for quiet title must allege: (1) A description of the property; (2) The basis of the plaintiff's title; (3) the adverse claims to the title against which a determination is sought, (4) the date as of which the determination is sought, and; (5) a prayer for the determination of the plaintiff's title against the adverse claims. (Lucas v. Sweet (1956) 47 Cal.2d 20). The California Supreme Court has emphasized that a claim to quiet title should be clear and specific, with the plaintiff required to set forth the essential facts of their case with reasonable precision (See Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550)

Here, Plaintiff does not allege title to the Subject Property, and Plaintiff does not assert a claim adverse to Defendant’s Deed of Trust to satisfy the third element of the Quiet Title Cause of Action. The FAC includes no allegations that Plaintiff holds title superior to that of Defendant or Defendant’s Deed of Trust is invalid.

However, even setting aside this defect, the Subject Property was an asset of the Estate of Ida Lydia Nazon, within the jurisdiction of an open Probate. Pursuant to Probate Code sections 10300 et seq., the sale of real property of an estate is subject to the jurisdiction and approval of the Probate Court. As such, any disputes arising from or relating to the sale, including but not limited to the allegations of wrongdoings, misrepresentations, or any claim affecting the legality, validity, or effect of the sale, fall squarely within the purview of the Probate Court that approved the sale.

Given that the Subject Property is part of the decedent’s estate in an open Probate, the Court agrees that disputes over its sale fall squarely within the Probate Court’s jurisdiction.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend.  

It is so ordered.

Dated:  November    , 2024

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.