Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 24STCV12517, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV12517 Hearing Date: November 13, 2024 Dept: 17
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT
17
TENATIVE RULING
|
TAMARA HARRIS
vs. KAISER PERMANENTE, et al. |
Case
No.: 24STCV12517 Hearing Date: November 13, 2024 |
Defendants’
demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
On 5/17/2024, in properia persona Plaintiff Tamara
Harris (Plaintiff) filed suit against Kaiser Permanente and Sedgwick Claims
Management Services (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) professional
negligence; (2) business and medical malpractice; (3) emotional distress; (4)
breach of contract; and (5) violation of the Insurance Code.
Now, Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s Complaint in its
entirety.
Discussion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by
the res judicata doctrine.
The
doctrine of res judicata “describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment.”
(Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) It promotes
judicial economy and “precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single
cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a different
legal theory or for different relief.” (Id. at p. 897 (internal citation
omitted).) To determine whether a prior action bars a second lawsuit, courts
examine whether (1) there has been a final determination on the merits, (2)
between the same parties or parties in privity with them, (3) on the same cause
of action. (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795; Tensor
Group v. City of Glendale (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 154, 160.)
In
June 2020, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants here, alleging that:
-
On March 27,
2007, while employed by “Kaiser Permanente,” she suffered a work-related
injury. (RJN, Ex. A [2020 Compl.].)
-
She commenced a
workers’ compensation case, which she contends resulted in an award of future
medical treatment and benefits. (Id.) She claimed that approximately 3
months after the award, Defendants terminated “much needed medical treatment.”
(Id.)
As
such, the foundation for Plaintiff’s entire complaint and the sole basis for
all of her causes of action in the 2020 Lawsuit was her workers’ compensation
claim. (Id.) Based on those allegations, she asserted seven causes of
action against Defendant: (1) general negligence, (2) intentional tort, (3)
premises liability, (4) business malpractice, (5) bad faith, (6) wrongful
denial or termination of workers’ compensation benefits, and (7) medical
malpractice. (RJN, Ex. A [2020 Compl., p. 3].) Plaintiff requested $2.5 million
in damages for future medical amounts, mental stress and other monetary
damages. (Id.)
On
8/3/2020, the Court sustained Defendants demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint,
without leave to amend, on the grounds that “Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the
exclusive remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation act.” (RJN, Ex. B
[Dec. 18, 2020 Min. Order].) On May 31, 2021, the Court entered Judgment
dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice. (Id. at Ex. C [Judgment].)
Now,
Plaintiff’s instant action alleges that she commenced a workers’ compensation
case against her employer, which she contends resulted in an “award” of future
medical treatment and benefits by WCAB in 2011. She also contends that
Defendants “offered and negotiated” a settlement agreement related to her
workers’ compensation case. (Compl.) She does not allege whether the parties
actually entered a settlement agreement, or the terms of such an agreement.
Instead, she claims that Defendants thereafter “refused to pay and continued to
delay and deny []medical treatment.” (Id.)
In
sum, the foundation for Plaintiff’s entire complaint and the sole basis for all
of her causes of action is Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. 2 (Id.)
After
review, the Court agrees that all three elements are met here for application
of the res judicata doctrine.
First,
there has been a final determination on the merits of Plaintiff’s allegations,
given the Court’s ordering sustaining Defendants’ demurs without leave to
amend, and dismissing the claim with prejudice. (Kanarek v. Bugliosi
(1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 327, 334; Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F. v. Countrywide
Fin. Corp. (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 1520, 1527.)
Second,
Plaintiff’s 2020 and 2024 lawsuits seek relief from the same parties – SCPMG
(Plaintiff’s employer) and Sedgwick (SCPMG’s claims administrator). While
Plaintiff now sues “Kaiser Permanente” instead of SCPMG, Plaintiff’s own
workers’ compensation case and 2020 complaint makes clear that the correct
legal name of her employer is SCPMG, and that any alleged settlement regarding
her benefits would have been with SCPMG – not “Kaiser Permanente.”
Third,
Plaintiff’s 2020 and 2024 actions seek to vindicate the same primary right –
workers’ compensation benefits. As the Court held in 2020, “Plaintiff’s
Complaint arise[s] out of a workers’ compensation claim and allegations that
she has not been properly compensated under this claim.” (RJN, Ex. B [Dec. 18,
2020 Min. Order].) Here, Plaintiff makes the same allegation. She claims that
although the WCAB awarded her future medical treatment in 2011, “Defendants refused
to pay and continued to delay and deny [her] medical treatment.” Thus, although
Plaintiff has repackaged these allegations as new torts and contract claims,
the underlying right she seeks to enforce is the same.
Given
this conclusion, the Court’s analysis need not go further. However, setting
aside the issue of res judicata, the Court would still conclude that the
substantive reasoning behind the dismissal of Plaintiff’s 2020 Complaint
applies with equal force here—i.e., that workers’ compensation exclusivity bars
Plaintiff’s suit. (Labor Code § 3600 (a), Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service,
Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1001.)
Based
on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend.
It is so ordered.
Dated: November
, 2024
Hon. Jon R.
Takasugi
Judge of the
Superior Court
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