Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 24STCV12517, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV12517    Hearing Date: November 13, 2024    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 17

 

TENATIVE RULING

 

TAMARA HARRIS

 

         vs.

 

KAISER PERMANENTE, et al.

 

 Case No.:  24STCV12517

 

 

 Hearing Date:  November 13, 2024

 

Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

 

            On 5/17/2024, in properia persona Plaintiff Tamara Harris (Plaintiff) filed suit against Kaiser Permanente and Sedgwick Claims Management Services (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) professional negligence; (2) business and medical malpractice; (3) emotional distress; (4) breach of contract; and (5) violation of the Insurance Code.

 

            Now, Defendants demur to Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety. 

 

Discussion

 

            Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the res judicata doctrine.

 

The doctrine of res judicata “describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) It promotes judicial economy and “precludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action on a different legal theory or for different relief.” (Id. at p. 897 (internal citation omitted).) To determine whether a prior action bars a second lawsuit, courts examine whether (1) there has been a final determination on the merits, (2) between the same parties or parties in privity with them, (3) on the same cause of action. (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 791, 795; Tensor Group v. City of Glendale (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 154, 160.) 

 

In June 2020, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants here, alleging that:

 

-         On March 27, 2007, while employed by “Kaiser Permanente,” she suffered a work-related injury. (RJN, Ex. A [2020 Compl.].)

 

-         She commenced a workers’ compensation case, which she contends resulted in an award of future medical treatment and benefits. (Id.) She claimed that approximately 3 months after the award, Defendants terminated “much needed medical treatment.” (Id.)

 

As such, the foundation for Plaintiff’s entire complaint and the sole basis for all of her causes of action in the 2020 Lawsuit was her workers’ compensation claim. (Id.) Based on those allegations, she asserted seven causes of action against Defendant: (1) general negligence, (2) intentional tort, (3) premises liability, (4) business malpractice, (5) bad faith, (6) wrongful denial or termination of workers’ compensation benefits, and (7) medical malpractice. (RJN, Ex. A [2020 Compl., p. 3].) Plaintiff requested $2.5 million in damages for future medical amounts, mental stress and other monetary damages. (Id.)

 

On 8/3/2020, the Court sustained Defendants demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint, without leave to amend, on the grounds that “Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation act.” (RJN, Ex. B [Dec. 18, 2020 Min. Order].) On May 31, 2021, the Court entered Judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice. (Id. at Ex. C [Judgment].)

 

Now, Plaintiff’s instant action alleges that she commenced a workers’ compensation case against her employer, which she contends resulted in an “award” of future medical treatment and benefits by WCAB in 2011. She also contends that Defendants “offered and negotiated” a settlement agreement related to her workers’ compensation case. (Compl.) She does not allege whether the parties actually entered a settlement agreement, or the terms of such an agreement. Instead, she claims that Defendants thereafter “refused to pay and continued to delay and deny []medical treatment.” (Id.)

 

In sum, the foundation for Plaintiff’s entire complaint and the sole basis for all of her causes of action is Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. 2 (Id.)

 

After review, the Court agrees that all three elements are met here for application of the res judicata doctrine.

 

First, there has been a final determination on the merits of Plaintiff’s allegations, given the Court’s ordering sustaining Defendants’ demurs without leave to amend, and dismissing the claim with prejudice. (Kanarek v. Bugliosi (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 327, 334; Fed. Home Loan Bank of S.F. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp. (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 1520, 1527.)

 

Second, Plaintiff’s 2020 and 2024 lawsuits seek relief from the same parties – SCPMG (Plaintiff’s employer) and Sedgwick (SCPMG’s claims administrator). While Plaintiff now sues “Kaiser Permanente” instead of SCPMG, Plaintiff’s own workers’ compensation case and 2020 complaint makes clear that the correct legal name of her employer is SCPMG, and that any alleged settlement regarding her benefits would have been with SCPMG – not “Kaiser Permanente.”

 

Third, Plaintiff’s 2020 and 2024 actions seek to vindicate the same primary right – workers’ compensation benefits. As the Court held in 2020, “Plaintiff’s Complaint arise[s] out of a workers’ compensation claim and allegations that she has not been properly compensated under this claim.” (RJN, Ex. B [Dec. 18, 2020 Min. Order].) Here, Plaintiff makes the same allegation. She claims that although the WCAB awarded her future medical treatment in 2011, “Defendants refused to pay and continued to delay and deny [her] medical treatment.” Thus, although Plaintiff has repackaged these allegations as new torts and contract claims, the underlying right she seeks to enforce is the same.

 

Given this conclusion, the Court’s analysis need not go further. However, setting aside the issue of res judicata, the Court would still conclude that the substantive reasoning behind the dismissal of Plaintiff’s 2020 Complaint applies with equal force here—i.e., that workers’ compensation exclusivity bars Plaintiff’s suit. (Labor Code § 3600 (a), Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1001.)

 

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend.

 

It is so ordered.

 

Dated:  November    , 2024

                                                                                                                                                          

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.