Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 24STCV16690, Date: 2025-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV16690    Hearing Date: April 11, 2025    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

City Attorney Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.  

On 7/3/2024, Plaintiff Abraham Cruz (Plaintiff) filed suit for relief under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 526a as a representative of the City of Industry.

            On 2/24/2025, James M. Casso, Bianca Sparks, and Casso & Sparks, LLP (collectively, Defendants or City Attorney Defendants) moved for a judgment on the pleadings. 

Discussion

            The City Attorney Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Alternatively, Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Cruz fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendants. Defendants also argue that his claim is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a).

            After review, the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by res judicata. Given this conclusion, the Court does not reach the remaining arguments set forth by Defendants.

[T]he doctrine of res judicata operates to bar any further litigation arising out of the same subject matter of a prior action as between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (Gates v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 301, 308, 311 [trial court should have sustained demurrer to complaint in second lawsuit on res judicata grounds].) The doctrine has two aspects: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.

Claim preclusion “prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 [DKN].) Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves: (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties or parties in privity with the parties in the first suit (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit. (DKN, p. 824.) “If claim preclusion is established, it operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether.” (Ibid.)

Issue preclusion, on the other hand, prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) The elements of issue preclusion are substantially the same as claim preclusion, with two differences. First, issue preclusion can be raised by one who was not a party or in privity with a party in the first suit. (Vandenberg v. Super. Ct. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 828.) “Only the party against whom the doctrine is invoked must be bound by the prior proceeding. [Citations.]” (Ibid. [emphasis in original].) Second, “[u]nlike claim preclusion, for issue preclusion to apply the issue must have been actually litigated and decided.” (Samara v. Matar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 796, 808, aff’d (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322.) In sum, issue preclusion applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) that was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) is being asserted in a second suit against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party. (DKN, pp. 824–825.)

The doctrine of res judicata “is not mechanically applied, and in each case the court must determine whether its application will advance the public policies which underlie the doctrine.” (Alpha Mechanical, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1333.) Those policies are: “(1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system: and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.” (Ibid.) The elements of claim and issue preclusion are easily satisfied here

Here, Cruz’s claim against the City Attorney Defendants is completely barred because it involves the same cause of action between the same parties, after a final judgment on the merits in the Concerned Citizens of City of Industry v. City of Industry, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC700716 (Concerned Citizens Lawsuit).

As for the first element, even though Cruz was not the named plaintiff in the Concerned Citizens Lawsuit, he and Concerned Citizens are still treated as the “same parties” for purposes of res judicata because he and Concerned Citizens sued the City Attorney Defendants in a representative capacity. In Gates, the court of appeal held that “[j]udgments in representative taxpayer actions are binding on all other taxpayers even though the named taxpayer plaintiff in the second suit was not the same taxpayer who brought the original case.” (Gates v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 301, 307.) Thus, even though Cruz was not the named plaintiff in Concerned Citizens, “the necessary privity for res judicata to apply is established by the fact that both suits were commenced as taxpayer actions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a and are thus brought by taxpayers suing in a representative capacity.” (Id.; Concerned Citizens SAC, ¶¶ 1-2, 123, 145, 150.)

As for the second element, California law defines a cause of action by focusing on the “primary right” at stake. For claim preclusion, a “claim” (or “cause of action”) is “the existence of a primary right and one violation of that right.” (Gates, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 309.) In other words, a cause of action “arises out of an antecedent primary right and corresponding duty, and a breach of such primary right and duty by the person upon whom the duty rests.” (Id.) “In California the phrase ‘cause of action’ is often used indiscriminately ... to mean counts which state [according to different legal theories] the same cause of action....” (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 798.) It is “the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory (common law or statutory) advanced.” (Id.) “Thus, under the primary rights theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered. When two actions involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm, they generally involve the same primary right.” (Id.) “Were the rule otherwise, litigation finally would end only when a party ran out of counsel whose knowledge and imagination could conceive of different theories of relief based upon the same factual background.” (Kronkright v. Gardner (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 214, 216.)

Here, Defendants Casso and Sparks were named defendants in the Concerned Citizens Lawsuit. Although their law firm, Casso & Sparks, LLP was not a named defendant in the prior action, it is treated as the same party for purposes of res judicata. (Lerner v. Los Angeles City Board of Education (1963) 59 Cal.2d 382, 398 [agents of the same government are in privity with one another].) Therefore, the parties are the same in both lawsuits. (See also Citizens for Open Access to Sand and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass’n (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1069– [the concept of “privity” refers “to a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property . . . ”].)

Finally, as to the third element, in the Concerned Citizens Lawsuit, the Court sustained the demurrer of Casso and Sparks as to each cause of action alleged against them without leave to amend on the grounds that Cruz failed to state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. (Hosp Decl., ¶ 5, Exs. 33-34.) Then, the Court entered a separate judgment in favor of City Defendants pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§ 578, 579 and 581(f)(l). (Id., ¶ 6, Ex. 35.) Cruz did not appeal the order. (Id., ¶ 7.) Thus, the judgment was a “final judgment on the merits.” Thus, Cruz’s Section 526a claim is barred.

As such, Plaintiff’s representative claim against the City Attorney Defendants is barred under a theory of claim preclusion.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims are barred under a theory of issue preclusion.

Issue preclusion prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action. (E.g., DKN, pp. 824–825.) An issue is decided by a prior judgment if the issue “is actually raised by proper pleadings and treated as an issue in the cause . . . ” (Sutphin v. Speik (1940) 15 Cal.2d 195, 202.) “But the rule goes further. If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject-matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged.” (Id.) “Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable.” (Id.) Courts should apply issue preclusion “to prevent repetitious litigation of what is essentially the same dispute.” (Rest.2d Judgments, § 27, com. c, p. 252.)

In this case, the Complaint seeks to relitigate the issue of whether the City Attorney Defendants’ contract was lawfully procured (Complaint, ¶¶ 26, 128-132, 154-165), which was clearly already litigated and resolved in the Concerned Citizens Lawsuit (see e.g., Hosp Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, Exs. 32 [Concerned Citizens SAC, ¶ 95]; Ex. 33 [Tr., 42:18-28, 43:1-8]; 34 [Minute Order], 35 [Judgment].) Moreover, “[p]reclusion ordinarily is proper if the question is one of the legal effect of a document identical in all relevant respects to another document whose effect was adjudicated in a prior action.” (Rest.2d Judgments, § 27, com. c.)

Furthermore, the Complaint attempts to relitigate the issue of whether the City Attorneys failed to act as impartial advisors and provide independent appropriate legal advice with respect to various alleged conflicts of interest (see e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 129, 131), which was also already litigated and decided against Concerned Citizens. (Hosp Decl. Exs. 32 [Concerned Citizens SAC, ¶¶ 96-99]; 33 [Tr., 19:3-9, 43:25- 28]; 35 [Judgment])

Finally, the Complaint also argues that it is not permissible for the City to pay for the City Attorney Defendants’ individual defense in the action. (Complaint, ¶¶ 133-136.) Again, that issue was already litigated by the parties and dismissed in the Concerned Citizens Lawsuit. (Hosp Decl. Exs. 32 [Concerned Citizens SAC, ¶¶ 100-102, 146], 33, 35.)

The Court finds these issues to be precluded by the prior judgment in Concerned Citizens.

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims to be barred by both issue and claim preclusion.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, without leave to amend. 

It is so ordered.

Dated:  April    , 2025

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.  

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

            City Defendant’s motion for a judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

            On 7/3/2024, Plaintiff Abraham Cruz (Plaintiff) filed suit for relief under Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 526a as a representative of the City of Industry.

            On 2/24/2025, City Defendants City of Industry, Mark Radecki, Cory Moss, Newell Ruggles, Michael Greubel (erroneously sued as Michael Gruebel), and Steven Marcucci (collectively, City Defendants) moved for a judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Factual Background

On 12/8/2020, Gilmore filed the Cruz I Lawsuit on behalf of Cruz and against the City, Radecki, Moss, Ruggles, Greubel, and former Councilmember Catherine Marcucci. (Hosp Decl. ¶ 8.) Like this lawsuit, Cruz asserted a single “Private Attorney General Action/Representative Action” under Section 526a that relied on the same generic conflict of interest and competitive bidding. (Id. ¶ 9.) Ultimately, after giving Cruz several opportunities to amend, this Court concluded that Cruz’s claim lacked any merit. (Id. ¶¶ 10-12, Exs. 37-39.) On 8/23/2021, the Court sustained the City defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend as to Cruz’s second amended complaint (Cruz I SAC). (Id. ¶ 12, Ex. 39.) Among other things, the Court found that Cruz’s failed to “identif[y] any specific provisions of law or the City [Charter] that is being violated by City Defendants’ alleged conduct.” (Id., Ex. 39.) Accordingly, on November 1, 2021, the Court entered a judgment dismissing the Cruz I Lawsuit and Cruz did not appeal. (Id. ¶ 13, Ex. 40.)

On 7/3/2024, Cruz filed this lawsuit in which he—again—asserts a claim under Section 526a in a representative capacity on behalf of the City. (Compl. ¶ 156.) The allegations are identical to those already litigated and resolved in the previous lawsuits, including (1) housing rented to City Councilmembers (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 48-69; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 72-89), (2) various employment contracts, including Moss’s employment with CNC Equestrian and Radecki’s employment with Square Root (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 70-81, 82-89; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 90-99, 102-107), (3) the City contract with Haddick’s Towing (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 90-93; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 108-113), (4) other contracts executed years before any of the City Councilmembers were elected were obtained in violation of the City Charter or otherwise with no bids or oversight (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 108-112, 118-124; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 148-145, 161-162), (5) funding of El Encanto Hospital (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 94-99; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 114-124), and (6) use of City funds to defend individual defendants (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 133-147; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 167-171)

Discussion

            City Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Alternatively, the City Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that Cruz fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against City Defendants. City Defendants also argue that his claim is barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a).

            After review, the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by res judicata. Given this conclusion, the Court does not reach the remaining arguments set forth by the City Defendants.

[T]he doctrine of res judicata operates to bar any further litigation arising out of the same subject matter of a prior action as between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (Gates v. Superior Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 301, 308, 311 [trial court should have sustained demurrer to complaint in second lawsuit on res judicata grounds].) The doctrine has two aspects: claim preclusion and issue preclusion.

Claim preclusion “prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 [DKN].) Claim preclusion arises if a second suit involves: (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties or parties in privity with the parties in the first suit (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit. (Id.) “If claim preclusion is established, it operates to bar relitigation of the claim altogether.” (Id.)

Issue preclusion, on the other hand, prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) The elements of issue preclusion are substantially the same as claim preclusion, with two differences. First, issue preclusion can be raised by one who was not a party or in privity with a party in the first suit. (Vandenberg v. Super. Ct. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 828.) “Only the party against whom the doctrine is invoked must be bound by the prior proceeding. [Citations.]” (Id. [emphasis in original].) Second, “[u]nlike claim preclusion, for issue preclusion to apply the issue must have been actually litigated and decided.” (Samara v. Matar (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 796, 808, aff’d (2018) 5 Cal.5th 322.) In sum, issue preclusion applies: (1) after final adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) that was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) is being asserted in a second suit against one who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that party. (DKN, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 824–825.)

The doctrine of res judicata “is not mechanically applied, and in each case the court must determine whether its application will advance the public policies which underlie the doctrine.” (Alpha Mechanical, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of America (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1333.) Those policies are: “(1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system: and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation.” (Id.) The elements of claim and issue preclusion are easily satisfied here.

Here, Cruz’s claim against the City Defendants is completely barred because it involves the same cause of action between the same parties, after a final judgment on the merits in the Cruz I Lawsuit. (DKN, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 824–825.)

As for the first element, Cruz is the plaintiff in both actions suing in a representative capacity on behalf of the City. Radecki, Moss, Ruggles, and Greubel are named defendants in Cruz I and the instant action. Even though Councilmember Steven Marcucci was not a defendant in Cruz I, he is still treated as the “same party” for purposes of res judicata because he shares an “an identity or community of interest” with the City Defendants in the Cruz I Lawsuit, which included his late wife, former Councilmember Catherine Marcucci. (Id. at p. 826 [privity “requires the sharing of ‘an identity or community of interest,’ with ‘adequate representation’ of that interest in the first suit, and circumstances such that the nonparty ‘should reasonably have expected to be bound’ by the first suit.”].)

Agents of the City, including City Councilmembers, are also in privity with one another because they have “an identity or community of interest” with the subject matter of the litigation. (See id.; Lerner v. Los Angeles Cty. Bd. of Education (1963) 59 Cal.2d 382, 398 [agents of the same government are in privity with one another]; Cal Sierra Dev., Inc. v. George Reed, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 663, 674 [privity “deals with a person’s relationship to the subject matter of the litigation.’”].) Here, Cruz’s allegations against the current City Councilmembers in this case are identical to the allegations against the City Councilmembers in office at the time of the Cruz I Lawsuit. (E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 57-58; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 72, 79.) Thus, they are in privity and the parties are the same.

As for the second element, California law defines a cause of action by focusing on the “primary right” at stake. For claim preclusion, a “claim” (or “cause of action”) is “the existence of a primary right and one violation of that right.” (Gates, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at 309.) In other words, a cause of action “arises out of an antecedent primary right and corresponding duty, and a breach of such primary right and duty by the person upon whom the duty rests.” (Id.) “In California the phrase ‘cause of action’ is often used indiscriminately ... to mean counts which state [according to different legal theories] the same cause of action....” (Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 788, 798.) It is “the right to obtain redress for a harm suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal theory (common law or statutory) advanced.” (Id.) “Thus, under the primary rights theory, the determinative factor is the harm suffered. When two actions involving the same parties seek compensation for the same harm, they generally involve the same primary right.” (Id.) “Were the rule otherwise, litigation finally would end only when a party ran out of counsel whose knowledge and imagination could conceive of different theories of relief based upon the same factual background.” (Kronkright v. Gardner (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 214, 216.)

This case and the Cruz I Lawsuit involve the same “Private Attorney General/Representative Action” claim under Section 526a. In Gates, the issue was whether a stipulated judgment in a representative taxpayer claim barred a subsequent taxpayer suit by other plaintiffs challenging the same practices of the Los Angeles Police Department. (Gates, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at 305–308.) Even though the actions were filed by two different plaintiffs, the court still held that claim preclusion applied because “the pleadings in both instances rely upon [Section 526a]” and the first taxpayer lawsuit “extinguished all equitable claims which were or might have been brought under [Section 526a].” (Id., p. 310.) Accordingly, claim preclusion applies to this case because the claims in both cases rely upon Section 526a involving the same alleged “improper expenditures, waste and ultra vires activities” of the City Council. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2, 156, 158; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 1-2, 123, 145, 150.)

Finally, as to the third element, the order sustaining the demurrer in the Cruz I Lawsuit is a final judgment on the merits. “A judgment given after the sustaining of a general demurrer on a ground of substance, for example, that an absolute defense is disclosed by the allegations of the complaint, may be deemed a judgment on the merits, and conclusive in a subsequent suit; and the same is true where the demurrer sets up the failure of the facts alleged to establish a cause of action, and the same facts are pleaded in the second action.” (Goddard v. Sec. Title Ins. & Guarantee Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 51–53.)

As such, Plaintiff’s representative claim against the City Defendants is barred under a theory of claim preclusion.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims are barred under a theory of issue preclusion.

Issue preclusion prohibits the relitigation of issues argued and decided in a previous case, even if the second suit raises different causes of action. (E.g., DKN, supra, 61 Cal.4th at 824–825.) An issue is decided by a prior judgment if the issue “is actually raised by proper pleadings and treated as an issue in the cause . . . ” (Sutphin v. Speik (1940) 15 Cal.2d 195, 202.) “But the rule goes further. If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject-matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged.” (Id.) “Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable.” (Id.) Courts should apply issue preclusion “to prevent repetitious litigation of what is essentially the same dispute.” (Rest.2d Judgments, § 27, com. c, p. 252.)

Here, Cruz’s claim against the City Defendants arises out of the same issues that were litigated in the Cruz I Lawsuit. They include (1) alleged conflicts of interest and competitive bidding violations relating to certain contracts (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 86 [Square Root], 36 [Zerep], 90-93 [Haddick’s Towing], 108-112 [CNC Engineering], 118-124 [Valley Vista], 157; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 23, 41, 105, 108-113, 132, 140, 148-154, 186, 188, 208, 218; Demurrer, pp. 11-12); (2) alleged conflicts of interests relating to the employment of certain City Councilmembers (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 70-81 [Moss/CNC Equestrian], 82-89 [Radecki/Square Root]; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 90-99, 102-107); (3) conflicts of interest relating to rental agreements involving Radecki, Moss, Greubel, and Marcucci (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 48-69; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 72- 89); and (4) other instances of alleged “waste” relating to El Encanto Hospital and the City defending officials sued for these violations (e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 94-99, 133-147; Cruz I SAC ¶¶ 114-124, 167-171). Each of these issues was litigated and conclusively determined when the court sustained the City Defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend in Cruz I. (See Exs. 39 [Min. Order, p. 3 [“Plaintiff has also failed to identify specific provisions of law being violated by City Defendants’ alleged illegal conduct.”]; 40 [Tr., p. 17:1-3, 6-8]).

In opposition, Plaintiff argues he has included additional allegations about two alleged payments made by the City to resolve claims by Scrivens and Schlicting. (Compl. ¶¶ 137-147.) Cruz speculates that these payments constituted “waste” and should, therefore, be clawed back under Section 526a. (E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 147, 155-156.) However, these allegations are part of the same alleged pattern of corruption and influence of the Perez defendants as in Cruz’s previous lawsuit under Section 526a. (See, Gates, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at 311 [judgment in taxpayer suit challenging a certain pattern of LAPD’s practices “barr[ed] not only the reopening of the original controversy, but also subsequent litigation of all issues which were or could have been raised in the original suit.”].)

In sum, the Court finds Plaintiff’s claims to be barred by both issue and claim preclusion.

Based on the foregoing, City Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted, without leave to amend.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  April    , 2025

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.