Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 24STCV29207, Date: 2025-05-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV29207 Hearing Date: May 13, 2025 Dept: 17
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 17
TENTATIVE RULING
| MICHAEL A. WHITE vs. THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al. | Case No.: 24STCV29207 Hearing Date: May 14, 2025 |
Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED IN PART, SUSTAINED IN PART:
- Defendants’ demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first cause of action;
- Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITH 15 DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND, as to the second cause of action; and
- Defendants’ demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, as to the third cause of action.
Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.
On 11/6/2024, Plaintiff Michael A. White (Plaintiff) filed suit against the County of Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (collectively, Defendants). On 2/18/2025, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC) alleging: (1) race discrimination; (2) age discrimination; and (3) retaliation.
On 3/24/2025, Defendants demurred to Plaintiff’s FAC.
Discussion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims are insufficiently pled.
After review, the Court agrees only in part.
As to the first cause of action, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show discriminatory motive. However, Plaintiff alleges:
Plaintiff applied for promotion to the rank of Captain eight (8) times in the last 13 years. Each and every time he applied for promotion to the rank of captain, he was found to be well qualified for the position. Nevertheless, each and every time Captain’s positions were awarded to non-African Americans, often with far less experience, less qualified, less tenure in the department and often younger. On information and belief, he is currently at the highest level of qualification to be promoted and, but for the discrimination and other illegal adverse treatment that he has and is currently receiving, would have been promoted today to the rank of Captain or above. Other than the discrimination, harassment and retaliation as alleged herein, there is no impediment to his being promoted to higher rank.
(FAC ¶ 6.)
Accepted as true at the pleading stage, these allegations are sufficient at the pleading stage to state a claim. A prima facie discrimination claim generally requires the plaintiff to allege facts which could show that (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the position he or she sought or was performing competently in the position held, (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests a discriminatory motive." (Wilkin v. Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 806, 821.) Plaintiff’s allegations here do so by alleging that he repeatedly applied for a position he was well-qualified for, and each the time the position was instead given to a non-African American, less qualified candidate. While Defendants argue that the inference that the decision was race based is speculative, it is difficult to imagine what other specific circumstantial facts Plaintiffs could allege without the benefit of discovery.
As for the second cause of action, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged facts which could show age discrimination. More specifically, “Plaintiff pleads that candidates chosen over him were ‘junior,’ ‘younger,’ or ‘less tenured’ than Plaintiff, but there are no facts suggesting how ‘junior,’ ‘younger’ or ‘less tenured’ or how a competitor being less tenured equates to a competitor being less qualified” (Motion, 13: 17-19.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s allegations are uncertain in that they make unclear what the magnitude of age difference was for any of the individuals who were promoted over Plaintiff. Clearly, an allegation that a less tenured person was promoted over him who is the same age as him cannot support a claim for age discrimination. However, leave to amend will be afforded to clarify these allegations.
As for the third cause of action, Defendants argue that the third cause of action for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5 is barred due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Government Claims Act and present the claim to the County prior to filing this lawsuit.
California Government Code section 911.2 provides:
A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property… shall be presented… not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.
“[T]he claims presentation requirement applies to all forms of monetary demands, regardless of the theory of the action…The failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars the plaintiff from bringing suit against that entity.” (California Restaurant Management Systems v. City of San Diego (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1581, 1591) (emphasis added). “Accrual for purposes of the Act is the date of accrual that would pertain under the statute of limitations applicable to a dispute between private litigants.” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (Willis) (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1118).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged he has complied with the Government Claims Act, and the alleged retaliatory non-promotions took place more than six months prior to filing. Compliance with the Government Claims Act is not an alternative method of resolution, but instead it is a necessary element for bringing a claim before the court. (DiCampliMintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990 [“the timely filing of a written government claim is an element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail on his or her cause of action.”].
In Willis, the plaintiff was a peace officer who alleged that the city that employed him violated Labor Code section 1102.5 by denying him promotions after he allegedly engaged in protected activity under the whistleblower statute. Before trial, the city successfully moved to strike allegations of certain alleged adverse employment actions within the officer’s 1102.5 cause of action on grounds the officer had not timely presented a government tort claim within six months of the acts as required by the Government Claims Act.2 In holding that the trial court’s Labor Code section 1102.5 rulings were correct, the Court of Appeal held that public policy requires the “strict application” of the claims presentation requirement due in no small part to the “recognition of the special status of public entities, according them greater protections than nonpublic entity defendants, because … public entities … will incur costs that must ultimately be borne by the taxpayers.” (Willis, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 1120)
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he presented his pre-August 6, 2024, 1102.5 claims to the Department prior to bringing his suit.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend, as to the third cause of action.
Motion to Strike
Defendants argue that the following should be stricken:
- Paragraph 23, in its entirety.
- Paragraph 24, in its entirety.
- Paragraph 25, in its entirety.
- Paragraph 26, to the extent it alleges any claims before November 6, 2021.
As for the pre-2021 causes of action, the Court finds sufficient facts at the pleadings stage to show a continuing violation, such that the claims are not clearly barred on their face.
As for the contention that the pre-November 2021 causes of action are outside the Government Claims Act’s statute of limitations, the Court similarly finds sufficient allegations to show a continuing violation at the pleadings stage.
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to strike is denied.
It is so ordered.
Dated: May , 2025
Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
Judge of the Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative. If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order. If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.