Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 24STCV30883, Date: 2025-06-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV30883    Hearing Date: June 4, 2025    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 17

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

ERIC ALTON, et al.

 

         vs.

 

UNITED AMERICAN INDIAN INVOLVEMENT, INC., et al.

 

 Case No.:  24STCV30883

 

 

 

 Hearing Date: June 4, 2025

 

Defendant’s motion, joined by remaining Defendants, to compel arbitration is GRANTED. This action is stayed pending the completion of arbitration.

 

            On 11/22/2024, Plaintiffs Eric Alton and Kevin Koko (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against United American Indian Involvement, Inc., United American Involvement Foundation, Inc., and Hope Craig (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) disability discrimination; (2) retaliation; (3) failure to engage in interactive process; (4) harassment; (5) wrongful termination; and (6) whistleblower retaliation.

 

            On 12/6/2024, Defendant United American Indian Involvement, Inc. (Defendant) moved to compel arbitration and stay this proceeding. The remaining Defendants filed a joinder to the motion.

 

Legal Standard

 

Where the Court has determined that an agreement to arbitrate a controversy exists, the Court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy …unless it determines that…  grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) Among the grounds which can support rescission are fraud, duress, and unconscionability. (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 239.) The Court may also decline to compel arbitration wherein there is possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2 (c).)

 

Discussion

 

I.                   Defendants’ Burden

 

The party moving to compel arbitration “bears the burden of proving [the] existence [of an arbitration agreement] by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) The moving party also bears the burden of demonstrating that the claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.)

 

A.    Existing Agreement

 

Here, Defendant submitted evidence that as part of Plaintiffs’ employment onboarding with UAII, Plaintiff Koko hand-signed UAII’s Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes (the Arbitration Agreement) on 5/15/2023, and Plaintiff Alton hand-signed UAII’s Arbitration Agreement on 2/12/2024. (Abbott Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. A (Plaintiff Koko’s Signed Arbitration Agreement), ¶ 5, Ex. B (Plaintiff Alton’s Signed Arbitration Agreement).)

 

      In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that they did not sign the agreements.  However, after review, the Court finds the preponderance of evidence supports a finding that they were signed by Plaintiffs. This is based, in part, on the fact that there is no evidence to support a finding of fraud, and the Arbitration Agreements were hand-signed.

 

      The Arbitration Agreements cover “[a]ny dispute, controversy, or claim ("Claims") between the parties arising out of or in any way relating to the employment of Employee by the Company, or otherwise arising out of or relating in any way to Employee's employment or the termination of that employment, or any other matters between the parties…” (Abbot Decl., Exh. A.) Each of Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the scope of the Agreement. 

 

Given that Defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that arbitration agreements exist, and that Plaintiffs’ claims are covered by those agreements, the burden shifts to the Plaintiffs to establish that the arbitration clauses should not be enforced. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

 

II.               Plaintiff’s Burden 

 

The party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence any defense, such as unconscionability or duress. (Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236.) Here, Plaintiffs argue the arbitration agreements are invalid because they are unconscionable.

 

Here, Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreements are procedurally unconscionable because they are adhesion contacts.

 

Where pre-employment adhesion contracts are involved, a degree of procedural unconscionability is always present. This is because, “the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration agreement.” (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1071.)  However, where “there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, the degree of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low, and the agreement will be enforceable unless the degree of substantive unconscionability is high.” (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 796.)

 

As evidence of substantive unconscionability, Plaintiffs argue that the ADR rules are overly restrictive and the ability to subpoena witnesses is compromised. However, tellingly, Plaintiffs do not cite a single case wherein a Court has found comparable rules—which are created by the ADR and not Defendant—to be unconscionable.

 

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to show any evidence of substantive unconscionability.  Therefore, while Plaintiffs have demonstrated a degree of procedural unconscionability, they have not demonstrated any degree of substantive unconscionability. As a result, the Court finds that the arbitration agreement is enforceable as to both Plaintiffs’ claims. (Ajamian, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 796.) The Court stays this action pending the completion of arbitration.

 

It is so ordered.

 

Dated:  June    , 2025

                                                                                                                                                          

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.  





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