Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 25STCV00797, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV00797    Hearing Date: April 22, 2025    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. 

            On 1/13/2025, Plaintiff Ranson Almeida (Plaintiff) filed suit against South Bay Aviation, Inc. (Defendant), alleging: (1) Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); and (2) Military and Veterans Code section 394.

Legal Standard

Where the Court has determined that an agreement to arbitrate a controversy exists, the Court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy …unless it determines that…  grounds exist for rescission of the agreement.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) Among the grounds which can support rescission are fraud, duress, and unconscionability. (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 231, 239.) The Court may also decline to compel arbitration wherein there is possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2 (c).)

Discussion

The party moving to compel arbitration “bears the burden of proving [the] existence [of an arbitration agreement] by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) The moving party also bears the burden of demonstrating that the claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement. (Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 955, 961.)

            Here, Defendant submitted evidence that Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an employment relationship that included the agreement of the parties to the South Bay Aviation’s “Employee Manual.” (Seal Decl., Exh. A, Employee Manual) Plaintiff signed his consent to abide by the employee manual on 7/14/2021. This manual, at clause “O” on p. 12, has a binding arbitration agreement.

            In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Manual in question is an informational “guide” that expressly states that is not a contract.

            In support, Plaintiff cites provisions from the Manual that provide: “This employee manual provides information about employment”; “nothing in this manual creates an express or implied contract”; “I understand this is a guide only…I further understand this manual is not intended in any way to create an employment contract….” (Seal Decl., Exh. A.)

            However, as noted by Defendant in reply, these assertions are taken out of context: “Plaintiff seeks to extend the intent of Clause A in which the Employee Manual clarifies that nothing in the manual is intended to create an expressed or implied contract, for as the clause description states, “at will employment.” (Reply, 2: 23-26.)

            In other words, the provisions cited by Plaintiff were intended to make clear that this the Employee Manual was not intended to create an express or implied “employment contract” supplanting the Plaintiff’s employment as an “at will employee.”

Moreover, the Employee Manual expressly invokes the arbitration agreement in a separate identifiable clause and acknowledgement.

As such, the facts are distinguishable from those in cases like Esparza v. Sand & Sea, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 781. There, the welcome letter stated “this handbook is not intended to be a contract (express or implied), nor is it intended to otherwise create any legally enforceable obligations on the part of the company or its employees.) (Id.) Here, by contrast, the Manual does not state that it is not intended to create any enforceable obligations. Rather, it states that there is nothing in the Manual transforming Plaintiff’s employment to a contractual employment, rather than “at will” employment.

Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the employment relationship, and thus fall within the scope of the arbitration provision.

Taken together, Defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that an arbitration agreement exists, and that Plaintiff’s claims are covered by that agreement. Accordingly, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to establish that the arbitration clause should not be enforced. (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236. (Pinnacle).)

Plaintiff did not advance any argument as to unenforceability and thus has failed to meet his burden to show that arbitration should not be enforced. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 841-42;

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is granted. 

It is so ordered.

Dated:  April    , 2025

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.