Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 25STCV00895, Date: 2025-05-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25STCV00895 Hearing Date: May 12, 2025 Dept: 17
County of Los
Angeles
DEPARTMENT 17
TENTATIVE RULING
|
DAVID HERRERA
vs. RAMONA PROPERTIES, LLC |
Case
No.: 25STCV00895 Hearing Date: May 12, 2025 |
Defendant’s
demurrer is SUSTAINED, WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND, as to the fifth and ninth causes
of action. Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED as to the remaining causes of
action.
Defendant’s
motion to strike is DENIED.
On
1/14/2025, Plaintiff David Herrera (Plaintiff) filed suit against Ramona
Properties, LLC (Defendant), alleging: (1) breach of warranty of habitability;
(2) breach of warranty of habitability; (3) breach of warranty of habitability;
(4) negligence per se; (5) nuisance; (6) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (7) breach of contract; (8) unfair business practices; and (9)
fraudulent concealment.
On
3/20/2025, Defendant demurred to Plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and
ninth causes of action. Defendant also moves to strike portions of Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
Discussion
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff’s claims are insufficiently pled.
After
review, the Court agrees in part.
As
for the fifth cause of action, Defendant argues that this claim is duplicative.
The Court agrees. “‘Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the
same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.’
The nuisance claim ‘stands or falls with the determination of the negligence
cause of action’ in such cases.” (Melton v. Boustred (2010) 183
Cal.App.4th 521, 542.)
As
for the sixth cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged
extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to show intentional infliction of
emotional distress. However, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knowingly allowed
bed bugs and “deplorable” living conditions to persist at their residence.
(Complaint ¶ 5.) Whether or not this conduct is, in fact, extreme and
outrageous, is a factual determination not properly made at this stage.
As
for the seventh cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not
sufficiently alleged the terms of the contract. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff
alleges “Defendants and Plaintiff entered into a valid Rental Agreement (that
had written, oral and implied terms) setting forth terms surrounding the rental
of the room at the Subject Property.” (Complaint ¶ 166.) Plaintiff alleges that
there was a warranty of habitability under the contract, and that it was
breached by Defendant’s failure to address the bed bug infestation. This is
sufficient to put Defendant on notice of the allegations support the breach of
contract claim.
As
for the eighth cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff violated
California Civil Code sections 1941 and 1941.1, and engaged in unfair business
practices by demanding rent while failing to abate known habitability
violations. As such, this claim is sufficiently plead at the pleadings stage.
Finally,
as for the ninth cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not
alleged facts which could show fraudulent concealment. The Court agrees.
Plaintiff’s allegations could show a breach of contract, but not fraud. “A
person may not ordinarily recover in tort for the breach of duties that merely
restate contractual obligations.” (Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown
& Toland Med. Grp. (2006) 143 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1041 citing Aas v.
Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal. 4th 627, 643.)
Based
on the foregoing, Defendant’s demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend, as
to the fifth and ninth causes of action. Defendant’s demurrer is overruled as
to the remaining causes of action.
Motion to Strike
Defendant
argues that Plaintiff has not alleged facts which could support a prayer for
punitive damages. However, as set forth above, the Court overruled Defendant’s
demurrer to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. As such,
Plaintiff has alleged facts which could show Defendant acted with conscious
disregard for Plaintiff’s rights and with the intent, design, and malicious
purpose of injuring the Plaintiff. (Civ. Code § 3294(b).)
Based
on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to strike is denied.
It is so ordered.
Dated: May
, 2025
Hon. Jon R.
Takasugi
Judge of the
Superior Court
Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must
send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org
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website at www.lacourt.org. If a party submits
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identify the party submitting on the tentative.
If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this
tentative as the final order. If the department
does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the
tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed
off calendar. For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213)
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