Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: 25STCV04518, Date: 2025-05-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV04518    Hearing Date: May 20, 2025    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENATIVE RULING

Defendant’s special motion to strike is GRANTED.

On 2/18/2025, Plaintiff Zachary Walkine (Plaintiff) filed suit against Jason S. Bromberg, M.D. and Agoura-West Valley Pediatric Medical Group (collectively, Defendants), alleging: (1) defamation (per se); (2) medical malpractice (negligence); (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

            On 4/17/2025, Defendant Jason S. Bromberg (Defendant) moved to specially strike Plaintiff’s Complaint.

Legal Standard

On a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 425.16, also known as an anti-SLAPP motion, moving parties have the initial burden to demonstrate that a cause of action is subject to a special motion to strike. (Martinez v. Metabolife Inter. Ins. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 181, 186; Fox Searchlight Pictures Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 304.) First, the court must determine whether moving parties have made a prima facie showing that the attacked claims arise from a protected activity, including defendants’ right of petition, or free speech, under a constitution, in connection with issues of public interest. (Healy v. Tuscany Hills Landscape & Recreation Corp., (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1, 5; Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 278; Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).) Moving parties can satisfy this burden by showing (1) statements made before legislative, executive or judicial proceedings, or made in connection with matters being considered in such proceedings, or (2) statements made in a public forum, or other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional rights of petition or free speech, in connection with issues of public interest. (Code Civ. Proc.,­ § 425.16, subd. (e); Equilon Ent., LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66.) 

If the court finds this showing has been made, it must dismiss the cause of action unless the plaintiff meets its burden to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Balzaga v. Fox News Network, LLC (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1336.) This means that the plaintiff must state a legally sufficient claim and must then present evidence that substantiates or sustains the claim. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61; see also Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 [plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited”].)

Factual Background  

Plaintiff has brought suit against moving defendant, Jason S. Bromberg, alleging that Dr. Bromberg made a report to child protective services of suspected child abuse on or about November 28, 2023, without reasonable suspicion of abuse. The plaintiff alleges that report resulted in his children being removed from his custody between December 2023 and June 2024 and caused him harm.

Discussion

            Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to anti-SLAPP because: (1) a report of suspected child abuse made under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (the Act) to an appropriate investigative authority, such as child protective services, constitutes an activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute; and (2) Plaintiff cannot show a probability of prevailing on the merits because the conduct is protected by the litigation privilege.

            After review, the Court agrees.

            As for the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Dr. Bromberg is a licensed physician and surgeon. (Bromberg Decl., ¶ 1.) As such, he is deemed a “mandatory reporter,” under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. (Penal Code § 11165.7(a)(21).) That is, he has a legal obligation to make a report to an agency specified in Section 11165.93 whenever in his professional capacity he has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect. Failure to make such a report constitutes a misdemeanor. (Penal Code § 11166(a).)

In Dwight R, the Court held that a report of suspected child abuse to a child protective services by a “mandated reporter” is protected by Section 425.16 as an act preparatory to or in anticipation of official proceedings, namely, an investigation into the abuse allegations. (Dwight R. v. Christy B. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 697, 711, and fn. 6; see also B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 191 [Legislature considers child welfare agencies, to be child protective agencies that are designated to accept reports and investigate child abuse reports].)

As such, Dr. Bromberg’s report qualifies as an activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.

Accordingly, the Court turns to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. To prevail at prong two, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal. 4th 811, 821.) The plaintiff must also overcome any substantive defenses that exist, including a defense of privilege. (Rohde v. Wolf (2007) 154 Cal. App. 4th 28, 38.)

The Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act provides that “[n]o mandated reporter shall be civilly or criminally liable for any report required or authorized by this article, and this immunity shall apply even if the mandated reporter acquired the knowledge or reasonable suspicion of child abuse or neglect outside of their professional capacity or outside the scope of their employment.” (Penal Code § 11172.)

A “mandated reporter is also absolutely immune from civil and criminal liability for “conduct giving rise to the obligation to report [including] the collection of data, or the observation, examination, or treatment of the suspected victim or perpetrator of child abuse,” and even for knowingly or recklessly making a false report or falsifying evidence of child abuse or neglect. (Penal Code § 11172(a).) This provision of Section 11172(a), provides and “unqualified, absolute immunity from criminal and civil liability ‘for any report required or authorized’.” (Dwight R, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 707-708.) That absolute immunity also applies to “conduct giving rise to the obligation to report [including] the collection of data, or the observation, examination, or treatment of the suspected victim or perpetrator of child abuse,” and even for knowingly or recklessly making a false report or falsifying evidence of child abuse or neglect. (Id., citing Storch v. Silverman (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 671, 681.)

As explained in Storch: “The [Reporting Act] is designed to encourage the reporting of child abuse to the greatest extent possible to prevent further abuse. Reporters are required to report child abuse promptly and they are subject to criminal prosecution if they fail to report as required. Accordingly, absolute immunity from liability for all reports is consistent with that scheme.” (Storch, supra, at 678–679 [italics added]; Dwight R, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at 708.)

Accordingly, Defendant is absolutely immune from liability for having made the child abuse report, even if that report lacked adequate foundation, as plaintiff alleges. Each of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant stem from the report of child abuse. As such, the Court finds Plaintiff cannot show a reasonable probability of prevailing on the merits. While Plaintiff argues that immunity only applies where the report was made in good faith and with reasonable suspicion, this would necessarily require a factual determination. A requirement that each claim be factually assessed before immunity can be applied would entirely undermine the purpose of immunity, as it would necessarily require that the claim proceed beyond the pleadings stage. 

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s special motion to strike is granted.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  May    , 2025

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar.  For more information, please contact the court clerk at (213) 633-0517.