Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: BC676901, Date: 2022-10-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC676901    Hearing Date: October 18, 2022    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 17

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

RONALD ANDREW BOTH

                          

         vs.

 

JEFFREY SCOTT LIOLIOS, et al. 

 

                                         

 Case No.:  BC676901

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  October 18, 2022

 

 

Both is awarded $1,198,512 in reasonable attorney fees. The adjusted award is to be apportioned amongst the parties in the same proportions as requested in the Moving Parties’ motion.

 

Given that there has been no finding of alter-ego status, Liolios is only jointly and severally liable for attorney fees awarded on Both’s and Plank’s wage claim.

 

On 09/21/17, Plaintiff Ronald Andrew Both filed a Complaint against Jeffrey Scott Liolios and Liolios Group, setting forth claims for 1) breach of fiduciary duty; 2) oppression of minority member; 3) unjust enrichment; 4) violation of Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq.; 5) accounting. 

 

On 10/25/17, Liolios Group filed a XC against Both, Geoffrey Plank, Grant Stude, and Capital Market Access, LLC (Capital), setting forth claims for 1) breach of contract; 2) misappropriation of trade secrets; 3) intentional interference with contract; and 4) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. 

 

On 12/13/17, Both, Plank, and Stude filed a XXC against Liolios and Liolios Group, setting forth claims for 1) breach of contract; 2) quantum meruit; 3) unpaid wages in violation of Labor Code §§ 200, 201; 4) waiting-time penalties pursuant to Labor Code § 203; and 5) violation of Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. 

 

            Now, Both, Plank, Stude and Capital (Moving Parties) move to recover $1,598,016 in reasonable attorney fees apportioned as follows: (1) $1,434,590.59 to Both, (2) $138,425.41 to Plank, (3) $15,000 to Stude, and (4) $10,000 to CMA.

 

Discussion

 

            Moving Parties argue they entitled to recover attorney fees under a number of provisions. More specifically, they argue Both and Plank are entitled to attorney fees for prevailing on their wage claims under Labor Code section 218.5; Both, Plank, and Stude are entitled to attorney fees for prevailing on a contract with an attorney-fees provision under Civil Code section 1717; and Both, Plank, Stude, and CMA are entitled to their attorney fees for prevailing on LGI’s cross-claim for misappropriation of trade secrets under Civil Code section 3426.4.

           

Rates

 

            Mark Mazda claims a rate of $615/hr. Mr. Mazda has been a member of the California Bar since 1995, and specializes in civil litigation.  After a consideration of the relevant factors, including the duration of the litigation, the contingency nature of the representation, the difficulty of the litigation, and the skill required, the Court finds that this is a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney with similar skill and experience. (Stokus v. Marsh (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 647, 657 (Stokus).)

           

Hours

 

            Mr. Mazda claims 1,299.2 hours spent on this matter. In support, Mr. Mazda did not submit annotated billing records but rather provided detailed descriptions of the various services provided. Specifically, Mr. Mazda provided the following information about his hours claimed:

 

Hours    Brief Description of Task

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Multiplying Mr. Mazda’s hourly rate of $615 by 1,299.2 hours yields a lodestar attorney fees amount of $799,008.

 

In opposition, Defendants argue that Both is not entitled to recover for a number of claims and motions including three motions to compel, depositions of individuals like Jack Corman, and the misappropriation of trade secrets claim. However, as extensively noted by Both in reply, the tasks identified by Defendants were for covered claims and were directly relevant to Both’s wage claims.  (See Reply, 3: 15- 7:12.) As such, the Court finds these tasks recoverable.

 

Similarly, the Court finds that Both is entitled to recover for the misappropriation of trade secret claim. Under California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Civil Code sections 3426-3426.11, attorney fees are recoverable if a claimed trade secret violation is made or resisted in bad faith or if a willful or malicious appropriation if found. Here, as noted by Both in reply, Defendants’ misappropriation claim was based on claims that their client contact information for LGI’s clients was not available on the Internet, and that they spent significant time and funds identifying, recruiting, and maintaining its clients and LGI’s propriety information. Both claims were established to be demonstrably false during trial, indicating that the cause of action was entirely without merit. As a meritless claim, it falls within the scope of Civil Code section 3426.4.  

 

Relevant factors to determine whether an enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

 

            Here, the Court finds a 1.5 multiplier to be warranted. Mr. Mazda is a solo practitioner who took this case on a purely contingent basis. Accordingly, Mr. Mazda not only bore the full risk of non-recovery but was completely precluded from working or billing on any other case throughout this litigation. Given these factors, alongside the fact that this matter was heavily contested, proceeded to trial, and involved multiple claims and cross-claims, the Court finds a 1.5 multiplier to be warranted. 

 

Both is awarded $1,198,512 in reasonable attorney fees. The adjusted award is to be apportioned amongst the parties in the same proportions as requested in the Moving Parties’ motion.

           

It is so ordered.

 

Dated:  October    , 2022

                                                                                                                                                          

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

 

 

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

 

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