Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: BC714907, Date: 2022-10-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC714907    Hearing Date: October 26, 2022    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Motion in Limine: RFAs

            Defendant Zhao seeks to exclude Zhang’s requests for admission which were deemed admitted after he failed to respond. Defendant argues that the RFAs are highly prejudicial because they will “imply the Defendants were aware of the alleged fraud and all of actions which were allegedly taken in pursuit of the alleged fraudulent scheme” and “[t]he Minute Order will confuse the jury because Plaintiff will argue that all of the facts deemed admitted are in fact true thereby allowing the Plaintiff to admit facts in evidence without providing any proof whatsoever.” (Motion, 6: 2- 11.)

            In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Zhao has no right to interfere with the pursuit of default judgment against Zhang and Lexury, and a party’s admission of wrongdoing can never be prejudicial to that proceeding.

            However, as to Plaintiff’s first point, there is no suggestion in Zhao’s motion that default judgment is improper against Zhang. CCP section 579 is clear that separate judgments against appearing and defaulted parties are permissible: “In an action against several defendants, the Court may, in its discretion, render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed against the others, whenever a several judgment is proper.” Here, Zhang’s admissions are admissible to establish his own liability. However, here, the question is whether or not Zhang’s admissions should be admissible in the trial determining Zhao’s liability.

            The Court concludes that they should not. Zhao is an appearing party here and has disputed the allegations set forth by Plaintiff. Zhang’s admissions were deemed admitted due to a failure to respond, rather than according to proof. To allow Zhang’s admissions to be used against Zhao would allow Plaintiff to utilize the fact that a party failed to respond in order to alleviate its burden of proof to establish the veracity of its claims. Moreover importantly, to allow the evidence would also create a high risk that the jury will confuse the RFAs as substantive evidence against Zhao. (Evid. Code § 352.)

            In sum, the Court finds that while the RFAs deemed admitted as to Zhang may be used to obtain a default judgment against Zhang, those RFAs may not be admitted against Zhao to establish Zhao’s liability. The Court will allow trail to proceed against Zhang, and will then evaluate the application for default judgment against Zhao.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion in limine to exclude Zhang’s RFAs from trial is granted.

Motion in Limine: Writ of Possession

            Plaintiff argues the writ of possession obtained by Defendants in the Lead Case should be excluded from evidence because it was only a provisional determination of the ownership of the 6 vehicles and is “extremely prejudicial” to Plaintiff. In support, Plaintiff notes that the writ of possession was only granted “because Zhengfang was denied to intervene, [so] there was no ‘opposition.’” (Motion, 5: 14-17.)

            In opposition, Defendants argue that contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, Plaintiff did intervene and oppose the motion: “Plaintiff intervened and filed an Opposition to Zhao’s and Zhang’s Application and submitted a Notice of Lodging of Wiring Transfer Receipts and lodged evidence in opposition to its claims to superior title to the vehicles.” (4: 17-19.) It was only after considering Plaintiff’s arguments, its opposition and evidence, that the Court issued the Writ ordering possession of the vehicles to Zhao and Zhang. Indeed, Defendants’ request for judicial notice includes an opposition submitted by Plaintiff to oppose the ex parte application for the writ of possession.

            However, the determinative issue for this motion is not whether or not the writ application was opposed. Rather, the issue is whether or not the writ can be admitted into evidence to determine the issue of possession. The Court concludes that it cannot. The ruling on the writ application was not an adjudication on the merits for the question of possession. Rather, the ruling was a preliminary determination to maintain the status quo precisely so that the issue of possession could be determined later. Just as Defendants argue of the RFAs, to admit the writ as proof of possession would create a serious risk that the jury would be confused that this was substantive evidence of possession.

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion in limine to exclude the writ of possession from trial is granted.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  October    , 2022

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court