Judge: Jon R. Takasugi, Case: BC714907, Date: 2023-03-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: BC714907    Hearing Date: March 24, 2023    Dept: 17

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 17

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is DENIED.

Defendant’s motion for a new trial is DENIED. 

            On July 23, 2018, Plaintiff Guangyu Zhao filed a complaint against FCC Logistics, Inc. and Jeremy Wong. On September 4, 2018, Plaintiffs Guangyu Zhao and Bowei Zhang (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a first amended complaint (FAC) against FCC Logistics and Jeremy Wong, alleging: (1) conversion; (2) possession of personal property and damage; and (3) declaratory relief.

            On April 15, 2019, FCC Logistics filed a cross-complaint (XC) against Guangyu Zhao, Bowei Zhang, JZ USA Group Inc., Kevin Qu, Gua Investment, Inc., Qiang Hua, Spartan Auto Collection, and United Auto Finance, alleging: (1) conspiracy; (2) fraud and deceit; (3) breach of warehouse storage agreement; and (4) unjust enrichment.

            On June 11, 2020, Defendant and Cross-Complainant FCC Logistics (FCC) moved to consolidate the instant action (“First Action”; Case No.: BC714907) with Hong Kong Zhefang International Trade Co., Ltd. v. Zhao (“Second Action”; Case No.: 19STCV43714)

            Now, Defendant Guangyu Zhao (Defendant) moves for a new trial. Defendant also moves for a judgment notwithstanding the special verdict. (JNOV)

Legal Standard

A verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be modified or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part of the issues on the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:¿ 

(1)¿Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury¿or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial;¿ 

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(2)¿Misconduct of the jury;¿and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by are sort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors;¿ 

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(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against;¿ 

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(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial;¿ 

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(5) Excessive or inadequate damages;¿ 

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(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law;¿ 

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(7) Error in¿law, occurring at the trial and¿excepted to by the party making the application.¿ 

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(See CCP § 657.)¿ 

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When ruling on an application for a new trial, the court sits as an independent trier of fact.¿(Lane v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th¿405, 412.)¿The court, therefore, has broad discretion to order new trials, limited only by the obligation to state its reasons for granting a new trial and the existence of substantial evidence in the record to support those reasons.¿(Id.)¿¿In assessing¿the need for a new trial,¿the court must rely on its¿view of the overall record,¿taking into account such factors, among others, as the nature and seriousness of the¿alleged¿misconduct, the general¿atmosphere, including the judge’s control, of the trial, the likelihood of prejudicing the jury, and the efficacy of objection or admonition under all the circumstances.¿(Dominguez v. Pantalone¿(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d¿201, 211.)¿ 

Discussion

            Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, and because Plaintiff’s counsel’s closing argument was prejudicial.

            As to the first contention, Defendant argues that: (1) Plaintiff failed to introduce evidence that Defendant Zhao knew of the existence of the agreement between Plaintiff and GUA; (2) Plaintiff failed to introduce evidence showing Defendant was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiff’s harm; (3) there was no substantial evidence to show Defendant converted Plaintiff’s property; and (4) Plaintiff failed to show that it had a right to the vehicles at issue in this action.

However, as noted in opposition, evidence was submitted at trial that:

-         Defendant had knowledge of the contract (i.e., the sale of the six vehicles). This inference was supported by evidence that Defendant was in joint venture/partnership with B, and that GUA repeatedly remitted funds paid in connection to the sale to Defendant’s address at 3 Corn Mill. (JNOV Opp., 7:24-8:5.)

-         Plaintiff purchased the six vehicles from GUA and GUA delivered the 6 vehicles to Plaintiff’s designated warehouse, FCC. (JNOV Opp., 7: 6-10.) In particular, Plaintiff submitted evidence of payment to GUA for the vehicles, and delivery of the six vehicles to Plaintiff’s designated warehouse. (Ibid.)

-         Plaintiff suffered damages by being deprived the six vehicles, and that Defendant wrongfully possession of the six vehicles.

Moreover, Plaintiff notes that Defendant did not submit any evidence to show that he was entitled to possession of the six vehicles. Defendant also testified that despite going with Zhang to the DMV to transfer the titles to the six vehicles, he did not sign any purchase agreement to buy the car.

Taken together, a jury could have reasonably reached the verdict that it did based on this evidence.

This leave the question of whether or not the punitive damages claim is excessive or Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in prejudicial misconduct.

As for punitive damages, Defendant argues that the award is unsupported because there is no evidence to show intentional conduct from Defendant (“Here, we focus on reprehensibility.”, Motion for New Trial, 16: 15.) However, as set forth above, evidence was introduced that Defendant intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s contract with GUA and knowingly deprived Plaintiff of the six vehicles. As such, a jury could have reasonably awarded the punitive damages amount that it did

Finally, as for prejudicial misconduct, Defendant did not object to counsel’s closing statement during trial. Moreover, Defendant fails to persuasively show that the identified assertion so prejudiced the jury that a different result would have otherwise been reached. A motion for new trial due to misconduct by an opposing counsel can only be granted “if it is reasonably probable that the party moving for a new trial would have obtained a more favorable result absent the misconduct.” (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal. App. 4th 1402, 1411.) This “reasonable probability” requires more than a mere “abstract possibility” of a better result. (See Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 780, 800.) Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel fabricated links between Defendant and GUA and inferred Defendant was a wealthy person. However, as set forth above, Plaintiff submitted evidence from which a jury could have a reasonably inferred that Defendant was aware of the sales agreement for the six vehicles, and intentionally interfered with that contract, and wrongfully deprived Plaintiff of possession of those six vehicles. As such, because there was evidence from which a jury could reached the verdict that it did, there is no basis for the Court to conclude that these statements made in closing argument were responsible for the jury’s verdict, and that a more favorable result for Defendant would be have been reached absent these comments.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for a new trial is denied.

JNOV

            Defendant argues that JNOV is required because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and the judgment is not consistent with or supported by the facts.

The trial court’s discretion in granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is severely limited.” (ENA North Beach, Inc. v. 524 Union Street (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 195, 210.) “If there is any substantial evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in support of the verdict, the motion should be denied.” (King v. State of California (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 287 (quotation omitted).) “[T]he standard of review is whether any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted-supports the jury's conclusion.” (Sweatman v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68.)

            As set forth above, the Court concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

            Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied.

It is so ordered.

Dated:  March    , 2023

   Hon. Jon R. Takasugi
   Judge of the Superior Court

Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court at smcdept17@lacourt.org by 4 p.m. the day prior as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org.  If a party submits on the tentative, the party’s email must include the case number and must identify the party submitting on the tentative.  If all parties to a motion submit, the court will adopt this tentative as the final order.  If the department does not receive an email indicating the parties are submitting on the tentative and there are no appearances at the hearing, the motion may be placed off calendar. 

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