Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 19STCV43741, Date: 2024-04-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV43741    Hearing Date: April 11, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Edward Artiaga (“Artiaga”) moves for summary judgment against Plaintiffs Estate of Christian Escobedo, Elizabeth Medrando, and Alfredo Escobedo (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Artiaga appears to seek summary adjudication in the alternative. Defendant City of Los Angeles (“City”) joins in Artiaga’s motions.

The Court DENIES the motion for summary judgment.

The Court does not issue a tentative on the summary adjudication motion but invites argument as to whether summary adjudication of any particular claim should be granted in light of the Court’s ruling on the summary judgment motion.

Background

This case concerns police officer Edward Artiaga’s January 14, 2018 shooting of decedent Christian Escobedo (“Escobedo”).

The following facts are taken from the parties’ separate statements except where otherwise noted. The Court does not consider the Defendants’ reply separate statement, which is not authorized by statute. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.)

On January 14, 2018, at approximately 6:25 a.m., the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) received a 911 call from a man living on Amethyst Street in the City of Los Angeles reporting that there were two men sleeping on the street in front of his driveway, one of whom was holding a handgun in his hand. (Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) 1.) At 6:31 a.m., the Communications Division of LAPD broadcast an alert regarding that call to officers Artiaga and Steven Valenzuela, describing the two men and stating that there was a “possible ADW [assault with a deadly weapon] suspect.” (UMF 2.)

Artiaga and Valenzuela responded to the alert and parked their patrol vehicle one house east of where the men were observed. (UMF 3.) Because the call indicated that the reported individuals were possible ADW suspects, Artiaga believed that a suspect had already assaulted someone with a deadly weapon. (UMF 9.)

Upon arriving, the officers saw two men lying in the driveway, one of whom is unidentified and one of whom was Escobedo. (UMF 10, 15; Casillas Decl., Ex. 11 (“Exhibit 11”).) Artiaga briefly stopped by the front of the patrol car and illuminated the men with a light attached to his weapon and yelled for them to stand up, at which point the unidentified man stood up and ran up the driveway away from the officers. (UMF 10-13; Exhibit 11.)

In very short succession afterward, Valenzuela pursued the unidentified man on foot and Artiaga ran up to a position on the driveway next to one of the cars and a few feet away from Escobedo, to Escobedo’s right. (UMF 14; Exhibit 11.) At this point, Escobedo was still lying on his back. (UMF 16.) As he ran onto the driveway, Artiaga sent out a broadcast requesting backup, an “airship”, and a supervisor. (UMF 17; Exhibit 11.)

Artiaga’s Body Worn Camera (“BWC”) footage then depicts Artiaga yelling “Hey partner, partner, partner, partner.” (Exhibit 11.) The BWC footage then shows Escobedo sitting up and turning rightwards toward Artiaga as Artiaga yells “Don’t move, don’t move!” (Exhibit 11.) As Escobedo turned toward Artiaga, Artiaga fired five shots at him over the course of roughly five seconds while backing away. (Exhibit 11.)

            Defendants contend that Escobedo had a gun in his right hand as he sat up and brought the hand upward from the waist area to the right side of his torso. (UMF 20.) Defendants contend that at the time Artiaga fired, Escobedo was pointing the gun at Artiaga and Artiaga was looking at the muzzle of Escobedo’s gun. (UMF 22.) Artiaga declares that he feared that Escobedo was taking aim to kill him. (Artiaga Decl. ¶ 12.)

Escobedo’s left hand was empty as he sat up. (Exhibit 11 at 1:20-1:21.) It is difficult to tell from the BWC footage whether there was anything in Escobedo’s right hand. His right hand is near the bottom of the frame and is not illuminated by Artiaga’s flashlight. (Exhibit 11.) When Artiaga begins firing, Escobedo’s right arm still appears to be pointed in the direction of his feet. (Casillas Decl., Ex. 6 (the “Slow Motion BWC”) at 1:21.) A split second before Artiaga fires the first shot, Escobedo’s right arm rapidly crosses over his body, pointing toward his left side and away from Artiaga. (Slow Motion BWC at 1:21-23.) As Artiaga fires the second shot, Escobedo falls onto his back and his right arm returns to his right side, where it settles before Artiaga fires the third shot. (Slow Motion BWC at 1:21-1:24.) Shortly after the shooting, another officer arrived and placed handcuffs on Escobedo. (Exhibit 11.) As the officer did so, Artiaga instructed the officer “don’t touch the gun”, which the BWC footage shows lying to Escobedo’s left. (Exhibit 11 at 7:30-7:55.)

In his deposition, Artiaga testified that he told a police investigator that the gun had been in Escobedo’s left hand, but that he was mistaken and only told the investigator that the gun was in the left hand because Artiaga was sleep-deprived at the time he gave the statement. (Casillas Decl., Ex. 5 (“Artiaga Deposition”) at pp. 178:20-180:22.)

Within two minutes of the shooting, Artiaga requested an ambulance. (UMF 23.) The paramedics determined Escobedo to be deceased and he was not transported to the hospital. (UMF 24.)

Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants on December 5, 2019, raising claims for (1) battery; (2) wrongful death; and (3) civil rights violations under Civil Code, section 52.1.

Artiaga filed this motion on January 3, 2023. The City joined the motion on January 23, 2023. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Artiaga filed a reply.

Evidentiary Objections

The Court overrules Defendants’ evidentiary objections without prejudice to their ability to raise them at trial.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) 

“In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom [citation] and must view such evidence [citations] and such inferences [citations] in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Aguilar, supra, at pp. 844-845 [quotation marks omitted].) 

“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.)  A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)

Discussion

Battery

“The essential elements of a cause of action for battery are: (1) defendant touched plaintiff, or caused plaintiff to be touched, with the intent to harm or offend plaintiff; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the touching; (3) plaintiff was harmed or offended by defendant’s conduct; and (4) a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position would have been offended by the touching.” (So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668-669.)

            Law enforcement officers have a duty to act reasonably when using deadly force. (Hayes v. County of San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 629.) A law enforcement officer who uses deadly force unreasonably can be subject to liability. (Id. at p. 639.) “The Fourth Amendment's ‘reasonableness’ standard is not the same as the standard of ‘reasonable care’ under tort law, and negligent acts do not incur constitutional liability.” (Id. at p. 638.) “[S]tate negligence law, which considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding any use of deadly force, is broader than federal Fourth Amendment law, which tends to focus more narrowly on the moment when deadly force is used.” (Id. at p. 639 [internal citations omitted].) Preshooting circumstances, including the preshooting conduct of an officer, can show that an otherwise reasonable use of deadly force was in fact unreasonable. (Id. at p. 630.)

            Defendants argue that Artiaga’s use of force was reasonable. Defendants argue that Escobedo pointed a gun at Artiaga with his right hand immediately prior to the shooting and that Artiaga therefore reasonably feared for his life. Although Defendants mistakenly argue under the Fourth Amendment framework, the Court will still consider their arguments under the framework provided by state law.

            There are triable issues of fact as to whether Artiaga reasonably used deadly force.

LAPD officers are trained to be extremely careful if there is a reported presence of firearms and not to come up on a suspect if the suspect is reported as being armed with a firearm because of the high likelihood that the suspect would be shot. (Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts (“AMF”) 4-5, 7.) A suspect’s mere possession of a firearm does not justify shooting that suspect, per LAPD training. (AMF 6.) Officers are also trained not to approach a suspect reported to be armed with a firearm unless they can confirm that the suspect is not in physical possession of a gun in his hands. (AMF 10.) When a suspect who may have a firearm is asleep, LAPD training instructs officers to communicate with such suspects at a distance for safety and to anticipate that the suspect may be startled upon waking. (AMF 11-13.)

While violations of police training do not per se show unreasonable conduct, they can be instructive. Here, Artiaga had received a report that at least one of the two suspects had a gun. Artiaga approached Escobedo while he was lying on the ground. Although Artiaga contends that Escobedo was awake for the entirety of the encounter, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Escobedo was sleeping because he did not move or react while Artiaga yelled at the two men two get up, the other man fled, Valenzuela chased the other man, and Artiaga approached Escobedo while calling for backup. A jury could reasonably conclude that this is not the behavior of a man who is awake. Artiaga’s decided to approach a suspect who he knew could have a gun, and who, lying down on a driveway around sunrise, could have been sleeping. This type of behavior, which contravened LAPD training and resulted in the precise danger that that training seeks to avoid, seems to fall squarely into the type of preshooting behavior which the California Supreme Court held could be probative of unreasonable use of force in Hayes.

Further, as Escobedo sits up, there is no clear evidence in the BWC footage that he has a gun in his right hand and, in fact, the footage seems to show that his right arm remains pointed toward his legs – i.e., 90 degrees away from Artiaga – until Artiaga fires his first shot, at which point Escobedo’s right arm flies across his body. There is thus a triable issue of fact as to whether Escobedo ever pointed a gun in Artiaga’s direction.

            The Court thus concludes that Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the battery claim. The Court therefore denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.