Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 20STCV25131, Date: 2025-06-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV25131    Hearing Date: June 5, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Michelle Peoples (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order interpreting and enforcing the settlement agreement in this case.

Plaintiff additionally requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,372.50.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion.

The Court awards attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,750.00.

Background

Plaintiff filed this action on July 20, 2020.

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Robert Earl Gill (“Gill”), Plaintiff’s uncle, had committed elder abuse against Plaintiff’s deceased father, Eugene Peoples (the “Decedent”). Plaintiff alleged that Gill had the Decedent transfer the Decedent’s interest in two parcels of real property to Gill, who then transferred the property to a revocable trust (the “Trust”) to which Gill and his wife, Defendant Paulette Ingram-Gill (“Ingram-Gill”) were co-trustees.

On August 14, 2024, the parties reached a settlement agreement after mediation (the “Settlement”).

On August 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement of the entire case.

On November 25, 2025, the Court entered a minute order dismissing this case pursuant to the settlement agreement.

Plaintiff filed this motion on April 29, 2025. No party has filed an opposition.

Legal Standard

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6, subd. (a).)

“The trial court [may] resolve[] questions about the settlement, by motion procedure as authorized by section 664.6.” (Malouf Bros. v. Dixon (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 280, 284.) “[T]he trial court is empowered under section 664.6 to resolve reasonable disputes over the terms of the settlement”, but this power does not extend to making factual determinations such as whether a material breach has occurred, because “[t]hese disputes are not relevant to the entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.6.” (Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 795.)

Discussion

Motion to Enforce Settlement

            A disagreement has arisen over the terms of the Settlement.

            The Settlement provides that two properties, referred to as the Main Street Property and the 101st Street Property, shall be sold, and the proceeds divided between the parties. Defendants contend that, under the Settlement, the costs of sale are to be taken out of Plaintiff’s share of the proceeds.

The Settlement states:

1. Both properties are to be sold forthwith. [Plaintiff] shall be responsible for handling all aspects of the sale , subject only to the requirement of keeping DEFENDANTS reasonably informed of the progress of the sales. DEFENDANTS agree to execute all documents necessary to effectuate the ability of PEOPLES to be responsible for all aspects of the marketing and sale of the PROPERTIES.

2. Once the Main Street Property sells, [Plaintiff] shall receive from escrow a sum equivalent to 75% of the net sales proceeds.

3. Once the 101st Street Property sells, [Plaintiff] shall receive from escrow, a sum equivalent to 50% of the net sales proceeds.

4. Regardless of which of the PROPERTIES is sold first, [Plaintiff] shall

be entitled to the additional sum of $80,000.00 from the net proceeds remaining after she is paid her distributive share from escrow that is first to close.

(Butler Decl., Ex. 1 (“Stipulation”), Settlement Agreement at p. 3, ¶¶ 1-4.)

            On December 1, 2024, a buyer was found for the 101st Street Property and escrow was opened in connection with the sale. (Butler Decl. ¶ 2.) On January 13, 2025, a Preliminary Closing Statement was received by the parties which included certain charges related to the sale, totaling $69,811.65. (Butler Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 3.)

            On January 22, 2025, Defendants’ counsel sent correspondence to Plaintiff taking the position that, because the Settlement provides that Plaintiff shall be responsible for handling all aspects of the sale, the costs of the sale are to come out of Plaintiff’s share of the sale proceeds. (Butler Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 4.)

            Here, the Settlement provides that Plaintiff’s shares of the sales shall come from the “net sales proceeds”. (Stipulation, Settlement Agreement at p. 3, ¶¶ 2-4 [emphasis added].) Conversely, Defendants’ remaining share (25% of the Main Street Property and 50% of the 101st Street Property) is to come out of the net sales proceeds.  Thus, the Settlement provides that the costs of sale are to be subtracted before allocating to the parties their respective shares of the proceeds. The Court therefore agrees with Plaintiff’s interpretation – Plaintiff is not required to pay the costs of sale out of her share.

            The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion.

Attorney’s Fees

“In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney’s fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to other costs.” (Civ. Code § 1717, subd. (a).)

“The court, upon notice and motion by a party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except [where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case], the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section.” (Civ. Code § 1717, subd. (b).)

The Settlement provides that the prevailing party in a proceeding to enforce the Settlement shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. (Stipulation, Settlement Agreement at p. 5, ¶ 13.)

Plaintiff requests an hourly rate of $625.00 for attorney L’Tanya M. Butler. The Court finds this rate to be reasonable. Plaintiff requests 1 hour for Butler’s attempts to informally resolve the issue, 4 hours for the preparation of this motion, 2 hours for any reply, and 1 hour to attend the hearing. As no opposition or reply have been filed, the Court awards a total of 6 hours.

The Court therefore awards attorney’s fees in the amount of $3,750.00.