Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 20STCV40677, Date: 2023-10-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV40677 Hearing Date: February 27, 2024 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
SALVADOR BARRIOS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. HEALTHY START-EAST LA, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
20STCV40677 Hearing Date: February 27, 2024 Calendar Number: 7 |
Defendants County of Los Angeles (the “County”) and City of
Commerce (the “City”) (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) separately move for
summary judgment against Plaintiffs Salvador Barrios (“Salvador”) and Elena
Barrios (“Elena”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).
The Court DENIES the City’s motion for summary judgment.
The Court does not issue a tentative on the County’s motion
for summary judgment. The Court solicits
argument from both parties on the issue of what the County is alleged to have
done that gives rise to liability and the state of the evidence on that issue. The Court will hear first from Plaintiff and
then from the County on the issue.
This is a personal injury case resulting from an automobile
collision.
On February 25, 2020, Salvador was driving southbound on
LaVerne Avenue and attempted to execute a left turn onto eastbound Telegraph
Road. (Commerce City Undisputed Material Fact (“CC UMF”) 2.) Defendant Daniel
Tercero Neri was driving westbound on Telegraph Road, and his vehicle struck Salvador’s.
(CC UMF 2.)
The border between the City of Commerce and the County of
Los Angeles runs along Telegraph Road. Specifically, the border sits a total of
45 feet north of the center line of Telegraph Road, including 10 feet from the
north curb of Telegraph to the sidewalk. (CC UMF 7-10.) Thus, the entirety of
Telegraph Road itself lies within the City’s jurisdiction.
The only traffic control at the intersection of LaVerne and
Telegraph is a stop sign maintained by the County on the southbound side of
LaVerne. (Plaintiffs’ Additional Material Fact in Opposition to the County’s
Motion (“PLA AMF”) 80.)
There were no parking prohibitions on Telegraph Road at the
intersection with LaVerne at the time of the collision. (Plaintiff’s Additional
Material Fact in Opposition to the City’s Motion (“PC AMF”) 27.) In other
words, the City permitted any vehicle to park on Telegraph Road up to the
intersection with LaVerne, with no “red curb” section at or next to the corner
of the two streets. Only the curb return itself (the portion of the curb that
curves as it turns from Telegraph to LaVerne) was painted red. (PC AMF 14-17,
27.) At the time of the collision, a black SUV was legally parked along the
northern curb of Telegraph Road, just east of where the red curb on the curb
return ended. (PC AMF 16.) The SUV was parked approximately 27 feet east of the
eastern curb line of LaVerne and 3 feet, 5 inches south of the north curb line
of Telegraph. (PC AMF 16.)
Between 2010 and 2020, there were five vehicular collisions
at the intersection, three of which involved a vehicle turning left from La
Verne and a westbound vehicle on Telegraph Road. (PLA AMF 109.)
Plaintiffs provide evidence that, for a number of the
intersections on Telegraph, the County proactively provided traffic signal
maintenance for the entire intersection and billed the City for a portion of
the costs. (PLA AMF 91-97.) The County only provided this maintenance for
intersections that were signalized. The intersection of La Verne and Telegraph
lies between two such intersections for which the County provided proactive
maintenance. However, Plaintiffs do not provide evidence that the County provided
proactive maintenance subject intersection itself. Additionally, from 2010
through 2020, the county had a contractual agreement with the City to provide
public works services within the City, including traffic advising services,
infrastructure design and construction, traffic law enforcement, street maintenance,
and painting red curbs. (PLA AMF 83-90.) Plaintiffs do not provide evidence as
to whether the County did any work relating to the City’s portion of the
subject intersection as a result of this contract.
Plaintiffs filed this
action on October 22, 2020. The operative complaint is now the First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”), which raises claims for (1) negligence; (2) negligent
entrustment; (3) dangerous condition of public property under Government Code
sections 830, 835, and 835.2; (4) negligent/reckless acts of public employees,
agents, or contractors under Government Code sections 815.2, 815.4, and 820, et
seq.; (5) general negligence; and (6) loss of consortium. Only the third,
fourth, and sixth causes of action are alleged against Moving Defendants.
The City moved for summary judgment on August 1, 2023. The
County moved for summary judgment on September 13, 2023. Plaintiffs filed an
opposition to each motion. Each Moving Defendant filed a reply in support of
its motion.
The Court overrules the parties’ evidentiary objections
without prejudice to their ability to raise them at trial.
The Court grants the parties’ requests for judicial notice.
The purpose of a motion for
summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism
to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether, despite
their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) “Code of
Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to
grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences
reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences
or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
“In ruling on the motion,
the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences
reasonably drawn therefrom [citation] and must view such evidence [citations]
and such inferences [citations] in the light most favorable to the opposing
party.” (Aguilar, supra, at pp. 844-845 [quotation marks
omitted].)
“On a motion for summary
judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima
facie
showing that there are no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B.
Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant moving for
summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing
that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more
elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a
complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.
(p)(2).)
“Once the defendant . . .
has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a
triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or
a defense thereto.” (Ibid.) To establish a triable issue of material
fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive
evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) “If the plaintiff cannot do
so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente
Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
Plaintiff’s claims for dangerous condition of public
property rest on the same elements as negligence - namely, (1) a legal duty of
care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause resulting in injury. (Issakhani
v. Shadow Glen Homeowners Assn., Inc. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 917, 924,
citing Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)
Public property is in a “dangerous condition” when it “creates
a substantial (as distinguished from a minor, trivial or insignificant) risk of
injury when such property or adjacent property is used with due care in a
manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used.” (Gov. Code,
§ 830(a).)
“A public entity may be liable only for dangerous conditions
of its own property. But its own property may be considered dangerous if it
creates a substantial risk of injury to adjacent property or to persons on
adjacent property; and its own property may be considered dangerous if a
condition on the adjacent property exposes those using the public property to a
substantial risk of injury.” (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit
Authority (2003) 30 Cal.4th 139, 148 [citation and quotation marks omitted].)
“The existence of a dangerous condition is ordinarily a question of fact … but
it can be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one
conclusion.” (Ibid.)
The legislature was not concerned about the extent of
injury, but rather with the probability that an injury would occur. (See Law
Revision Commission Comment, Gov. Code, § 830.2.)
Dangerous Condition
Plaintiff contends that the City created a dangerous
condition by permitting parking on Telegraph up to the intersection.
The California Highway Design Manual (“HDM”) is a generally
accepted set of guidelines for highway design. (PC AMF 37, 38.) The HDM
identifies inadequate corner sight distance as a cause of higher collision
rates for an intersection. (Plaintiff’s Ex. WW; Dickson Decl. ¶ 53.) The HDM recommends that an 8-second line of
sight be allowed for a waiting driver to make a left turn, which would require
a corner sight distance of 552 feet when turning onto a roadway with a
prevailing speed of 47 miles per hour. (PC AMF 41-44.) The prevailing speed on
Telegraph Avenue was 47 miles per hour. (PC AMF 28.) However, the maximum
line-of-sight available while making Plaintiff’s turn, without proceeding into
a lane with cross-traffic, was only 90 feet – over 450 feet fewer than the
recommended distance. (PC AMF 46.) While the City argues that the HDM only
constitutes a set of guidelines rather than strict rules, noncompliance with
the HDM is nevertheless evidence of dangerous traffic planning.
Plaintiff also provides evidence that the intersection
design did not meet the City’s own guidelines. At the time of the collision,
the City had adopted the guidelines of the California Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control (the “California Manual”). (PC AMF 59, 60.) The California Manual
provides that “[a]t all intersections, one stall length on each side measured
from the crosswalk or end of curb return should have parking prohibited.” (PC
AMF 61; Plaintiff Ex. WW.)
The parties additionally provide dueling experts opining in
turn that the intersection was and was not dangerous as a result of the parking
conditions. It is unnecessary to wade into the expert testimony. Plaintiff has
done more than enough to dispute that the condition was dangerous. Similarly,
the history of at least five similar accidents where a car turning left from
LaVerne to Telegraph collided with a westbound car on Telegraph creates a
triable issue that the City had notice. Additionally, Plaintiff provides expert
opinion evidence that the inadequate line-of-sight would be readily apparent to
any reasonable public engineer or maintenance employee performing work at a
location that allows on-street parking directly adjacent to an intersection.
(Borgeois Decl. ¶ 37.)
Causation
The City contends that the line-of-sight available at the
intersection is irrelevant because Plaintiff did not actually look left before
the accident. The City provides testimony from Neri that Salvador was looking
to the right – away from Neri – immediately before the accident. (CC UMF 31.)
However, Neri’s testimony appears contradictory – he also testified that he
could not see Salvador’s head and did not know whether Salvador was looking at
him when the accident occurred. (CC RUMF 31.) Furthermore, this argument from
the City appears to confuse the issue at hand. Plaintiffs contend that there
was insufficient visibility prior to entering the left turn – i.e.,
before Salvador’s car entered any lanes with cross traffic. Evidence that
Salvador was not looking left at the moment before the collision is not
evidence that Salvador did not look left before turning, or at the beginning of
the turn.
Thus, there is a triable issue of fact that Salvador looked
left before turning, and that the restricted line of sight therefore resulted
in the accident.
The Court therefore denies summary adjudication as to the
City on the cause of action.
It is undisputed that Telegraph Road was not under the
County’s jurisdiction. Thus, the County did not have control over the parking
rules on Telegraph, and could not have prohibited parking on the north side of
Telegraph.
However, the analysis does not end there. As discussed
above, “[a] public entity may be liable only for dangerous conditions of its
own property. But its own property may be considered dangerous if it creates a
substantial risk of injury to adjacent property or to persons on adjacent
property; and its own property may be considered dangerous if a condition on
the adjacent property exposes those using the public property to a substantial
risk of injury.” (Bonanno v. Central Contra Costa Transit Authority (2003)
30 Cal.4th 139, 148 [citation and quotation marks omitted].) “The existence of
a dangerous condition is ordinarily a question of fact … but it can be decided
as a matter of law if reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion.” (Ibid.)
In Bonanno, the Court found a public entity liable where a plaintiff was
injured by a condition on a property adjacent to a public bus stop while she
was on the adjacent non-public property approaching the bus stop. (Id.
at p. 151.) The California Supreme Court “reject[ed] [the defendant’s]
contention that it cannot be liable for an injury occurring on property (the
street) it neither owned nor controlled. [The Defendant] owned and controlled
its own bus stop, and a condition of that property, its physical situation, caused
users of the bus stop to be at risk from the immediately adjacent property[.]”
(Ibid.)
Much like in Bonanno, the conditions on Telegraph,
which was adjacent to the County-controlled portion of LaVerne, rendered
dangerous left turns off of LaVerne onto Telegraph. Thus, the County’s lack of
control is not necessarily a bar to liability.
The
Court, however, is left with some question based on the briefing as to what
Plaintiff is contending with respect to the County’s actions that makes the
County liable, and the state of the evidence on those contentions. The Court will hear first from Plaintiff and
then from the County as to that issue.
The City argues that summary adjudication should be granted
on this cause of action because there was no dangerous condition. For the same
reasons that Court denies summary adjudication on the fourth cause of action,
the Court denies summary judgment here, too.
“There are four elements to a cause of action for loss of
consortium: (1) a valid and lawful marriage between the plaintiff and the
person injured at the time of the injury; (2) a tortious injury to the
plaintiff’s spouse; (3) loss of consortium suffered by the plaintiff; and (4)
the loss was proximately caused by the defendant’s act.” (Vanhooser v. Superior Court (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 921, 927,
italics, quotation marks, and paragraph breaks omitted.) Notably, “[a] loss of
consortium cause of action is triggered by the spouse’s injury. A cause of
action for loss of consortium is, by its nature, dependent on the existence of
a cause of action for tortious injury to a spouse.” (Ibid., citations and quotation marks omitted.) “Without injury to
the spouse, the plaintiff has no loss of consortium claim.” (Id. at p. 928.)
Because this cause of action is derivative of the others, it
succeeds or fails as the others do. The Court therefore denies the City’s
request for summary adjudication.