Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 20STCV40677, Date: 2025-02-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV40677 Hearing Date: February 18, 2025 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
SALVAROR BARRIOS, et al.,
Plaintiffs, v. HEALTHY START-EAST LA, INC., et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
20STCV40677 Hearing Date: February 18, 2025 Calendar Number: 2 |
Defendant City of Commerce (the “City”) separately moves to
compel Plaintiff Salvador Barrios (“Salvador”) to serve further responses to
the City’s Form Interrogatories, Set Two, No. 17.1 and the City’s Request for
Admissions (“RFA”), Set One, Nos. 1-6, 8-11, 14, 17, 18, 21-26, 31, 46-57, and
70-113.
The City moves to compel Plaintiff Elena Barrios (“Elena”)
to serve further responses to the City’s Form Interrogatories, Set Two, No. 17.1
and the City’s Request for Admissions, Set One, Nos. 1-6. (The Court uses the
parties’ first names for the purpose of clarity only, and means no disrespect.
The Court DENIES the motions as they relate to RFA Nos. 56,
57, 73, and 75 served on Salvador.
The Court DENIES the motions as they relate to RFA Nos. 4
and 6 served on Elena.
The Court GRANTS the motions as they relate to the remaining
discovery items at issue. Plaintiffs
shall provide full and complete responses in twenty days.
This is a personal injury case resulting from an automobile
collision. Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants City of Commerce
(the “City”); County of Los Angeles (the “County”); Karapet Dzheragyan (“Dzheragyan”);
and Healthy Start-East LA (“Healthy Start”). The following facts are taken from
the parties’ separate statements relating to the motion for summary judgment
heard on February 27, 2024.
On February 25, 2020, Salvador was driving southbound on
LaVerne Avenue and attempted to execute a left turn onto eastbound Telegraph
Road. (Commerce City Undisputed Material Fact (“CC UMF”) 2.) Defendant Daniel
Tercero Neri was driving westbound on Telegraph Road, and his vehicle struck Salvador’s.
(CC UMF 2.)
The border between the City of Commerce and the County of
Los Angeles runs along Telegraph Road. Specifically, the border sits a total of
45 feet north of the center line of Telegraph Road, including 10 feet from the
north curb of Telegraph to the sidewalk. (CC UMF 7-10.) Thus, the entirety of
Telegraph Road itself lies within the City’s jurisdiction.
The only traffic control at the intersection of LaVerne and
Telegraph is a stop sign maintained by the County on the southbound side of
LaVerne. (Plaintiffs’ Additional Material Fact in Opposition to the County’s
Motion (“PLA AMF”) 80.)
There were no parking prohibitions on Telegraph Road at the
intersection with LaVerne at the time of the collision. (Plaintiff’s Additional
Material Fact in Opposition to the City’s Motion (“PC AMF”) 27.) In other
words, the City permitted any vehicle to park on Telegraph Road up to the
intersection with LaVerne, with no “red curb” section at or next to the corner
of the two streets. Only the curb return itself (the portion of the curb that
curves as it turns from Telegraph to LaVerne) was painted red. (PC AMF 14-17,
27.) At the time of the collision, a black SUV was legally parked along the
northern curb of Telegraph Road, just east of where the red curb on the curb
return ended. (PC AMF 16.) The SUV was parked approximately 27 feet east of the
eastern curb line of LaVerne and 3 feet, 5 inches south of the north curb line
of Telegraph. (PC AMF 16.)
Between 2010 and 2020, there were five vehicular collisions
at the intersection, three of which involved a vehicle turning left from La
Verne and a westbound vehicle on Telegraph Road. (PLA AMF 109.)
Plaintiffs provide evidence that, for a number of the
intersections on Telegraph, the County proactively provided traffic signal
maintenance for the entire intersection and billed the City for a portion of
the costs. (PLA AMF 91-97.) The County only provided this maintenance for
intersections that were signalized. The intersection of La Verne and Telegraph
lies between two such intersections for which the County provided proactive
maintenance. However, Plaintiffs do not provide evidence that the County provided
proactive maintenance subject intersection itself. Additionally, from 2010
through 2020, the county had a contractual agreement with the City to provide
public works services within the City, including traffic advising services,
infrastructure design and construction, traffic law enforcement, street maintenance,
and painting red curbs. (PLA AMF 83-90.) Plaintiffs do not provide evidence as
to whether the County did any work relating to the City’s portion of the
subject intersection as a result of this contract.
Plaintiffs filed this
action on October 22, 2020. The operative complaint is now the First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”), which raises claims for (1) negligence; (2) negligent
entrustment; (3) dangerous condition of public property under Government Code
sections 830, 835, and 835.2; (4) negligent/reckless acts of public employees,
agents, or contractors under Government Code sections 815.2, 815.4, and 820, et
seq.; (5) general negligence; and (6) loss of consortium. Only the third,
fourth, and sixth causes of action are alleged against Moving Defendants.
On August 26, 2024, the City served the discovery at issue
in these motions.
On October 23, 2024, Plaintiffs served their responses to
the discovery.
The
City filed each of these four motions on January 3, 2025. Salvador filed an
opposition to each of the motions relating to him. Elena filed an opposition to
each of the motions relating to her. The City filed two replies: a consolidated
reply in support of the Salvador motions and a consolidated reply in support of
the Elena motions.
Code
of Civil Procedure section 2030.220, subdivision (a) requires that “[e]ach
answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and
straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party
permits.” Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300, a party may
move to compel further responses to a form interrogatory if the other party’s
answer is “evasive or incomplete.” The responding party has the burden of
justifying the objections to the form and special interrogatories. (Coy v.
Super. Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)
“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7
(commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who
unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to
interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted
with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition
of the sanction unjust. If a party then fails to obey an order compelling
answers, the court may make those orders that are just, including the
imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating
sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of or in
addition to that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under
Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290.
“(a) On receipt of a
response to requests for admissions, the party requesting admissions may move
for an order compelling a further response if that party deems that either or
both of the following apply:
(1) An answer to a particular request
is evasive or incomplete.
(2) An objection to a particular
request is without merit or too general.”
(Code Civ. Proc. §
2033.290.)
“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7
(commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who
unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel further response, unless it
finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification
or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
2033.290(d).)
The Court has reviewed the parties’ papers and rules as
follows on the requests at issue.
The Court makes special note of Plaintiffs’ objection that
the City’s discovery seeks information on documents prepared for the purpose of
a mediation that occurred between the parties and disclosed in the mediation.
“One of the fundamental ways the Legislature has sought to
encourage mediation is by enacting several ‘mediation confidentiality
provisions.’ ” (Rojas v. Superior Court (2004) 33 Cal.4th 407, 415.)
“(a)
No evidence of anything said or any admission made for the purpose of, in the
course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation consultation is
admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be
compelled, in any arbitration, administrative adjudication, civil action, or
other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant to law, testimony can be
compelled to be given.
(b) No writing,
as defined in Section 250, that is prepared for
the
purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation or a mediation
consultation, is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the
writing shall not be compelled, in any arbitration, administrative
adjudication, civil action, or other noncriminal proceeding in which, pursuant
to law, testimony can be compelled to be given.
(c)
All communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between
participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation consultation shall
remain confidential.”
(Evid. Code, § 1119.)
“Evidence
otherwise admissible or subject to discovery outside of a mediation or a
mediation consultation shall not be or become inadmissible or protected from
disclosure solely by reason of its introduction or use in a mediation or a
mediation consultation.” (Ev. Code, § 1120, subd. (a).) “Likewise, otherwise
admissible facts cannot be shielded from disclosure simply because they have
been placed in confidential mediation documents.” (Lappe v. Superior Court
(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 774, 783.)
Plaintiffs contend that “[d]ocuments and information
revealed in the voluntary mediation were and are confidential, inadmissible,
and not subject to discovery in this or any civil action.” (See, e.g.,
Opposition to Salvador RFA Motion at p. 3:3-5.)
Plaintiffs object that Defendants seek information related
to Plaintiff’s life care plan (“LCP”), which was prepared for the purpose of
the mediation and revealed in the course of the mediation.
The Court agrees that the LCP document itself is protected.
However, relevant facts relating Salvador’s medical needs after the collision
remain admissible – and critical to Defendants’ ability to litigate issues of
damages. The Court therefore finds that the mediation privilege is not a bar
where the City seeks information that is contained in the LCP but not the LCP
itself.
The Court notes that the City’s separate statement is
confusingly numbered. The Court uses the numberings in Plaintiffs’ separate
statement.
RFA No. 1: Granted.
RFA No. 2: Granted.
RFA No. 3: Granted.
RFA No. 4: Granted.
RFA No. 5: Granted.
RFA No. 6: Granted.
RFA No. 8: Granted.
RFA No. 10: Granted.
RFA No. 11: Granted.
RFA No. 14: Granted.
RFA No. 17: Granted.
RFA No. 18: Granted.
RFA No. 21: Granted.
RFA No. 22: Granted.
RFA No. 23: Granted.
RFA No. 24: Granted.
RFA No. 25: Granted.
RFA No. 26: Granted.
RFA No. 31: Granted.
RFA No. 46: Granted.
RFA No. 47: Granted.
RFA No. 48: Granted.
RFA No. 49: Granted.
RFA No. 50: Granted.
RFA No. 51: Granted.
RFA No. 52: Granted.
RFA No. 53: Granted.
RFA No. 54: Granted.
RFA No. 55: Granted.
RFA No. 56: Denied.
RFA No. 57: Denied.
RFA No. 70: Granted.
RFA No. 71: Granted.
RFA No. 72: Granted.
RFA No. 73: Denied.
RFA No. 74: Granted.
RFA No. 75: Denied.
RFA No. 76: Granted.
RFA No. 77: Granted.
RFA No. 78: Granted.
RFA No. 79: Granted.
RFA No. 80: Granted.
RFA No. 81: Granted.
RFA No. 82: Granted.
RFA No. 83: Granted.
RFA No. 84: Granted.
RFA No. 85: Granted.
RFA No. 86: Granted.
RFA No. 87: Granted.
RFA No. 88: Granted.
RFA No. 89: Granted.
RFA No. 90: Granted.
RFA No. 91: Granted.
RFA No. 92: Granted.
RFA No. 93: Granted.
RFA No. 94: Granted.
RFA No. 95: Granted.
RFA No. 96: Granted.
RFA No. 97: Granted.
RFA No. 98: Granted.
RFA No. 99: Granted.
RFA No. 100: Granted.
RFA No. 101: Granted.
RFA No. 102: Granted.
RFA No. 103: Granted.
RFA No. 104: Granted.
RFA No. 105: Granted.
RFA No. 106: Granted.
RFA No. 107: Granted.
RFA No. 108: Granted.
RFA No. 109: Granted.
RFA No. 110: Granted.
RFA No. 111: Granted.
RFA No. 112: Granted.
RFA No. 113: Granted.
Form
Interrogatory No. 17.1: Granted.
RFA No. 1: Granted.
RFA No. 2: Granted.
RFA No. 3: Granted.
RFA No. 4: Denied.
RFA No. 5: Granted.
RFA No. 6: Denied.
Form
Interrogatory No. 17.1: Granted.