Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 20STCV45192, Date: 2025-03-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV45192 Hearing Date: March 5, 2025 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE RULING
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   JEFFREY QIUHONG YANG,                                   Plaintiff,             v. GLOBAL WIN CAPITAL CORPORATION,                                    Defendant.    | 
  
   Case No: 20STCV45192 Related Case No: 21STCV35083    Hearing Date:  March 4, 2025  Calendar Number: Add
  On #17  | 
 
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            Defendant
Global Win Capital Corporation (“Global Win”) moves for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial.
            The Court tentatively
DENIES the motion.  It would be most
helpful to the Court if at the hearing counsel for both sides are prepared to support
arguments concerning the matters discussed below with specific citations to the
record.   
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
            Defendant
moves for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (“JNOV”) on the grounds that there
is no substantial evidence on at least one element of each cause of action on
which the jury found for Plaintiff Jeffrey Yang (“Yang”).  Each of these elements involved hotly
disputed fact issues on which the jury found for Yang.  
The general verdict in favor of Yang
on each claim “implies findings in favor of the prevailing party on all
material issues. If the evidence supports implied findings on any set of issues
that will sustain the verdict, it is assumed that the jury found in favor of
the prevailing party on those issues. (Wilson v. County of Orange (2009)
169 Cal.App.4th 1185.)  There is ample
evidence in the record to support the jury’s liability determinations in favor
of Yang.
Legal Standard
            Code
of Civil Procedure section 629 states that “[t]he court, before the expiration
of its power to rule on a motion for a new trial, either of its own motion,
after five days’ notice, or on motion of a party against whom a verdict has
been rendered, shall render judgment in favor of the aggrieved party
notwithstanding the verdict whenever a motion for a directed verdict for the
aggrieved party should have been granted had a previous motion been made.”
(Code Civ. Proc. § 629.)
            A
JNOV motion ordinarily challenges whether the evidence was sufficient to prove
the claims or defenses asserted by the opposing party and now embodied in the
jury’s verdict. (Moore v. San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733-34;
see Martin v. Ideal Packing Co. (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 232, 235 [a
JNOV motion is “in the nature of a demurrer to the evidence”].) It thus has the
same function as a motion for nonsuit or directed verdict, the only difference
being that the JNOV motion lies after a verdict for the opposing party has been
rendered. (Beavers v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 310, 327; CC-California
Plaza Assocs. v. Paller & Goldstein (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1042,
1050.)   
 
            All
evidence supporting the verdict is presumed true, so the issue is whether the
facts constitute a prima facie case or defense as a matter of law.  (Fountain
Valley Chateau Blanc Homeowner's Ass’n v. Department of Veterans Affairs
(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 743, 750.) “The court may not weigh evidence, draw
inferences contrary to the verdict, or assess the credibility of witnesses. The
court must deny the motion if there is any substantial evidence to support the
verdict.” (Begnal v. Canfield & Assocs., Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
66, 72.  
 
            A
JNOV motion is governed by the same rules that govern a motion for directed
verdict or nonsuit. (Hauter v. Zogarts (1975) 14 Cal.3d 104, 110; Rollenhagen
v. City of Orange (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 414, 417 [disapproved on other
grounds in Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 738].)
Further, a JNOV motion “may be granted only if it appears from the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the verdict, that
there is no substantial evidence in support.” (Sweatman v. Department of
Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68; Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures
& Television (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1137-38.) A JNOV in favor of
a defendant is proper “only where, disregarding conflicting evidence on behalf
of the defendants and giving to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which it
is legally entitled, therein indulging in every legitimate inference which may
be drawn from that evidence, the result is a determination that there is no
evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff.” (See Reynolds v. Wilson (1958) 51 Cal.2d 94,
99.)  
Yang’s Breach of Contract Claim
            Global
Win argues that it is entitled to judgment on the breach of contract claim
because of lack of evidence that Yang performed the contract and lack of
evidence that Yang resigned for good reason. 
Global Win first argues that it is
undisputed that Yang violated his contractual obligations to devote full time
and attention to Global Win’s business, to provide undivided loyalty to Global
Win, and to refrain from devoting any time to any outside business that would
interfere with or derogate from his obligations to Global Win without approval
from Global Win’s Board.  (Mot. at
11:7-11.)  This was the argument that
Global Win presented to the jury at trial and that the jury rejected.  Far from being based on undisputed evidence,
these issues were hotly contested and there was substantial evidence supporting
the general verdict in favor of Yang. 
The contract language on which Global
Win relies reads as follows:  “Executive
agrees to devote his best efforts, energies, and skill to the discharge of the
duties and responsibilities attributable to his position, and to this end will
devote his full time and attention exclusively to the business and affairs of
the Company.  Executive recognizes that,
during the period of Executive’s employment hereunder, Executive owes an
undivided duty of loyalty to the Company. 
Executive agrees that, without the approval of the Board, Executive
shall not devote any time to any business affiliation which would interfere
with or derogate from Executive’s obligation under this Agreement other than
that with the Company, its parents, subsidiaries or affiliates.”  (Exhibit 17-2.)  
This is a complex contractual
term.  Global Win argues for its most
restrictive meaning so that any work Yang did other than for Global Win
violates the contract.  Yang points out
that the last sentence implies that only business affiliations that conflict
with Yang’s obligations require board approval, and that this sentence is
consistent with an understanding that obligations that do not conflict are
permissible and do not require board approval. 
Moreover, while Yang agreed to devote his “full time and attention”
exclusively to the business and affairs of the Company, Yang contended at trial
that the parties agreed that he could also work on other endeavors on his own
time, rather than during business hours. 
Each party submitted substantial though conflicting evidence at trial
that supported their interpretations.
Yang submitted evidence that his
side venture, RREPAC, was for a liquid aseptic packing business idea that was
entirely unrelated to Global Win’s bulk cardboard business and thus did not
conflict.  Yang testified that both
Chairman Wu and Kevin Jiang approved of Yang’s business, and the jury was
permitted to accept that testimony.  Yang
also offered the idea to Global Win which was not interested.  He got permission for his travels to Brazil,
where he did work for Global Win from Kevin Jiang, and there was no
interference with his work.  He testified
that he fulfilled his obligations to Global Win and that RREPAC did not
interfere with his work for Global Win. 
While the jury could have accepted the various contrary arguments that
Global Win makes in its motion, it did not do so.
Yang also presented substantial
evidence that he had good reason to resign. 
This includes, for example, evidence that the internal audit report was
a pretext to manufacture grounds for Plaintiff’s termination. Moreover, there
was substantial evidence that Global Win changed Yang’s job duty in a manner
inconsistent with his position as chief financial officer and materially
diminished his authority.  While Global
Win characterizes this as an immaterial change, there is disputed evidence on
this point and the jury was entitled to determine that the changes were
material.
Yang’s Whistleblower Retaliation
Claim
Global Win argues that there is no evidence
to show that he disclosed Global Win’s alleged engagement in illegal activities
to someone with authority over Yang or an employee with authority to
investigate the non-compliance. (Mot. at 14:7-12.)  Plaintiff testified that he reported the
alleged illegal activity to Ellis Liu, the director of human resources and  to CEO Junming Shu.  The evidence at trial established that these high-ranking
individuals within the corporation satisfied the requirement for the reporting obligation.
Motion
for New Trial
Legal Standard
Code of Civil Procedure section 657
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
The verdict may be vacated and any other decision may be
modified or vacated, in whole or in part, and a new or further trial granted on
all or part of the issues, on the application of the party aggrieved, for any
of the following causes, materially affecting the substantial rights of such
party: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or
adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either
party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of
the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to
a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the
determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any
one of the jurors. 
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not
have guarded against. 
4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making
the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial. 
5. Excessive or inadequate damages. 
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or
other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law. 
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by
the party making the application. 
When a new trial is granted, on all or part of the issues,
the court shall specify the ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the
court’s reason or reasons for granting the new trial upon each ground
stated. 
 
A new trial shall not be granted upon the ground of
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, nor
upon the ground of excessive or inadequate damages, unless after weighing the
evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable
inferences therefrom, that the court or jury clearly should have reached a
different verdict or decision. 
(Code Civ. Proc. § 657.) A motion for new trial is a
creature of statute and the Court may grant a new trial only by conforming to
the statutory procedures.¿ (Sanchez-Corea v. Bank of America (1985) 38
Cal.3d 892, 899-900.)¿ Further, under Article VI, section 13, of the California
Constitution, no judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted unless, after
an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the Court shall be
of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.¿ (In re Marriage of Steiner & Hosseini (2004) 117 Cal. App.
4th 519, 526.)¿
            As an
initial matter, contrary to Global Win’s argument, the Court after weighing the
evidence is not “convinced from the entire record, including reasonable
inferences therefore, that the . . . jury clearly should have reached a
different verdict or decision” (Code Civ. Proc. § 657) on the liability
determinations that Global Win’s motion challenges.  The Court therefore proceeds to discuss the
one other argument that Global Win asserts in its new trial motion.
Inconsistent Verdict 
            Global Win
argues that the jury’s general verdict in favor of Global Win on the claim for breach
of fiduciary duty is inconsistent with the general verdict in favor of Yang for
breach of contract.  Global Win is not
correct.
            Verdicts
are inconsistent when they are “beyond possibility of reconciliation under any
possible application of the evidence and instructions.”  (Oxford v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2009)
177 Cal.App.4th 700 [citation omitted].) 
If any conclusions could be drawn thereunder which would explain the
apparent conflict, the jury will be deemed to have drawn them.”  (Ibid.)  Global Win does not demonstrate inconsistent
verdicts under this exacting standard.
            The jury
could have easily found that Yang violated his fiduciary duty to Global Win in
one narrow respect—failing to return the housing allowance that was provided to
him—while also finding that Yang did “substantially all” of the “significant things”
that the contract obligated him to do by fulfilling his duties to Global Win in
all other respects.  Indeed, that is what
appears to have been what the jury determined, given that the jury awarded
damages to Global Win of only $41,000, which was in the approximate amount of
the housing allowance.
            To prevail
on its argument, Global Win would have to show that an executive who violates
his fiduciary duty to his employer, no matter how limited or insignificant the
breach, automatically forfeits all of his or her rights under the employment
contract.  No case of which the Court is
aware has such a Draconian rule of law.  
Global Win’s cases do not support such a legal argument and
are therefore inapposite.  (See Fowler
v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34, 41-42 [justifying
discharge of marketing manager who, while still employed, attempted to form
competing company and refused to reveal information about company to employer];
Mamou v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc.  (2008) [employee may not use principal’s time,
facilities, or proprietary secrets to build a competing business].)  None of these cases involved failing to
return a housing allowance. To the extent that Global Win is arguing that the
jury’s fiduciary duty verdict means that it agreed that Yang was unlawfully
competing with Global Win, Global Win is not entitled to such an interpretation
of the verdict on this motion.   indeed,
the jury appears to have concluded no such thing given the limited damage award
in favor of Global Win which tracks the funds relating to the housing allowance.