Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 21STCV08425, Date: 2023-11-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV08425 Hearing Date: December 5, 2023 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
Debra Felipe, Plaintiff, v. DEBRA FELIPE vs C J CONCRETE
CONSTRUCTION INC., et al., Defendants. And Related Cross-Claim. |
Case No:
21STCV08425 Hearing Date: December 5, 2023 Calendar Number: 3 |
Defendant and Cross-Claimant C J Concrete Construction Inc.
(“CJ”) moves for sanctions against Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Debra Felipe
and Cross-Defendant Construction Paper, Inc. (“Construction Paper”)
(collectively, “Cross-Defendants”). Defendant seeks issue sanctions,
evidentiary sanctions, and monetary sanctions consisting of $8,910.00 in
attorney’s fees.
The Court DENIES CJ’s request for terminating
sanctions.
The Court GRANTS CJ’s request for issue sanctions as
follows. The following facts will be
established for all purposes in this lawsuit.
(a) Plaintiff operated Construction Paper as her alter ego; and (b)
Plaintiff carried out operations of Construction Paper during part of the time
she was working for CJ. The Court denies
the other requests for issue sanctions.
The Court GRANTS CJ’s request for evidentiary sanctions as
follows. Plaintiff is precluded from
offering at trial any evidence and any testimony referring to or regarding: (a) the destroyed documents for any purpose;
(b) the operational or nonoperational status of Construction Paper, Inc.; (c)
the hours Debra Felipe spent working on Construction Paper, Inc.; or (d) the
destroyed documents to either support her wage and hour claims against the
Defendants or to defend against cross claims by the Defendants. The Court denies the other requests for
evidentiary sanctions.
The Court will give CACI Instruction 204-Willful Suppression
at the time of trial at CJ’s request.
The Court GRANTS CJ’s request for monetary sanctions in the
amount of $8,910.00. Cross-Defendants
shall pay that amount to CJ’s counsel within 30 days.
This action arises out of Plaintiff’s employment at CJ.
Plaintiff filed this action on March 3, 2021 against
Defendants CJ and John C. Sarno (collectively, “Defendants”), stating claims
for (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (2) retaliation;
(3) failure to pay wages due on termination; (4) failure to pay hourly and
overtime wages in violation of the California Labor Code; (5) failure to pay
overtime wages in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act; (6) failure to
provide meal periods; (7) failure to provide rest periods; (8) violation of Business
and Professions Code section 17200, et seq.; (9) failure to issue accurate
itemized wage statements; (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and (11) fraud.
Defendants filed an answer on April 13, 2021.
CJ filed a cross-complaint against the Cross-Defendants on
April 12, 2021. The operative cross-complaint is now the First Amended
Cross-Complaint (“FACC”), filed on May 28, 2021, which alleges (1) fraudulent
concealment; (2) fraud and deceit; (3) violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies
Act; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) negligent misrepresentation; (6)
conversion; and (7) violation of Business & Professions Code section 17200,
et seq.
The causes of action in the cross-complaint arise out of
Plaintiff’s employment with CJ and her operation of Construction Paper. CJ
alleges that Plaintiff used her position at CJ to channel money from CJ to
Construction Paper.
This motion concerns Cross-Defendants’ destruction of
electronically stored information (“ESI”) stored on servers previously operated
by Construction Paper.
Between 2018 and 2021, Cross-Defendants maintained on-premises
servers (the “Servers”) run by MicroNet Computer Consultants, Inc.
(“Micronet”).
On June 14, 2021, approximately 60 days after CJ filed its
cross-complaint against Felipe and Construction Paper, Felipe asked MicroNet to
shut down the Servers. MicroNet repeatedly suggested that Felipe back up the
email records on the server elsewhere, but Felipe did not do so.
On June 28, 2021, CJ’s counsel sent Cross-Defendants a
notice to preserve ESI, stating that it expected that it anticipated that their
phone, email, and banking records would be important in this litigation.
On July 20, 2021, Felipe gave the server away without
backing up the data or migrating it elsewhere. As a result, Cross-Defendants
are unable to produce emails from the Servers.
Where a party misuses the discovery process, courts have
discretion to impose terminating, issue, evidence, or monetary sanctions. (Code
Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.010(g), 2030.290(c); R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative
Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 495.) Misuse of the discovery
process includes failure to respond to an authorized method of discovery or
disobeying a court order to provide discovery. (Code Civ. Proc., §§
2023.010(d), (g).)
Ultimate discovery sanctions are justified where there is a
willful discovery order violation, a history of abuse, and evidence showing
that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with discovery rules. (Van
Sickle v. Gilbert (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1516.) “[A] penalty as
severe as dismissal or default is not authorized where noncompliance with
discovery is caused by an inability to comply rather than willfulness or bad
faith.” (Brown v. Sup. Ct. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 701, 707.) Further, preventing
parties from presenting their cases on the merits is a drastic measure;
terminating sanctions should only be ordered when there has been previous
noncompliance with a rule or order and it appears a less severe sanction would
not be effective. (Link v. Cater (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1315,
1326.)
Before any sanctions may be imposed the court must make an
express finding that there has been a willful failure of the party to serve the
required answers. (Fairfield v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County
(1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 113, 118.) Lack of diligence may be deemed willful where
the party understood its obligation, had the ability to comply, and failed to
comply. (Deyo v. Killbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 787.) The party
who failed to comply with discovery obligations has the burden of showing that
the failure was not willful. Id. at 788.)
Cross-Defendants do not contest any of the foregoing facts
and concede that sanctions for spoliation of evidence are appropriate,
disputing only the type and severity of the sanctions.
As
discussed above, terminating sanctions are justified where there is a willful
discovery order violation, a history of abuse, and evidence showing that less severe
sanctions would not produce compliance with discovery rules. (Van Sickle v.
Gilbert, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 1516.) Furthermore, terminating
sanctions should only be ordered when there has been previous noncompliance
with a rule or order and it appears a less severe sanction would not be
effective. (Link v. Cater, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p.
1326.)
Here, there has been no previous noncompliance with a rule
or order. Cross-Defendant’s destruction of the ESI in question is the first
instance of discovery abuse, and although CJ sent Cross-Defendants a notice to
preserve the ESI, that notice was not a court order.
“[T]he trial court may impose terminating sanctions as a
first measure in extreme cases, or where the record shows lesser sanctions
would be ineffective. (Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v.
Howell (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 154, 191–192.) In Department of Forestry
& Fire Protection v. Howell, the trial court found that “[plaintiff’s]
willful, repeated and egregious misuses of the discovery process permeated
nearly every single significant issue in this case to an extent that threatened
the integrity of the judicial process and made it implausible that defendants
could ever receive a fair trial. (Id. at 197 [internal quotations
omitted].)
Here, however, the conduct is not so extreme as to warrant
terminating sanctions in the first instance, nor does the record show that
lesser sanctions would be unlikely to produce compliance. Cross-Defendants
admit that their conduct was wrongful and acknowledge that sanctions are
appropriate. This is not the kind of severe and incorrigible behavior that
terminating sanctions are meant to respond to. The fact that Cross-Defendants
previously served late and incomplete discovery responses on Defendants does not
elevate their conduct to “willful, repeated and egregious misuses of the
discovery process” “permeat[ing] every single significant issue in this case.”
(Department of Forestry & Fire Protection v. Howell, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at 197.)
Defendants argue that the contents of the Servers are
relevant to Felipe’s alleged embezzlement, witness information, and the
allocation of Felipe’s working hours between CJ and Construction Paper. CJ
additionally argues that the ESI will show that Felipe was an independent
contractor, rather than an employee, under California’s ABC test. However, these
are narrow factual issues. More targeted sanctions are thus capable of
remedying the impact on Defendants.
The Court therefore denies terminating sanctions.
Cross-Defendants
admit that the following issue sanctions are warranted:
(a) Plaintiff operated Construction Paper, as her alter ego;
and
(b) Plaintiff
carried out operations of Construction Paper, during part of the time she was
working for CJ.
CJ requests
additional issue sanctions establishing that:
(c) Felipe has no
evidence to support her estimate of the work hours she spent per week
performing services for CJ;
(d) Felipe provided
services to CJ through her business entity Construction Paper; and
(e) Construction
Paper was customarily engaged in the type of work Felipe was performing for CJ.
The Court finds that sanctions (a) and (b) are
appropriate here, but that the remaining issues are better dealt with by lesser
sanctions.
Cross-Defendants admit that it would be warranted to
prohibit Plaintiff from offering at trial any evidence and any testimony
referring to or regarding:
(a) the destroyed documents for any purpose;
(b) the operational or nonoperational status of Construction
Paper, Inc.; or
(c) the hours Debra
Felipe spent working on Construction Paper, Inc.
CJ additionally requests that the Court prohibit Felipe from
offering at trial any evidence referring to or regarding:
(d) the destroyed
documents to either support her wage and hour claims against the Defendants or
to defend against cross claims by the Defendants;
(e) the hours she
allegedly worked for Defendants; and
(f) any dispute by
Felipe that good cause existed for any adverse employment actions taken against
Felipe by Defendants.
The Court finds that sanctions (a)-(d) are appropriate, but
that (e) and (f) are overly broad, and best handled by a jury instruction.
Cross-Defendants would also agree to a jury instruction on
CACI Instruction 204-Willful Suppression at time of trial. The Court finds that
this instruction is appropriate as to the issues of the hours Felipe worked for
CJ; whether Felipe provided services to CJ through her business entity
Construction Paper; whether Construction Paper was customarily engaged in the
type of work Felipe was performing for CJ; and whether good cause existed for
any adverse employment actions taken against Felipe by Defendants.
CJ requests attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,910.00 for
the time spent on this motion. Terence Liao has a billing rate of $405.00 per
hour and anticipates spending a total of 22 hours on this motion, 18 hours of
which have already been spent. (Liao Decl. ¶ 20.)
Cross-Defendants do not respond to CJ’s request for
attorney’s fees. The Court grants the request for attorney’s fees.