Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 21STCV10774, Date: 2023-11-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV10774 Hearing Date: November 16, 2023 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
DANIEL NISHIYAMA, Plaintiff, v. MELANIE MIDDIEN, SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE
OF THE MIDDIEN-RADER FAMILY TRUST, et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
21STCV10774 Hearing Date: November 16, 2023 Calendar Number: 2 |
Defendant Melanie Middien (“Defendant”) moves for the
dismissal of this action, the expungement of attorney liens, and terminating
sanctions against Plaintiff Daniel Nishiyama (“Plaintiff”).
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. The denial is without prejudice to
Defendant’s ability to file a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication
Defendant’s motion for terminating sanctions is DENIED.
Plaintiff is an attorney who represented Defendant’s former
spouse (the “Decedent”) in a divorce proceeding. In order to pay his legal
fees, the Decedent permitted Plaintiff to attach liens to his community
property interest in five real properties to which Defendant and the Decedent
held an interest.
Defendant is the trustee of the family trust. Plaintiff
filed a claim in the probate proceedings that arose out of the Decedent’s
death. Defendant denied the claim. Plaintiff filed this civil case, stating
claims for (1) breach of contract; (2) common counts; (3) enforcement of lien;
and (4) adjudication of creditor’s claim.
Defendant filed the motion to dismiss on September 19, 2023
and the motion for terminating sanctions on September 26, 2023. Plaintiff filed
an opposition to the motion to dismiss along with a declaration. Plaintiff
filed a declaration in opposition to the motion for terminating sanctions.
Defendant’s
motion to dismiss does not fit into a recognized category of motions under
California civil procedure.
The motion could not be a demurrer or a motion for judgment
on the pleadings since it relies largely on extrinsic evidence beyond the face
of the pleadings. (See Donabedian v.
Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer,
a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice,
or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents]; Cloud v. Northrup Grumman
Corp.¿(1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999
[the same rules govern a motion for judgment on the pleadings as a demurrer,
and the grounds for the motion must be apparent on the face of the pleadings.)
The
motion to dismiss most closely resembles a motion for summary judgment, in that
it relies on evidence to argue the merits. However, the notice of motion does
not state that Defendant seeks summary judgment or summary adjudication. Importantly, the motion is also missing a
separate statement.
A motion for summary judgment must contain and be supported
by the following documents:
“(1) Notice of motion by [moving party] for
summary judgment or summary adjudication or both;
(2) Separate statement of undisputed material
facts in support of [moving party's] motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication or both;
(3) Memorandum in support of [moving party's]
motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication or both;
(4) Evidence in support of [moving party's]
motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication or both; and
(5) Request for judicial notice in support of
[moving party's] motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication or both
(if appropriate).”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1350(c).)
The inclusion of a separate statement’s inclusion is a
strict requirement for motions of summary judgment, and must comply with
subdivision (d) of Rule 3.1350 of the California Rules of Court, which reads as
follows:
“(1) The Separate Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts in support of a motion must separately identify:
(A) Each cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative
defense that is the subject of the motion; and
(B) Each supporting material fact claimed
to be without dispute with respect to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative
defense that is the subject of the motion.
(2) The separate statement should include only
material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of
the motion.
(3) The separate statement must be in the two-column format specified in (h). The statement must
state in numerical sequence the undisputed material facts in the first column
followed by the evidence that establishes those undisputed facts in that same
column. Citation to the evidence in support of each material fact must include
reference to the exhibit, title, page, and line numbers.”
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350,
subd. (d).)
Defendant’s
motion is not called a summary judgment motion and does not meet these
requirements. The motion therefore does not present a clear basis for the Court
to grant pretrial judgment as requested. Although the Court denies Defendant’s
motion, this denial does not affect Plaintiff’s ability to file a motion for
summary judgment compliant with the requirements in California Rule of Court Rule
3.1350.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is
therefore Denied. The denial is without
prejudice to Defendant’s ability to file a motion for summary judgment or
summary adjudication using the appropriate procedure.
The motion for terminating sanctions raises a number of
issues, but none is a basis for this Court to issue terminating sanctions.
“A
secured creditor can bring only one lawsuit to enforce its security interest
and collect its debt. (Security Pacific National Bank v. Wozab (1990) 51
Cal.3d 991, 997, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 726, subd. (a).)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has violated the one action
rule by asserting multiple causes of action in this case. As an initial matter, this is a substantive
argument on the merits and is not properly raised on a motion for termination
sanctions.
Second, Defendant’s argument misunderstands the meaning of
“action” in the statute – “[a]n action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of
justice[.]” (Id. at 998, quoting Code Civ. Proc. § 22.) Although
Plaintiff has filed multiple causes of action, those causes of action are part
of one case, i.e., one action.
Although Plaintiff sought to assert a claim in the probate
court prior to filing in civil court, Defendant rejected Plaintiff’s claim in
the probate court. The probate court therefore found that a civil action would
be the appropriate remedy for Plaintiff to seek and declined to relate this
case to the probate case on July 27, 2021.
Plaintiff therefore has not violated the one-action rule.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff improperly filed Plaintiff’s
financial records that were marked in a manner indicating that they should not
be filed with the court. The Court recognizes that a protective order could be
appropriate with respect to these documents in the current case. However,
without an actual protective order in place here, filing those documents does
not constitute an abuse of the discovery process.
Similarly, Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s efforts to photograph
and videotape the properties at issue. Again, the Court does not make a ruling
here on whether a protective order would be appropriate, but because a
protective order was not in place, this conduct is not discovery abuse.
Defendant
identifies a series of behaviors by Plaintiff in the previous family law case.
Although some of the conduct alleged is serious, it did not occur in this case,
and the Court therefore does not view the conduct as a basis for terminating
sanctions in the current case.
“It is an undisputed equitable principle that those who seek
the aid of equity must sue in good faith.” (Samuelson v. Ingraham (1969)
272 Cal.App.2d 804, 806.) “Any unconscionable conduct which relates to the
transaction may give rise to the defense of unclean hands and bar relief.” (Ibid.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has unclean hands and
therefore cannot obtain relief.
There is no law providing that the doctrine of unclean hands
is a basis for terminating sanctions in a case like this one. Rather, unclean
hands is a substantive doctrine that can bar recovery on the merits of a case.
Thus, Plaintiff may still assert the defense of unclean hands in a motion for
summary judgment or at trial, but it is not a basis for sanctions.