Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 21STCV22392, Date: 2023-11-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV22392 Hearing Date: December 20, 2023 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
|
CHEYENNE ROBINSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SANTA MONICA, et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
21STCV22392 Hearing Date: December 20, 2023 Calendar Number: 14 |
Defendants City of Santa Monica (“Santa Monica”), Cynthia
Renaud, Jacob Emanuel, Juan C. Cornejo (“Cornejo”), Jennifer Estrada, Evan
Raleigh, Douglas Woodhams, Jeff Glaser and Candice Cobarrubias (“Cobarrubias”)
(collectively, “Defendants”) moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication
against Plaintiffs Cheyenne Robinson and Stormy Jane Eny-Edy, (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) on May 12, 2023. The only defendant whose motion remains at issue
is Cobarrubias.
The Court DENIES Cobarrubias’s motion for summary judgment.
The
Court DENIES Cobarrubias’s motion for summary adjudication as to violations of
the Bane Act (first cause of action), negligence (fourth cause of action), and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (fifth cause of action).
Background
For the factual background relevant to this motion, the
Court refers the parties to the Court’s November 28, 2023 Minute Order. The Court repeats only certain facts relating
to Cobarrubias for context.
Plaintiffs Robinson and Eny-Edy went to a protest in the
City of Santa Monica on May 31, 2020 regarding the death of George Floyd. (UMF
¶¶ 1, 2, 11.) Both the Santa Monica Police Department (“SMPD”) and Los Angeles
Police Department (“LAPD”) were present at the protest. (UMF ¶¶ 12, 13.) Around
5:30 pm, the police informed Plaintiffs that there was a curfew in place. (UMF
¶¶ 2, 11, 12.)
Estrada was the jail administrator for SMPD on May 31, 2020.
(AUMF ¶ 3.) Cobarrubias, the police captain, instructed Estrada to scout a
location at the Santa Monica Airport for a field jail with Glaser, a
lieutenant. (AUMF ¶ 4.) Estrada and Glaser selected the airport as a field
jail. ((AUMF ¶ 6.) Estrada spoke to Cobarrubias and informed her that it would
be better to bring arrestees to the station because they would have access to
bathrooms and phones, and it would be possible to separate arrestees. (AUMF ¶
7.) Cobarrubias decided to use the airport as a field jail. (AUMF ¶¶ 8, 9.)
Estrada was tasked with running the field jail. (AUMF ¶ 15.)
Cobarrubias was deployed to the SMPD command post that evening. (AUMF ¶ 19.) The
field jail was set up by 3pm with the plan to bring arrestees in, cite them,
and release them; however, SMPD command post made the decision that arrestees
would not be released from the field jail. (AUMF ¶¶ 16-18.) Despite Estrada
telling the SMPD command post that the field jail was not equipped to handle
more arrestees, SMPD command post continued bringing arrestees to the field
jail. (AUMF ¶ 20.) All of the arrestees were cited for curfew violation, based
on SMPD command’s instructions. (AUMF ¶ 21.)
Robinson was arrested by a SMPD officers Raleigh and Woodhams
and taken to a booking location at the Santa Monica Airport, where she was held
in a chain link fence area. (UMF ¶¶ 5-7, AUMF ¶ 58.) Edy-Eny was arrested by
the LAPD and taken to the Santa Monica Fire Department, where she was held in a
fenced area. (UMF ¶¶ 12-14.)
At each location, arrestees were restrained in tight plastic
‘flexcuffs’ for hours and were not given access to bathrooms or water. (AUMF ¶
13.) Both Plaintiffs expressed discomfort with their flexcuffs and asked for
them to be loosened or removed, but the officers present did not respond. (AUMF
¶¶ 39-41, 60-62.)
Plaintiffs filed this action against Defendants on June 15,
2021, stating claims for (1) violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act (Civil Code
§ 52.1); (2) false arrest and false imprisonment; (3) assault and battery; (4)
negligence; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); and (6)
negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) against all Defendants.
Defendants, with the exception of Jeff Glaser and
Cobarrubias, filed this motion on May 12, 2023. Jeff Glaser and Cobarrubias joined
the motion and filed additional supporting documents on August 24, 2023. Plaintiffs filed an opposition and Defendants
filed a reply.
Plaintiffs have agreed to dismiss all individual Defendants
with the exception of Cornejo and Cobarrubias.
Accordingly, the only Defendants who remain in the case are Santa
Monica, Cornejo, and Cobarrubias.
On November 28, the Court denied summary judgment as Santa
Monica and Cornejo. The Court ordered additional briefing on the motion for
summary judgment or summary adjudication brought by Cobarrubias. Plaintiffs
filed a supplemental brief and Cobarrubias filed a response.
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’
pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in
fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the
evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’
and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
“In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all of
the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom [citation]
and must view such evidence [citations] and such inferences [citations] in the
light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Aguilar, supra, at
pp. 844-845 [quotation marks omitted].)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is
always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material
fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510,
1519.) A
defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or
her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has
shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion
must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be
granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
Plaintiffs contend that Cobarrubias is liable Bane Act
violations (first cause of action), negligence (fourth cause of action), and IIED
(fifth cause of action).
The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act has been codified at section
52.1 of the California Civil Code. The
elements of a claim for violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act are (1) the
defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s
constitutional or statutory rights by threatening or committing violent acts;
(2) the plaintiff reasonably believed that if he or she exercised his or her
constitutional rights the defendant would commit violence against him or her or
his or her property, or the defendant injured the plaintiff or his or her
property to prevent him or her from exercising his or her constitutional rights
or retaliated against the plaintiff for having exercised his or her
constitutional rights; (3) the plaintiff was harmed; and (4) the defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm. (Civ. Code, §
52.1; Austin B. v. Escondido Union School Dist., supra, 149
Cal.App.4th at p. 882.)
A Bane Act violation requires that the defendant have a
specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights. (Cornell v. City &
County of San Francisco (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 801-802.) “There is no
Bane Act violation where the overdetention occurs because of mere negligence
rather than a volitional act intended to interfere with the exercise or
enjoyment of the constitutional right.” (Bender v. County of Los Angeles
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 979 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)
“[E]ven if the defendant did not in fact recognize the [unlawfulness] of his
act, he will be adjudged as a matter of law to have acted [with the requisite
specific intent]—i.e., in reckless disregard of constitutional [or statutory]
prohibitions or guarantees.” (Cornell, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at
p. 803 [internal quotations and citations omitted].)
Under the integral participant doctrine, “an official whose
individual actions do not themselves rise to the level of a constitutional
violation may be held liable under section 1983 only if the official is an
integral participant in the unlawful act.” (Peck v. Montoya (9th Cir.
2022) 51 F.4th 877, 889.) An official is an integral participant if “(1) the
defendant knew about and acquiesced in the constitutionally defective conduct
as part of a common plan with those whose conduct constituted the violation, or
(2) the defendant set in motion a series of acts by others which the defendant
knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict the
constitutional injury.” (Id. at 891.) “That standard does not permit the
imposition of liability on a defendant who was unable to foresee that his
conduct would lead to the commission of a tort.” (Ibid.)
In Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner (9th Cir. 2020) 969
F.3d 930, the Ninth Circuit applied integral participant liability to a
superior officer for the false arrest of the plaintiff, explaining that “[the
plaintiff]’s detention was a reasonably foreseeable consequence—indeed, perhaps
the only reasonable interpretation—of [the superior officer]’s order that [the
plaintiff] be ‘picked up.’” (Id. at p. 942.)
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated several
constitutional rights in a manner that violated the Bane Act. The Court
addresses each of them in turn.
The Fourth Amendment protects “against unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a detainee from
punishment prior to the adjudication of guilt. (Bell v. Wolfish (1979)
441 U.S. 520, 535.) Further, “due process requires that the nature and duration
of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
individual is committed.” (Jackson v. Indiana (1972) 406 U.S. 715, 738.)
In its previous order, the Court found triable issues of
fact as to the Defendants other than Cobarrubias because Plaintiffs have
alleged coercion independent of that inherent in a wrongful detention. The examples given in the earlier order
included the following. SMPD policy
requires that an officer examine whether handcuffs or flexcuffs are too tight
when an arrestee complains about the tightness of their restraints. (Raleigh
Depo. 17:16-19:8.) Both Plaintiffs repeatedly complained that their flexcuffs
were too tight. (AUMF ¶¶ 39, 44, 60-62.) In fact, Robinson started crying as a
result of the pressure on her wrists. (AUMF ¶ 61.) In spite of this, officers
repeatedly disregarded Plaintiffs’ complaints. Moreover, Robinson observed some
arrestees asking to the use the bathroom and being denied, causing people to
urinate in the corner of the cage. (Robinson Depo. 76:22-78:14.) The Defendants’ imposition of these
conditions, and subsequent inaction to alter them, was a substantial factor in
causing the harm that Plaintiffs suffered. This makes the case different from Shoyoye
v. County of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, where the evidence
demonstrated rudeness and indifference to the plaintiff’s wrongful
incarceration, but no other form of coercion.
(Shoyoye, supra, 203 Cal. App. 4th at p. 961.)
As explained in more detail below, the Court agrees with
Defendants that there are no facts showing Cobarrubias was responsible for the
improper use and removal of the flexcuffs.
But Cobarrubias was involved in the rest of the alleged constitutional
violations in a manner that creates a triable issue of facts as to whether she
is liable for a Bane Act violation. Here,
Cobarrubias made the decision to set up the field jail at the airport. (AUMF ¶
6.) She decided to use the airport even though Estrada had informed her that it
would be better to bring arrestees to the station because they would have
access to bathrooms and phones, and it would be possible to separate arrestees.
(AUMF ¶¶ 7-9.) Cobarrubias was deployed to the SMPD command post that evening,
which decided to continue sending arrestees to the airport field jail even
though Estrada told the command post that the field jail was not equipped to
handle more arrestees. (AUMF ¶¶ 19-20.) The SMPD command post instructed that
all arrestees be cited for curfew violations. (AUMF ¶ 21.)
Cobarrubias therefore knew, or should have known, that
setting up the field jail at the airport would result in insufficient access to
bathrooms, but nevertheless ordered the use of the airport. Further,
Cobarrubias, having ordered the use of the airport, was deployed to command
post when it ordered that arrestees be continually sent there despite
overcapacity and ordered that all arrestees be cited, creating a triable issue
of fact that she knew about those facts as well when she left the order to use the
field jail in place. Given the volume of the arrestees, which Defendants
acknowledge “overstressed law enforcement agencies’ capacity” (Motion at p.
11:15-27), and the lack of sufficient bathrooms at the airport, it was “a
reasonably foreseeable consequence—indeed, perhaps the only reasonable
interpretation” that the continued use of the airport would deny arrestees
access to bathrooms for hours. (Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, supra,
969 F.3d at p. 942.)
Cobarrubias could therefore be liable under both the first
and second prongs of the Peck test – for acquiescing in a common plan
(by leaving the order to use the airport in place despite its reaching capacity
and the plans to cite all arrestees), and for setting in motion acts which she
should have known would lead to a constitutional injury (by ordering the use of
the airport in the first place). Thus, there is a triable issue of fact that
Cobarrubias is liable under the integral participant doctrine.
To prove a First Amendment violation, a plaintiff must show:
(1) that the plaintiff was engaged in
constitutionally protected activity”; (2) that the defendant's actions caused
the plaintiff “to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in that activity”; and (3) that the
“defendant's adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to the
plaintiff's exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.” (Mendocino
Environmental 1161 Center v. Mendocino County (9th Cir.1999) 192 F.3d 1283,
1300–01.) Plaintiffs need not show their speech was actually inhibited or
suppressed, rather, the proper inquiry is whether an official's acts would
chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment
activities. (Ariz. Students’ Ass’n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents (9th Cir.
2016) 824 F.3d 858, 867.)
The right to protest is protected by the First Amendment. (Collins
v. Jordan (9th Cir. 1996) 110 F.3d 1363, 1371.) The Court previously found
that Plaintiffs were arrested after engaging in a constitutionally protected
activity. As discussed above, they were subject to conditions of confinement
that may have violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Furthermore,
Defendants still have not briefed the first amendment argument – in either
their reply or their supplemental briefing. Thus, for the same reasons that
there is a triable issue of fact as to Cobarrubias’ integral participant
liability for the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, there is a
triable issue of fact as to the First Amendment violations.
As the Court explained in its previous
order, Plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the use of
overly tight flexcuffs and Cornejo’s cutting of their hands each constituted
excessive force.
Plaintiffs do not present an argument
that Cobarrubias was an integral participant as to the use of overly tight
flexcuffs, nor do they argue that Cobarrubias was an integral participant as to
Cornejo’s cutting of Plaintiffs’ hands. Defendants argue that Cobarrubias had
no knowledge that Cornejo would participate in any way other than driving the
bus for transportation, including that he would attempt to remove flexcuffs
using the wrong tool. The Court finds these arguments persuasive. No party has
argued that overly tight manner in which the flexcuffs were applied is inherent
to the use of flexcuffs in general, so it is not the case that Cobarrubias
reasonably should have known that they would have been applied too tightly.
Similarly, Cobarrubias could not reasonably have known that an employee would
attempt to improperly remove the flexcuffs with a knife and stab multiple
people as a result. Thus, there is no triable issue of fact that Cobarrubias is
liable for Cornejo’s actions or the tightness of the flexcuffs.
In order to state a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must
allege the elements of (1) “the existence of a legal duty of care,” (2) “breach
of that duty,” and (3) “proximate cause resulting in an injury.” (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)
“Once in custody, an arrestee is vulnerable, dependent,
subject to the control of the officer…. Due to this special relationship, the
officer owes a duty of reasonable care to the arrestee.” (Frausto v.
Department of California Highway Patrol (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 973, 993.)
Defendants argue that Cobarrubias is not liable under a
negligence theory because there is no special relationship and there is no
foreseeability.
As discussed above, it was foreseeable to Cobarrubias that
the use of the airport as a field jail despite the lack of bathroom access
would result in arrestees being denied bathroom access for hours.
As to special relationship, Defendants argue that Frausto’s
relationship between an arrestee and jailer does not extend to Cobarrubias
because she “had no interaction with Plaintiffs, nor did Cobarrubias make any
orders directed to Plaintiffs.” (Defendants’ Supplemental Brief at p. 5:24-26.)
Here, however, Cobarrubias was the superior officer who ordered the use of the
field jail, having been informed of the constitutionally problematic lack of
bathroom access. It is therefore incorrect to say that she did not make any
orders directed at the arrestees, even if she did not intend those
orders to affect Plaintiffs in particular. She knew that individuals
would be arrested, and therefore knew that those individuals would be subject
to a special relationship with their jailers, and nevertheless gave an order
that foreseeably led to the violation of their constitutional rights.
The
Court therefore denies summary adjudication to Cobarrubias on this issue.
“The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate
causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.
Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually
tolerated in a civilized community.” (Wilson
v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and ellipses omitted.)
“[T]he defendant’s conduct must be intended to inflict injury or engaged in
with the realization that injury will result.” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46
Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051 [internal quotations omitted].)
Here,
there is a triable issue of fact whether Cobarrubias’s order that the airport
be used as a field jail rose to the level of reckless disregard for the
probability of causing emotional distress. Cobarrubias was informed that the
airport lacked adequate bathroom facilities. Cobarrubias was deployed to the command
post when it was informed that the airport was at capacity and when it
continued sending arrestees there anyway. Cobarrubias was also deployed to the
command post when it ordered that all the arrestees be cited, which would
necessarily take hours given the sheer volume of arrestees. Thus, there is a
triable issue of fact as to whether Cornejo acted with reckless disregard for
the risk of denying the arrestees bathroom access for hours on end.
The
Court therefore denies summary adjudication to Cobarrubias on this issue.