Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 21STCV31344, Date: 2023-08-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV31344    Hearing Date: August 15, 2023    Dept: 72

Date:               8/15/23                                               

Case No.:        21STCV31344                                                                       

Case Name:     One Cal Plaza Owner, LLC vs. Broadway Elite, LLC, et al.  

            Plaintiff CNI One Cal Plaza Owner, LLC (“Plaintiff”) seeks an order awarding reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.  The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion.  Defendants Broadway Elite LLC and SCG America Group, Inc. are ordered to pay Plaintiff $93,296.50 in attorneys’ fees and $5,774.20 in costs, jointly and severally, within 15 calendar days of this order.  The judgment shall be amended to include the award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 

I.                    Background

On August 24, 2021, Plaintiff CNI One Cal Plaza Owner, LLC (“Plaintiff”) sued Defendants Broadway Elite, LLC and SCG America Group, Inc. (“Defendants”) for breach of lease, breach of guaranty, and declaratory relief arising out of an alleged Lease Agreement and Guaranty Agreement of property located at One California Plaza, 300 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90071. (Compl.)

On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”).  The Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion on January 24, 2023.  (1-24-23 Minute Order.) Plaintiff also filed a Proposed Judgment on February 22, 2023; that day, the Court granted it, and the clerk served it. (2-22-23 Proposed Judgment; 2-22-23 Certificate of Service.)

            On March 9, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Costs.  Plaintiff has sought judicial notice of its memorandum of costs.  The request for judicial notice is granted in full. 

            On April 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Order Awarding Reasonable Attorney’s Fees and Costs (“Motion”).  Defendants opposed. Plaintiff replied.

II.                 Legal Standard

A prevailing party in a lawsuit includes “the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant.”  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (a)(4).) Under Civil Code section 1717, the party prevailing is the one that recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. (Civ. Code § 1717, subd. (b)(1).)

A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as a matter of right.  (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032, subd. (a)(4), 1032, subd. (b), 1033.5.)  Furthermore, attorney’s fees are allowable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).)

Civil Code § 1717 states in pertinent part: “[i]n any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce¿that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the¿party¿prevailing¿on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees in addition to¿other¿costs.”  (Civ. Code, § 1717(a)).

The calculation of attorney’s fees in California begins with the “lodestar” method – multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate.  A computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on factors specific to the case, to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.  (Ibid. at p. 48, fn. 23.)  After the trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether the total award so calculated under all of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if so, shall reduce the section 1717 award so that it is a reasonable figure.  (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-1096.)

As explained in Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.:

“[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. [Citation.]  The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services. . . . This approach anchors the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.” [Internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted.]

((2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)  “It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.  [Citations.]  The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court has its own expertise. . . . The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.   [Citations.]”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623624.)

No specific findings reflecting the court’s calculations are required.  The record need only show that the attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.  The court’s focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided.  The starting point for this determination is the attorney’s time records.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].)  However, California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets. (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103.)  An experienced trial judge can assess the value of the professional services rendered in his or her court.   (Ibid.; Serrano, 20 Cal.3d 25 at 49.)

III.              Analysis

Using the lodestar method, the Court finds that the amount requested by Plaintiff for attorney’s fees, $93,296.50, is reasonable and appropriate.  No reduction is warranted under the facts of this case.  Moreover, Defendants do not oppose Plaintiff’s request for costs and the Court finds Plaintiff’s requested amount, $5,774.20, reasonable and appropriate.

Defendants do not disagree that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees but disagree about the proper amount of the fees.  Defendants make two primary arguments about the amount of attorney’s fees.  First, Defendants argue that the award of attorney fees should be limited in accordance with the schedule provided in the Los Angeles County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 3.214.  However, fees exceeding the scheduled amount can be awarded on a proper showing.  (Cruz v. Ayromloo (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1275.)  Counsel seeking such fees bear the burden of proof.  (Code Civ. Pro., §1033.5(c)(5).) Here, Plaintiff’s counsel has made that showing.

Second, the defendants argue that the amount of work and the hourly rates were excessive.  The Court does not agree.  The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s counsel billing statement, Exhibit 5 to the declaration of Stacey A. Villagomez in support of the motion.  The description of the work is clear.  The rates and amount of work appear appropriate for a case of this type.  The Court has reviewed the billing statements to make sure that Plaintiff was not billed twice for the same task (e.g., two attorneys attending a deposition when one would have sufficed).  The overall amount of billable time—139.3 hours—to bring this case to a successful conclusion is appropriate.  The broad criticism of the efficiency of the billing set forth in paragraphs 6-8 of the Altagen Declaration are not persuasive.

Accordingly, the Court grants the motion.  Plaintiff to give notice.