Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 21STCV33568, Date: 2023-10-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV33568 Hearing Date: December 7, 2023 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
LIZABETH GRALNICK, Plaintiff, v. DXC Technology, Inc, Defendants. |
Case No:
21STCV33568 Hearing Date: December 7, 2023 Calendar Number: 1 |
Defendants DXC Technology, Inc. (“DXC”) and Mary Finch
(collectively, “Defendants”) move for Summary Judgment and for Summary Adjudication
on each of the causes of action in Plaintiff Lizabeth Gralnik’s Second Amended
Complaint.
The Court GRANTS Defendants’ request for summary
adjudication on the twelfth cause of action. Except as so ordered, the Court
DENIES the motion.
This action arises out of Plaintiff’s employment at DXC.
Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that during her employment, DXC discriminated
against her on the basis of gender by moving her to an unfavorable position,
giving unwarranted negative performance reviews, and withholding pay.
Plaintiff began working for DXC’s predecessor in August of
2015. Plaintiff was hired for her expertise in the automotive industry. DXC’s
predecessor merged with Hewlett Packard to become the current DXC, at which
point Plaintiff transferred to the ECA department, more specifically, the
Oracle sales group, as a salesperson.
In October 2017, Plaintiff complained about her manager in
ECA, Kristi Nilles, for inappropriate conduct. Nilles was terminated following
an investigation.
In May 2018, Plaintiff received her performance evaluation
with a rating of 2 on a scale from 1-4, with 1 being the highest.
Nilles was replaced by Shawn Willoughby, in the summer of
2018. Willoughby treated male salespersons different from female salespersons
by instructing a male salesperson to double book a sale to show extra revenue.
Plaintiff and one other female coworker complained about Willoughby’s conduct.
Plaintiff complained about the conduct to Kristine Gersabeck, the ECA manager, on
more than one occasion and was a witness in an investigation following the
other employee’s complaint.
In the fall of 2018, Plaintiff applied for a position in the
automotive area. Plaintiff was not interviewed for the position and a man, Chet
Karpinski, with less experience was hired.
Plaintiff’s annual salary was $200,000 throughout her
employment with DXC. Plaintiff provides evidence that her salary was below the
midpoint for her grade level and was less than the salaries of men in her area.
(Responses to UMF 229, 305, 306.) Under an incentive compensation agreement,
salespersons received commissions based on the sales they completed in addition
to their base salaries.
In late 2018, the decision was made to transfer Plaintiff to
the consulting department. Beginning in March 2019, Willoughby instructed
Plaintiff to transfer her accounts in sales to other salespersons, with all of
the accounts being transferred by May 2019. When Plaintiff contacted Gersabeck
about the transfer, Gersabeck stated that Plaintiff would be transferred when
Gersabeck decided to transfer her. Plaintiff was not transferred to the
consulting department until September 2019, and was not able to work on
accounts for consulting before that time. As a result, she was unable to earn
credit toward her quotas for several months. Additionally, because Plaintiff
was moved between two different quotas, the pay calculating system was unable
to calculate her pay for both quotas, and used the higher annual, un-prorated
quotas that would apply if Plaintiff had worked for the entire year in the
consulting department. This resulted in Plaintiff receiving significantly less
pay than she contends she was owed.
In December 2019, Plaintiff made an HR complaint against
Gersabeck and Willoughby, complaining that she was not credited or paid for
deals that she closed, was not allowed to work in ECA during the transfer time,
and was subjected to unlawful retaliation and discrimination.
In 2020, Plaintiff made another complaint to Mary Finch
about not being paid wages owed to her, as well as discrimination and
retaliation. Finch said that she would look into the complaint. However, no
investigation occurred.
Plaintiff resigned her position on October 21, 2021.
Plaintiff’s operative complaint is the Second Amended
Complaint (“SAC”), which states claims for (1) gender discrimination; (2)
violation of the Equal Pay Act; (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (4)
retaliation in violation of Labor Code Section 1102.5; (5) failure to pay
wages; (6) failure to reimburse expenses; (7) unlawful forfeiture of wages; (8)
unlawful clawback of wages; (9) failure to pay overtime; (10) failure to
prevent discrimination and retaliation; (11) unfair business practices in
violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200; and (12) failure to
provide accurate wage statements. All claims are raised against DXC, and the
5th, 6th, 9th, and 12th claims are raised against Finch as well.
Defendants moved for summary judgment or summary
adjudication on August 7, 2023. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendants
filed a reply.
The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’
pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in
fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the
evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’
and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no
triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
“In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all of
the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom [citation]
and must view such evidence [citations] and such inferences [citations] in the
light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Aguilar, supra, at
pp. 844-845 [quotation marks omitted].)
“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is
always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material
fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510,
1519.) A
defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or
her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has
shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be
established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
“Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)
To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion
must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68
Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) “If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be
granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159
Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
As an initial matter, Defendant has presented the summary
adjudication in a form and manner that makes it extremely difficult to grant
summary adjudication in its favor. In Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 243, the Court of Appeal criticized a litigant for expecting
the trial court to digest enormous amounts of separate statement assertions in
the context of the pretrial summary judgment motion. “The incredible
volume of material here simply has no place in a system where overburdened
trial courts labor long and hard.” (Id. at p. 289.) The Court of
Appeal offered guidance “in the event a trial court is ever again confronted
with anything remotely close to that here,” suggesting that a court could
legitimately exercise its inherent powers to strike facts or perhaps deny the
motion on this ground alone. (Id. at pp. 289-291.)
This is such a case. Defendant has presented a
staggering 4,511 supposedly undisputed facts over the course of 858 pages.
Between the statement of undisputed facts, the response to the statement of
undisputed facts, the additional undisputed material facts of Plaintiff, and
Defendant’s reply to the Plaintiff’s additional statement of undisputed facts
there are an astonishing 2,045 pages of material, said to be supported by
evidence that spans over a thousand additional pages. The Court believes it
would have been in its rights to deny Defendant’s motion in its entirety on
this basis alone. In addition, parties who submit an extraordinary volume
of factual material in support of a summary adjudication or summary judgment
motion create an impression that the motion presents inherently factual issues
for consideration. Nevertheless, the Court analyzes each of the issues raised
by Defendants as discussed below.
A plaintiff alleging discrimination under FEHA must allege
“that (1) [she] was a member of a protected class, (2) [she] was qualified for
the position he sought or was performing competently in the position he held,
(3) [she] suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion,
or denial of an available job, and (4) some other circumstance suggests
discriminatory motive.” (Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th
317, 355.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s gender discrimination
claim is subject to summary adjudication on a variety of points, including lack
of establishment of a prima facie case, no evidence of pretext, and no evidence
of less pay for Plaintiff than men doing substantially similar work. In the
context of this case, these are inherently disputed factual issues. Plaintiff
has persuasively explained her prima facie case, which the Court finds
sufficient. (See Plaintiff’s Opposition at pp. 5-10.) Defendant’s
attempt to show lack of disputes on material points fare no better.
Plaintiff has demonstrated that the issue of pretext, the adverse employment
action, and the pay gap between men and women are inherently factual questions.
(Response to UMF 39, 45, 47, 48, 49, 59, 60, 70, 96, 97, 119, 130, 131, 134,
145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 158, 159, 160, 167, 174, 186, 187, 189, 194, 196, 197,
202, 220, 229, 232, 235, 240, 243, 253, 259, 260, 261, 265, 270, 272, 280, 281,
303, 304, 305, 306, 320, 322, 2837, 2848, 2858, 2861, Additional Material
Facts (“AUMF”) 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44,
46,.)
Defendants’ reply to Plaintiff’s argument is
unpersuasive. For example, Defendant argues that John Snipes is the only
proper comparator for Plaintiff’s pay. Defendants’ disagreement that three
particular employees are not appropriate comparators cannot be decided on this
record at the summary judgment stage. It presents a classic question of fact
based on the record before the Court. Similarly, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff cannot prove that the actions were adverse or that the adverse
actions were taken because of gender – these are inherently factual questions
that Plaintiff provides evidence to dispute.
“An employer shall not pay any of its employees at wage
rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex for
substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and
responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions, except where
the employer demonstrates:
(1) The wage differential is based upon one or more of the
following factors:
(A) A seniority system.
(B) A merit system.
(C) A system that measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production.
(D) A bona fide
factor other than sex, such as education, training, or experience. This factor
shall apply only if the employer demonstrates that the factor is not based on
or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation, is job related with
respect to the position in question, and is consistent with a business
necessity. For purposes of this subparagraph, “business necessity” means an
overriding legitimate business purpose such that the factor relied upon
effectively fulfills the business purpose it is supposed to serve. This defense
shall not apply if the employee demonstrates that an alternative business
practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing
the wage differential.
(2) Each factor relied upon is applied reasonably.
(3) The one or more factors relied upon account for the
entire wage differential.
(4) Prior salary
shall not justify any disparity in compensation. Nothing in this section shall
be interpreted to mean that an employer may not make a compensation decision
based on a current employee’s existing salary, so long as any wage differential
resulting from that compensation decision is justified by one or more of the
factors in this subdivision.”
(Lab. Code § 1197.5, subd. (a).)
Defendants argue that this claim fails because Plaintiff
cannot provide evidence showing that she was paid less than her male peers. Plaintiff
has set forth a prima facie case here. (Opposition at pp. 9-10.) The Court
finds that Plaintiff has provided ample evidence to dispute this fact such that
summary judgment is not proper. (Response to UMF 150, 151, 229, 303, 304, 305,
306; AUMF 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30.)
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s violations are
constrained by the statute of limitations to the two-year period prior to the
filing of the Complaint. However, under the continuing violation doctrine,
incidents for which the filing would be individually untimely can be considered
if they are cumulatively part of an ongoing unlawful practice with incidents
that do fall within the statute of limitations.
(Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal. 4th 798, 811-824.)
Here, Plaintiff has provided evidence that the unequal pay was an ongoing
practice. Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not identified proper
comparators; as discussed above, the Court finds that this is an issue of fact
for trial.
The elements of a cause of action for failure to prevent
harassment or retaliation are: (1) actionable discrimination or harassment by
employees or nonemployees; (2) defendant’s legal duty of care toward plaintiff
(i.e., defendant is the plaintiff’s employer); (3) breach of that duty (i.e.,
failure to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and
harassment from occurring); (4) legal causation; and (5) damages to plaintiff.
(Trujillo v. North County Transit
District (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 287, 289; Bradley v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008)
158 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1630; Gov. Code, § 12940.)
Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot prove that she
suffered an adverse action or that there was a causal link with protected
activity. Defendants argue that the transfer of Plaintiff’s work away from her
while she was awaiting a role transfer was normal procedure and not an adverse
action. Although Defendant argues Plaintiff only took one protected action,
Plaintiff has provided evidence that she complained numerous times about her
managers’ behavior. (Responses to UMF 2937, 2949, 2961.) Similarly, Plaintiff
has shown evidence that her reduced performance rating affects pay. (AUMF 10,
11, 13, 14.) Plaintiff has provided evidence that DXC intentionally delayed
her transfer after removing Plaintiff’s work from her. (Responses to UMF 121,
131, 132, 133; Additional UMF 16, 17, 18, 48.) Finally, Plaintiff has shown
evidence that Willoughby, the manager she primarily complained about, refused
to credit her for deals that she worked on. (Responses to UMF 182, 189, 259,
260, 261, 262; AUMF 27, 38, 45, 49.) Although Defendants argue in their Reply that
Plaintiff’s delay in transfer predates her participation in an interview
regarding Willoughby, it does not predate all of her evidenced complaints about
him. Thus, the Court finds that the questions at issue here are questions of
fact for a jury.
The Labor Code’s whistleblower provision prohibits an
employer from retaliating against an employee who reports a violation of state
or federal statute or a local, state or federal rule or regulation or who
refuses to participate in any activity that would result in a violation of law.
(Lab. Code § 1102.5.) To prevail on whistleblower retaliation claim, a
plaintiff must establish that their alleged protected activated was a
contributing factor in the adverse action taken against them. (Lab. Code, §
1102.5.)
As discussed above, Plaintiff has provided evidence that she
complained and participated in an investigation about alleged discriminatory
conduct by Willoughby and that DXC took adverse actions against her as a
result. (Responses to UMF 49, 59, 69, 70, 96, 97, 119, 130, 131, 134, 149, 158,
159, 160, 167, 174, 179, 186, 187, 189, 184, 196, 197, 211, 220, 235, 240, 243,
246, 261, 262, 265, 270, 280, 281, 1837, 2848, 2858, 2862, 2863; AUMF 5, 9, 12,
13, 17, 18, 22, 25, 26, 32, 34, 38, 39, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50.) Plaintiff
has made out a prima facia case of whistleblower retaliation based on the
evidence cited and has disputed material facts. The Court denies summary
adjudication.
It is well-settled policy in California that all of an
employee’s earned wages must be fully and promptly paid. (Smith v. Superior
Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 77, 82.) Failure to promptly pay wages results in a
waiting time penalty whereby the wages continue to accrue up to a maximum of 30
days. (Lab. Code § 203.)
“‘Wages’ includes all amounts for labor performed by
employees of every description, whether the amount is fixed or ascertained by
the standard of time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method of
calculation.” (Lab. Code, § 200.) Bonuses are treated as wages when the bonus
is promised as part of compensation and the employee fulfills any agreed-to
conditions for the bonus. (Neisendorf v. Levi Strauss & Co. (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 509, 522.)
All earned wages are due and payable immediately upon an
employee’s termination. (Lab. Code, § 201, subd. (a).)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff was paid for all the sales
incentives that she earned and was properly denied those that she was denied.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not entitled to incentives from the sales
that were transferred away from her leading up to her transfer. Plaintiff
argues that DXC’s commission plan, which permitted this, improperly waived
commissions already agreed to even though Plaintiff had completed the
prerequisites for obtaining them. Plaintiff has provided evidence supporting a
claim that she was not paid for all the deals she procured in fiscal years
2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022. (AUMF 27.) This is a question of disputed fact and
the Court therefore denies summary adjudication.
For the reasons discussed below under the sixth cause of
action, the Court also denies summary adjudication as to Mary Finch.
“An employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all
necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence
of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the
directions of the employer, even though unlawful, unless the employee, at the
time of obeying the directions, believed them to be unlawful.” (Lab. Code, §
2802.)
Under Labor Code section 558.1, an owner, director, officer,
or managing agent who acts on an employer’s behalf in violating section 2802
may be held liable for such violation. (Ibid.)
Defendants only move for summary adjudication as to Mary
Finch, and not DXC, on this cause of action.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that Finch was
personally involved in the violations. Defendants argue that Finch started
working at DSX in October 2019 and did not have authority over the departments
who oversaw each of the violations that Plaintiff raises claims for against
Finch. (UMF 2830-2907; 3319-3357; 4473-4511.) Plaintiff contends that Finch’s
job description includes the payroll and benefit responsibilities in question
and that DXC’s policy on employee performance management states that Finch’s
position is responsible for auditing other business units for compliance. (UMF 2837,
2831, 2862.) Plaintiff further contends that day-dot-day involvement is not
necessary for a managing agent to be held liable. (Esperanza v. Hepta Run,
Inc. (2022) 74 Cal. App. 5th 44, 59.) Although Finch did not directly
supervise the payroll and benefit decisions in question, Plaintiff has raised a
triable issue of fact that Finch was responsible for auditing the units that
did make those decisions. Plaintiff provides evidence that Finch acknowledged
receipt of Plaintiff’s complaint about the pay and benefit issues alleged in
Plaintiff’s fifth, sixth, ninth, and twelfth causes of action and replied to
indicate that she would look into those complaints. (Responses to UMF 2837,
2838, 2839, 2848, 2858; AUMF 33, 34, 36, 46.)
Thus, the Court denies summary adjudication for Finch as to
this cause of action.
“Where any statute or contract requires an employer to
maintain the designated wage scale, it shall be unlawful to secretly pay a
lower wage while purporting to pay the wage designated by statute or by
contract.” (Lab. Code, § 223.)
“It shall be unlawful for any employer to collect or receive
from an employee any part of wages theretofore paid by said employer to said
employee.” (Lab. Code, § 221.)
Defendants argue as to the seventh and eighth causes of action
that DXC’s incentive bonus policy permissibly provides that no incentives are
earned until they are paid. (UMF 2673, 2674.) Plaintiff responds that she had
already earned certain incentive bonuses prior to signing the new
incentive bonus policy which provided as such, and that those bonuses
were unlawfully held back. (Responses to UMF 20-41.) Because Plaintiff has raised
a triable issue of fact and could establish a prima facie case, the Court
denies summary judgment.
“Notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage,
any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime
compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil
action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime
compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs
of suit.” (Lab. Code, § 1194, subd. (a).)
An employee is exempt from overtime requirements pursuant to
the outside sales exemption if (a) the employee earns more than 150% of the
minimum wage; (b) more than 50% of the employee’s compensation is derived from
commissions; and (c) the employee works in the mercantile industry (covered by
Wage Order 7) or in a professional, technical, clerical, mechanical or similar
occupation. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8 §§ 11040(3)(D) & 11070(3)(D); IWC
Wage Order Nos. 4 and 7, Section 3D.)
Here, Plaintiff admits that her annual salary was $200,000,
well over 150% of the minimum wage. (SAC ¶ 40.) Plaintiff admits that she is a
subject matter expert in the automotive industry with a masters degree and
worked for DXC as a sales lead. (SAC ¶ 9.) Plaintiff admits that her
compensation should have been 50% commissions, alleging in the SAC that she
should have earned at least $475,000 in commissions in 2020. (SAC ¶¶ 33-34.) However,
Plaintiff’s W2s demonstrate that her 2020 and 2021 earnings were more than 50%
salary, not commissions. (AUMF 37.) Thus, there is a triable issue of fact as
to whether Plaintiff was exempt in those years.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff falls under the
administrative exemption as well.
To establish that an employee is exempt under California’s
“administrative exemption,” an employer must establish that the employee: (1)
performed work directly related to management policies or general business
operations of the either the employer or the employer’s clients; (2)
customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment; (3)
performs, under general supervision only, specialized or technical work that
requires special training or knowledge; (4) performs administrative duties more
than half of the time; and (5) the monthly salary is at least twice the state
minimum wage for full-time employment. (Lab. Code, § 515; 8 CCR § 11160; see
also CACI 2721.)
Plaintiff has provided evidence that she spent far more than
half of her time selling products or services, rather than performing
administrative tasks. (Lauzon Decl., Exhs. 22, 51, 61.) Because Plaintiff can
dispute this fact which is key to the defense, summary adjudication is
improper.
As to both DXC and Finch, the Court denies summary
adjudication as to this cause of action.
The elements of a cause of action for failure to prevent
harassment or retaliation are: (1) actionable discrimination or harassment by
employees or nonemployees; (2) defendant’s legal duty of care toward plaintiff
(i.e., defendant is the plaintiff’s employer); (3) breach of that duty (i.e.,
failure to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and
harassment from occurring); (4) legal causation; and (5) damages to plaintiff.
(Trujillo v. North County Transit
District (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 280, 287, 289; Bradley v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008)
158 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1630; Gov. Code, § 12940.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim
because it is derivative of the other discrimination and retaliation claims.
Because the Court denies summary adjudication on those claims, Plaintiff’s
ability to prevail on this claim is not foreclosed, and the Court therefore
denies summary adjudication on this claim as well.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violate section 17200 by
failing to pay wages, not reimbursing expenses, using unlawful forfeitures, and
using unlawful clawbacks. Defendants argue that this claim fails because it is
derivative of Plaintiff’s wage claims and Plaintiff’s wage claims fail. Because
the Court denies summary adjudication on the foregoing wage claims, it also
denies summary adjudication on this claim.
“An employer, semimonthly or at the time of each payment of
wages, shall furnish to their employee, either as a detachable part of the
check, draft, or voucher paying the employee’s wages, or separately if wages
are paid by personal check or cash, an accurate itemized statement in writing
showing (1) gross wages earned, (2) total hours worked by the employee, except
as provided in subdivision (j), (3) the number of piece-rate units earned and
any applicable piece rate if the employee is paid on a piece-rate basis, (4)
all deductions, provided that all deductions made on written orders of the
employee may be aggregated and shown as one item, (5) net wages earned, (6) the
inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid, (7) the name of
the employee and only the last four digits of their social security number or
an employee identification number other than a social security number, (8) the
name and address of the legal entity that is the employer and, if the employer
is a farm labor contractor, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 1682, the
name and address of the legal entity that secured the services of the employer,
and (9) all applicable hourly rates in effect during the pay period and the
corresponding number of hours worked at each hourly rate by the employee[.]”
(Lab. Code, § 226, subd. (a).)
“The deductions made from payment of wages shall be recorded
in ink or other indelible form, properly dated, showing the month, day, and
year, and a copy of the statement and the record of the deductions shall be
kept on file by the employer for at least three years at the place of
employment or at a central location within the State of California.” (Lab.
Code, § 226, subd. (a).)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim fails because it is
premised on the overtime claim which also fails. The Court dispenses with this
argument because it denies summary adjudication on the overtime claim.
Defendant further argues that even if overtime pay is
illegally denied, wage statements are not inaccurate under section 226 on that
basis alone as long as they accurately display the actual hours worked and the
actual pay received. In Maldonado v. Epsilon Plastics, Inc. (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 1308, 1312, the court found that the defendant employer was liable
for failure to pay overtime wages but reversed the trial court’s penalties for
inaccurate wage statements. (Ibid.) “That the [defendant’s payment scheme]
ultimately turned out to be invalid mandates that the employees receive unpaid
overtime, interest, and attorney's fees. It does not mandate that they also
receive penalties for the wage statements which accurately reflected their
compensation under the rates at which they had worked at the time.” (Id.
at 1337 [internal citation omitted].) Plaintiff does not respond to this
contention in its opposition. Defendants have provided evidence that
Plaintiff’s wage statements do accurately reflect her actual hours and
compensation paid. (UMF 4336-4472.) Plaintiff does not dispute this fact. Thus,
under Maldonado, DXC and Finch are both entitled to summary judgment as
to this claim.