Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 21STCV38616, Date: 2023-09-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV38616    Hearing Date: April 18, 2024    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Sola Impact Fund II, LLP (“Sola Impact Fund”) and Sola Rentals, Inc. (“Sola Rentals”) (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) demur to the fifth and ninth causes of action in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

The Court OVERRULES the demurrer.

Background

This is a landlord-tenant case. The following facts are taken from the allegations in the FAC.

Defendants owned or managed (it is unclear which) a four-unit residential rental property located at 720-722 West 79th Street, Los Angeles, California 90044 (the “Property”). Plaintiffs were tenants at the Property during various time periods.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed to properly maintain the Property, resulting in a number of conditions, including long-term rat and cockroach infestations, severe water damage destabilizing the walls and ceiling, mold, unsecured entryways to the building, and mushrooms growing in the units due to pervasive moisture.

Plaintiffs filed this action on October 19, 2021. The operative complaint is now the FAC, filed against a number of defendants, including Sol Impact Fund and Sol Rentals. The FAC raises claims for, inter alia, violation of Business and Professions Code, sections 17200, et seq.; and violation of Civil Code, section 1942.4.

Moving Defendants demurred to the FAC on April 4, 2024. Plaintiffs filed an opposition and Moving Defendants filed a reply.

Legal Standard

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

Discussion

Fifth Cause of Action – Violation of Business and Professions Code, Section 17200, et seq.

To set forth a claim for a violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (“UCL”), Plaintiff must establish Defendant was engaged in an “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising” and certain specific acts. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) A cause of action for unfair competition “is not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action.” (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173.)

The UCL has a four-year statute of limitations. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17208.)

Moving Defendants argue that this claim is time-barred because it simply reasserts violations of Civil Code, section 1942.4, which has a one-year statute of limitations. This argument fails for two reasons.

First, the UCL creates a separate cause of action with a separate statute of limitations. Defendants have provided no law to indicate that the UCL simply imports the statutes of limitations from other causes of action pertaining to the violation of law that forms the basis for the claim. This is especially salient because the UCL is not, as discussed above, a mere substitute for other torts.

Second, even if UCL claims were constrained by the plaintiff’s ability to allege a different underlying claim within that claim’s statute of limitations, Plaintiffs have alleged a nuisance claim (four-year statute) and an implied warranty of habitability claim (four-year statute for written leases; two-year statute for oral leases) against Moving Defendants. While Defendants argue that the health code violations that Plaintiffs reference in their UCL claim constitutes violations of Civil Code, section 1942.4, many of the conditions alleged are equally colorable as nuisances or habitability violations.

The Court overrules the demurrer on this claim.

Ninth Cause of Action – Violation of Civil Code, Section 1942.4

“A landlord of a dwelling may not demand rent, collect rent, issue a notice of a rent increase, or issue a three-day notice to pay rent or quit pursuant to subdivision (2) of Section 1161 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if all of the following conditions exist prior to the landlord's demand or notice:

(1) The dwelling substantially lacks any of the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Section 1941.1 or violates Section 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in Section 17920.3 of the Health and Safety Code because conditions listed in that section exist to an extent that endangers the life, limb, health, property, safety, or welfare of the public or the occupants of the dwelling.

(2) A public officer or employee who is responsible for the enforcement of any housing law, after inspecting the premises, has notified the landlord or the landlord's agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair the substandard conditions.

(3) The conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice specified in paragraph (2) and the delay is without good cause. For purposes of this subdivision, service shall be complete at the time of deposit in the United States mail.

(4) The conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant or lessee in violation of Section 1929 or 1941.2.”

(Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (a).)

“A landlord who violates this section is liable to the tenant or lessee for the actual damages sustained by the tenant or lessee and special damages of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) and not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000).” (Civ. Code, § 1942.4, subd. (b)(1).)

The statute of limitations for penalty statutes such as section 1942.4 is one year. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (a).)

Plaintiffs allege the Housing Department issued Notices and Orders to Comply dated as follows:

• March 2017 (FAC ¶ 52);

• June 2019 (FAC ¶ 53);

• August 2019 (FAC ¶ 54); and

• October 2019 (FAC ¶ 55)

            Moving Defendants argue Plaintiffs are time-barred from seeking damages that accrued before October 19, 2020, one year before the Complaint was filed. Defendants further contend that it is the issuance of the Notice and Order to Comply that causes the claim to accrue and the limitations period to start running. The statute states otherwise. It is not the issuance of the notice under section 1942.4(a)(2) that creates the violation of section 1942.4(a). It is the collection of rent (or other listed actions), if the enumerated conditions, which include notice from law enforcement, exist.

            Thus, Plaintiffs may not raise claims for demands of rent, collection of rent, increases to rent, or issuance of three-day notices to pay or quit which occurred prior to October 19, 2020. Plaintiffs may raise claims relating to any of those actions that occurred on October 19, 2020 or later, as long as the required conditions existed at those times.

            The Court overrules the demurrer to this claim.