Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 22STCV06395, Date: 2025-03-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV06395    Hearing Date: March 11, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Godrick Williams (“Williams”) moves to disqualify Plaintiff Teresa Forshee from receiving any devise, bequest, or other transfer or property from the Estate of Magdalena Burger.

The Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Order Disqualifying Caregiver (Plaintiff Herein) and Dismissing Complaint.  

Background

This is an elder abuse and fraud case. Plaintiff Teresa Forshee, Personal Representative of the Estate of Magdalena Burger (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she is the personal representative of the Estate of Magdalena Burger as appointed in the Estate of Magdalena Burger, LASC Case No. 21STPB10648. (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 10.) Plaintiff alleges that there was a fraudulent transfer of property located at 14900 Rhinestone Dr., Sherman Oaks, CA 91403 (the “Subject Property”) via quitclaim deed. (Compl., ¶¶ 10, 13.)

On February 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Sydney Atkins (“Atkins”), Millett & Dominguez, LLC (“Millett”), Sara Irene Daniels (“Daniels”), Larry Donnell Ford (“Ford”), Merchants Bonding Company (“Merchants”), Williams, and Blue Royalties Trucking LLC, alleging causes of action for: (1) Financial Elder Abuse; (2) Fraud and Deceit; (3) Quiet Title; (4) Slander of Title; (5) Conversion; (6) Declaratory Relief; (7) Cancelation of Quitclaim Deed; (8) Notary Misconduct; and (9) Recovery on Notary Public Bond.

Default was entered against Defendants Ford and Daniels on June 2, 2022.

            Pursuant to requests for dismissal filed by Plaintiff, Defendants Merchants and Daniels were dismissed from this action with prejudice on January 17, 2023.

On November 21, 2023, Defendant Williams filed an answer to the complaint.

On July 2, 2024, pursuant to a motion for sanctions filed by Plaintiff, the answer of Defendant Millett was stricken and default against Millett was entered. (07/02/24 Minute Order.)

On August 21, 2024, this action was deemed related to Bill Frontuto v. Blue Royalties Trucking, LLC, et al., LASC Case No. 24VECV02228. (08/21/24 Minute Order.) This action was deemed the lead case. (08/21/24 Minute Order.)

On January 31, 2025, Defendant Williams filed the Motion for Order Disqualifying Caregiver (Plaintiff Herein) and Dismissing Complaint. Defendant Williams moves for an order “disqualifying [P]laintiff . . . from receiving any [d]evise, [b]equest or other transfer of property from the estate of Magdalena Burger pursuant to California Probate Code Section 21380.” (Not. of Mot. at p. 2:6-9.) The motion was not filed with a proof of service.

On February 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed and served an opposition to the motion.

As of March 6, 2025, no reply brief has been filed. Any reply brief was required to have been filed and served at least five court days prior to the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)

Legal Standard

An interested person is defined is defined as “[a]n heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person having a property right in or a claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding.” (Prob. Code, § 48, subd. (a)(1).) An interested person under the Probate Code is also “[a]ny person having priority for appointment as personal representative” or “[a] fiduciary representing an interested person.” (Prob. Code, § 48, subd. (a)(2)-(3).)

Discussion

The Motion is Procedurally Deficient

“[A]ll moving and supporting papers shall be served and filed at least 16 court days before the hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) “[D]ue process requires a party to be fully advised of the issues to be addressed and be given adequate notice of what facts it must rebut in order to prevail.” (Fenn v. Sherriff (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1481.) “Before filing any document, a party must serve, by any method permitted by the Code of Civil Procedure, one copy of the document on the attorney for each party separately represented, on each unrepresented party, and on any other person or entity when required by rule or statute.” (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.817(a)(1).)

Here, Williams did not file a proof of service concerning the motion. The Court recognizes that Willaims is self-represented. However, self-represented “litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys.” (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) Plaintiff’s counsel, Ryan Jackman (“Jackman”), declares that the version of the motion that was filed with the Court is substantially different from the version that was served on Plaintiff’s counsel’s office. (Jackman Decl., ¶¶ 15-16; Exhs 2 and 3.)

The failure to provide proper notice of the motion—as well as filing and serving two separate versions of the motion—warrants denial of the motion. However, the Court denies it on substantive grounds as well, as discussed below.

The Issue of Standing

Plaintiff argues that Williams lacks standing to bring the motion because he is not an interested person or a beneficiary of Decedent’s estate.  Attorney Jackman attests that at no time was Williams an interested person or a beneficiary of the estate of Decedent in any capacity. (Jackman Decl., ¶ 9.) 

The motion is made on the grounds that the complaint seeks to enforce the provisions of a purported will, is subject to statutory infirmities, and is void ad initio. (Not. of Mot. at p. 2:10-12.) Based on the declaration of Attorney Jackman, Williams is not an interested person under Prob. Code § 48. Moreover, this action is not a probate matter and is a civil action.

The Court therefore DENIES the request of Williams to disqualify Plaintiff from receiving any devise, bequest, or other transfer of property from the Estate of Magdalena Burger.

Williams Cites No Authority for Dismissing the Action

Although requesting that the Court dismiss this action, Williams cites no legal authority in support of such contention. “Contentions are waived when a party fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority.” (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.)

The Court DENIES the request of Williams to dismiss the complaint.

Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions is Procedurally Improper

In the opposition, Plaintiff requests sanctions against Williams in the sum of $1,575.00 pursuant to CCP § 128.5. (Opp’n at p. 6:4-21.) Attorney Jackman attests that Plaintiff incurred expenses and attorney’s fees of $1,575.00 in opposing the motion. (Jackman Decl., ¶¶ 18-19.)

            The request for sanctions is improper. A request for sanctions must “be made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific alleged action or tactic, made in bad faith, that is frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (f)(1)(A).) The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s request for sanctions against Williams.