Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 22STCV08533, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV08533 Hearing Date: March 12, 2024 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
LINDA EVERHART, Plaintiff, v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT, Defendant. |
Case No:
22STCV08533 Hearing Date: March 12, 2024 Calendar Number: 2 |
Evan Everhart (“Everhart”) moves to be appointed as the
successor in interest to the deceased Plaintiff Linda Everhart (“Plaintiff”).
The Court GRANTS Everhart’s motion.
This is an employment action. Plaintiff was employed by
Defendant Los Angeles Unified School District (“Defendant”) as a substitute
teacher from November 23, 1994 until November 5, 2021.
Plaintiff has a number of disabilities, including a standing
imbalance condition, muscle weakness, and limited eyesight. Plaintiff alleges
that Defendant discriminated against her and terminated her employment on the
basis of her disabilities and her religion.
Plaintiff filed this action on March 9, 2022. The operative
complaint is now the Second Amended Complaint, which raises claims for (1)
discrimination; (2) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to prevent
discrimination and retaliation; (4) failure to accommodate disability; (5)
failure to engage in the interactive process; and (6) retaliation in violation
of Labor Code, section 1102.5.
Plaintiff passed away on November 16, 2023 in Van Nuys,
California.
On January 22, 2024, Everhart moved to be appointed as
Plaintiff’s successor in interest to continue this litigation. On January 24,
2024, Everhart filed an amended motion and supporting declarations. Defendant
filed an opposition. No party filed a reply.
“A cause of action that survives the death of the person
entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent’s successor
in interest . . . and an action may be commenced by the decedent’s personal
representatives or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in interest.” (Code
Civ. Proc., § 377.30.) After the death of a plaintiff, the court, on
motion, shall allow a pending action that does not abate to be continued by the
decedent’s personal representative or successor-in-interest. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 377.31.)
The person who seeks to commence or continue a pending
action as the decedent’s successor-in-interest shall execute and file an
affidavit or declaration stating: (1) the decedent’s name, (2) the date and
place of decedent’s death, (3) “No proceeding is now pending in California for
administration of the decedent’s estate,” (4) a copy of the final order showing
the distribution of the decedent’s cause of action to the
successor-in-interest, if the decedent’s estate was administered, (5) either
the affiant or declarant is the decedent’s successor in interest or the affiant
or declarant is authorized to act on behalf of the decedent’s successor in
interest, with facts in support thereof, (6) “No other person has a superior
right to commence the action or proceeding or to be substituted for the
decedent in the pending action or proceeding,” and (7) the statements are true,
under penalty of perjury. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.32.)
Everhart has provided a declaration containing all of the
information required by Code of Civil Procedure, section 377.32.
Defendant does not deny that any of the statutory
requirements have been met, but instead argues that the motion should be denied
because Everhart’s substitution would prejudice Defendant because Defendant did
not have the opportunity to depose Plaintiff before she passed away.
Defendant does not cite to any authority indicating that
prejudice is a basis for denying a motion to be appointed as successor in
interest, which courts “shall allow” when the statutory requirements are
met. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.31.) Because denying the motion on this basis,
which would be incurable, would functionally extinguish Plaintiff’s claims, the
Court is not prepared to do so without even a single point of authority
indicating that such an action is permissible. Furthermore, it does not appear
that the prejudice to Defendant would be unduly heavy. Although Defendant will
not be able to depose Plaintiff, Plaintiff will also be unable to appear as a
witness. Thus, any disadvantages at trial are likely to be mutual. Defendant
will still be able to depose any witnesses that Plaintiff’s counsel does intend
to call at trial, and Defendant will be able to request production of any
documents containing information from Plaintiff which Plaintiff’s counsel
intends to present at trial.
The Court therefore grants the motion.