Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 22STCV09441, Date: 2025-04-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV09441    Hearing Date: April 8, 2025    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant American Medical Association (“Defendant”) moves for an award of attorney’s fees and costs against Plaintiff Edward H. Livingstone, MD (“Plaintiff”) under Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.15, subd. (c)(1). Defendant seeks attorney’s fees in the amount of $109,528.00 and costs in the amount of $1,698.00.

Plaintiff does not dispute the reasonableness of the amount of fees or costs, but makes a number of procedural and legal arguments contending that the Court should not award fees and costs at all in these circumstances.  The Court does not agree with Plaintiff’s arguments.  Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion.  The Court awards $109,528.00 in attorney’s fees and $1,698.00 in costs.

Background

            Plaintiff filed this action on March 17, 2022. The operative complaint is now the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which raises claims for (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (2) slander; (3) libel; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) false light invasion of privacy; and (6) public disclosure of private facts.

            On June 27, 2022, Defendant filed the special motion to strike (“anti-SLAPP motion”) that gives rise to this fee motion. On October 19, 2022, the Court issued an order granting the anti-SLAPP motion in part. The Court granted the motion as to the entirety of Plaintiff’s first claim for wrongful termination, second claim for slander, fifth claim for false light invasion of privacy, and sixth claim for public disclosure of private facts. The Court denied the motion as to Plaintiff’s third claim for libel and fourth claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In ruling on the motion, the Court found that 10 of the 11 allegedly defamatory statements at issue in the FAC were not actionable, but that the third claim for libel and fourth claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress could be supported with respect to one of the eleven allegedly defamatory statements.

            Defendant appealed and Plaintiff cross-appealed.

            On October 31, 2024, the Court of Appeal reversed the Court’s ruling on the fifth claim for false light invasion of privacy claim in a limited respect. The Court of Appeal reinstated the fifth claim for false light invasion of privacy cause of action as to the single alleged defamatory statement that also supported the libel and intentional infliction of emotion distress causes of action. The Court of Appeal affirmed the Court’s order in all other respects.

The remittitur was filed in this court on December 31, 2024.  On February 10, 2025, Defendant moved for attorney’s fees. Defendant filed an amended motion on February 13, 2025. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendant filed a reply.

Legal Standard

A defendant who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion is generally entitled to recover attorney fees and costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (c)(1).)

Attorney’s fees in anti-SLAPP motions are determined using the lodestar method. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) “Under the lodestar method, the trial court must first determine the lodestar figure—the reasonable hours spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate—based on a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744, 751.) 

The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)

The moving party bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) A plaintiff’s verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.)

“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) When items are properly objected to, the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.)

Discussion

Entitlement to Fees

Procedural Issues

Plaintiff argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the fee motion. Plaintiff argues that the initially-filed February 10, 2025 motion was over-length, and the February 13, 2025 motion was filed more than 40 days after remittitur (on December 31, 2025) as required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.278(c)(1).

The Court does not agree with these arguments.  Here, Defendant rectified the overlong brief within three days by filing an amended brief that omitted some of the text and revised spacing and pagination. (Supp. Kaufman Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) Because the amended brief only removed arguments and was still filed well in advance of the notice period required for motions, Plaintiff was not prejudiced. The arguments made by Defendant did not change between the brief that Plaintiff admits was timely filed and the corrected, amended brief filed days later.

Thus, Defendant’s motion was timely filed.  Even assuming for the sake of argument that it was not, the Court would exercise its discretion to grant a discretionary extension of time under these circumstances.

Success on the Anti-SLAPP Motion

Plaintiff argues that Defendant was not successful on the anti-SLAPP motion. Plaintiff argues that Defendant only achieved limited success because three claims survived as to one of the 11 allegedly defamatory statements. The Court disagrees. Defendant removed a significant number of statements from contention and removed half of Plaintiff’s causes of action.

Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeal stated that discovery must be taken as to the issues in the anti-SLAPP motion. That is not correct. The Court of appeal stated that it expressed no opinion as to whether Plaintiff could assert claims as to additional statements “excepting of course those already stricken” once he is able to take discovery in this case. (Remittitur at p. 34 [emphasis added].) As to the statements at issue in the anti-SLAPP motion, Defendant was largely successful.

Amount of Fees and Costs

Plaintiff does not dispute the reasonableness of the fees and costs. Defendant itself reduced by 25 percent its fees relating to the anti-SLAPP motion litigated in the trial court.  It also reduced by 10 percent the fees billed in opposing Plaintiff’s cross-appeal.  

The Court finds the hourly rates of Defendant’s counsel and the overall amount of the billing (as reduced by Defendant in its initial request) to be appropriate.  The Court also finds reasonable the requested $1,542.00 in costs related to the anti-SLAPP motion itself and $156.00 in costs related to Plaintiff’s ex parte and noticed motion to conduct discovery.