Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 22STCV12737, Date: 2025-04-24 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22STCV12737    Hearing Date: April 24, 2025    Dept: 72

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

 

DEPARTMENT 72

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

PEPPERDINE UNIVERSITY,

 

                                  Plaintiff,

 

         v.

 

 

HARLEY ELLIS DEVEREAUX CORPORATION,

 

                                  Defendants.

 

 Case No:  22STCV12737

 

 

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  April 24, 2025

 Calendar Number:  2

 

 

 

Defendant Sundt Construction, Inc. (“Sundt”) and Cross-Defendants Giroux Glass Inc. (“Giroux”); Iron Mechanical, Inc. (“Iron”); Inland Pacific Tile, Inc. (“Inland”); Global Specialties Direct Inc. (“Global”); and Continental Marble and Tile Co. (“Continental”) (collectively, “Moving Parties”) move for an order determining that the settlement between Moving Defendants and Plaintiff Pepperdine University (“Plaintiff”) is in good faith under Code of Civil Procedure, section 877.6 and is a bar to all cross-complaints for equitable and implied indemnity and contribution with respect to the damages claimed by Moving Parties. Defendant Harley Ellis Devereaux Corporation (“HED”) opposes.

 

Sundt further moves to dismiss and enter judgment on its Cross-Complaint against Giroux, Iron, Inland, Global, and Continental (collectively, “Moving Cross-Defendants”) with prejudice.

 

The Court GRANTS the motion.

 

Background

 

This is a construction dispute.

 

This claim arises out of the construction of new student housing at Pepperdine University. The housing project is located at 2455 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, California, commonly referred to as Outer Precinct Seaver Residence or Seaside Hall (the “Project”).

 

On December 15, 2014, Plaintiff hired Defendant HED to perform architectural and engineering design and construction administration, among other services, for the Project. (Oh Decl. ¶ 2.)

 

On November 6, 2015, Plaintiff contracted with Defendant Sundt as general contractor for the construction of the Project. (Griffin Decl. ¶ 2.)

 

The Project consists of a four-story dormitory with 67 residential suites. Each suite has two to four bedrooms, a living room, and common restroom facilities. The Project also includes a common area including a kitchen, dining area, and restrooms.

 

Sundt hired multiple subcontractors, including Giroux, Iron, Inland, Global, and Continental. As part of a Contractor Controlled Insurance Program (“CCIP”) for the project, each of the Moving Cross-Defendants, with the exception of Continental, completed an enrollment form and was enrolled in the CCIP.

 

The general scope of work for each subcontractor involved in this case is as follows: Giroux was responsible for installation of casement windows and windows; Iron was responsible for plumbing installation, including drains; Inland was responsible for bathroom tile and waterproofing installations; Global was responsible for shower accessories, including ADA seats; and Continental was responsible for bathroom tile and waterproofing installations.

 

The Project was first occupied by students in September 2018.

 

Plaintiff alleges negligence and/or design deficiencies relating to bathrooms and casement windows against HED. Plaintiff alleges that windows were falling or being damaged during wind events and that runoff and splash from the showers were failing to drain properly in the bathrooms. (Oh Decl. ¶ 4.)

 

Plaintiff filed this action on April 15, 2022. The operative complaint is now the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which raises claims for (1) breach of architect’s contract (against HED); (2) architect’s negligence (against HED); (3) breach of contractor’s contract (against Sundt); and (4) contractor’s negligence (against Sundt). Sundt was named via Doe amendment in the FAC.

 

After filing the FAC, Plaintiff provided the parties with a list of damages incurred, which most recently amounts to $17,896,526.70. (Oh Decl. ¶ 6.) This amount consists of $12,976,017.26 for estimated costs of repairing the windows; $4,564,795.00 for estimated costs of repairing the bathrooms; $195,692.98 in Stearman costs associated with investigating the defects; and $160,021.48 for temporary repairs and mitigation. (Oh Decl. ¶ 6.)

 

On December 5, 2022, Sundt filed its Cross-Complaint against Giroux; Iron; Perlite Plastering Co., Inc. (“Perlite”); Inland, and Global. Sundt’s Cross-Complaint raises claims for (1) express contractual indemnity; (2) implied indemnity; (3) equitable indemnity, apportionment, and contribution; and (4) declaratory relief.

 

On March 3, 2025, Moving Parties (including Sundt and the cross-defendants) filed this motion for determination of good-faith settlement.

 

On March 18, 2025, HED filed an opposition. On the same day, the Court continued the hearing, originally set for April 1, 2025, to April 8, 2025.

 

On April 1, 2025, Pepperdine, Sundt, and Continental each filed a reply. On the same day, Inland, Iron, and Global each filed a notice of joinder to Sundt’s reply. Global also joined Pepperdine’s reply.

 

On April 2, 2025, Giroux filed a notice of joinder to Sundt and Pepperdine’s replies.

 

On April 4, 2025, the Court continued the hearing from April 8, 2025 to April 24, 2025.

 

On April 18, 2025, HED filed an objection to Pepperdine and Continental’s replies, as well as to the joinders to those replies. HED did not object to Sundt’s reply.

 

Evidentiary Objections

 

The Court sustains Sundt’s objection 6 (argument), 7 (argument), 8 (argument), 9 (argument), 10 (argument and legal conclusion), and 13 (argument and legal conclusion)  to the Sebra declaration.

 

The Court overrules the remaining evidentiary objections.

 

Legal Standard

 

“Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (a)(1).) “A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).)

 

When analyzing a motion for determination of good faith settlement, the trial court should consider several factors, including “whether the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499 (Tech-Bilt).) Such factors (the “Tech-Bilt Factors”) are summarized as follows: 

 

1.      A rough approximation of the plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; 

2.      The amount paid in settlement; 

3.      The allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; 

4.      A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than it would if it were found liable after a trial; 

5.      The financial conditions and insurance policy limits of the settling defendants; and 

6.      The existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants. 

 

(Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 499.)

 

“[T]he trial court's good faith determination must take into account the settling tortfeasor's potential liability for indemnity to a cotortfeasor, as well as the settling tortfeasor's potential liability to the plaintiff.” (Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 796, 816 fn. 16.)

 

“Ordinarily, a determination as to whether a settlement is in good faith must be left to the discretion of the trial court” unless the exercise of discretion on the basis of the Tech-Bilt criteria could only lead to one conclusion. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 502.)

 

“[O]nly when the good faith nature of a settlement is disputed, it is incumbent upon the trial court to consider and weigh the Tech-Bilt factors. That is to say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient.” (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261.)

 

“The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).)

 

 

Discussion

 

Determination of Good-Faith Settlement

 

1. A rough approximation of the plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability

 

The total settlement amount is $4,000,000.00. Plaintiff claims a total of $17,896,526.70 in damages in this case. The Moving Parties that are covered by the CCIP are contributing a total of $3,900,000.00 and Continental is contributing $100,000.00.

 

This amount resulted from a two-day formalized mediation and weeks of subsequent negotiations between the parties. Plaintiff provided the Moving Parties with a defect list and cost of repair, which the Moving Parties’ consultants analyzed.

 

HED argues that this amount exposes HED to too much potential leftover liability with the settling parties out of the case. But HED admitted in its own discovery responses, months after Sundt’s Cross-Complaint was filed, that HED did not contend that anyone other than itself contributed to the construction defect claim. Furthermore, although HED contends that some or all of the defects were Plaintiff’s responsibility, this is again not a basis for claiming that the settling parties should pay Plaintiff a greater amount.

 

HED has not shown that this amount is not reasonably proportional to Plaintiff’s total demand, especially given the lower amount expected to be paid by settling defendants as a compromise before trial.

 

2. The amount paid in settlement 

 

            The Moving Parties agreed to pay a total settlement of $4,000,000.00.

 

3. The allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs 

 

There is only one Plaintiff in this action – Pepperdine. HED argues that an allocation must be made between the defendants because there are different distinct areas of damage, and failing to do so would prevent a proper offset as to HED. While it is true that the subcontractors worked on distinct portions of the Project (for the most part), HED was the general architecture and engineering firm, and oversaw the project as a whole. Thus, it is not necessary to delineate exactly which construction problems the settlement is meant to pay for in which amounts. HED will benefit from the offset regardless.

 

4. A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than it would if it were found liable after a trial

 

Here, the $4,000,000.00 settlement is substantially less than the total claim of over $17 million raised by Plaintiff. However, the fact that Plaintiff will not have to take the settling parties to trial supports a finding that this is reasonable. This is a construction case with a large number of parties. The costs of litigating the case to trial with all of the current parties would be great, and it is possible that Plaintiff may not prevail against any given party, especially if HED is correct that the defects resulted from Plaintiff’s own choices. The settlement amount is therefore within the ballpark of the Moving Parties’ potential liability.

 

5. The financial conditions and insurance policy limits of the settling defendants

 

The Moving Parties that are covered by the CCIP are contributing a total of $3,900,000.00 and Continental is contributing $100,000.00.

 

The primary CCIP policy was Exhausted at $2,000,000.00. (Griffin Decl. ¶ 10.) The first layer of excess is $25,000,000.00. (Supp. Griffin Decl. ¶ 4.)

 

6. The existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants. 

 

            The settlement resulted from a protracted period of negotiations between Plaintiff and the settling defendants. Further, HED has not introduced evidence showing bad faith by the settling parties – which is HED’s burden to show as an objecting party. (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).)

             The Court therefore finds that the Tech-Bilt factors favor a finding that the settlement was entered in good faith. The Court therefore grants the motion.




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