Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 22STCV20991, Date: 2023-10-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV20991 Hearing Date: January 16, 2024 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
JAIME SCHERER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ZAKI MANSOUR, et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
22STCV20991 Hearing Date: January 16, 2024 Calendar Number: 11 |
Plaintiffs Jaime Scherer and Scott Potter (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) demur to Defendant Zaki Mansour’s amended answer (the “Answer”)
to Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (the “FAC”).
The Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ demurrer.
This action concerns a residential lease. Under the lease, Plaintiffs were tenants of
the property owned by Defendants located at 5429 Virginia Avenue, Apartment
308, Los Angeles, California 90029 (the “Property”).
Plaintiffs filed this action on June 27, 2022. The operative
complaint is not the FAC, which raises claims for (1) violation of California
Civil Code section 1942.4; (2) tortious breach of the warranty of habitability;
(3) private nuisance; (4) violation of Business and Professions Code, sections
17200, et seq.; (5) negligence; (6) breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment; (7)
intentional influence to vacate; (8) intentional infliction of emotional
distress; (9) fraud and deceit; (10) violation of the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (11) violation of City of Los Angeles
Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance; (12) negligence per se; (13) violation of the
Unruh Civil Rights Act; (14) violation of the Bane Act, Civil Code section
52.1; (15) violation of Los Angeles County Retaliatory Eviction and
Anti-Harassment Ordinance; (16) termination of estate under Civil Code, section
789.3; (17) conversion of private property; (18) violation of City of Los
Angeles Civil and Human Rights Ordinance; (19) violation of California Welfare
and Institutions Code, sections 15600, et seq.; (20) violation of Los Angeles
Municipal Code sections 151.00, et seq.; (21) violation of California Vehicle
Code, section 22658; and (22) invasion of privacy.
On February 21, 2023, the Court sustained Mansour’s demurrer
to the ninth, thirteenth, causes of action, as well as the eighteenth and
nineteenth as to Potter only.
Mansour filed an initial answer to the FAC on March 2023,
2023.
On October 19, 2023, the Court sustained Plaintiffs’
demurrer with leave to amend as to Mansour’s fifth, twelfth, sixteenth,
nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-third affirmative defenses. The Court
overruled Plaintiffs’ demurrer as to Mansour’s fourth, sixth, and twenty-second
affirmative defenses.
Mansour filed the operative amended Answer (“Amended
Answer”) to the FAC on November 8, 2023.
Plaintiffs demurred to the Amended Answer on November 16,
2023. Mansour did not file an opposition.
As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins.
Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading
alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth
of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
A demurrer to an answer may be brought on one of three
grounds: (1) the answer does not include facts sufficient to constitute a
defense; (2) uncertainty; and (3) the facts, as pleaded, are insufficient to
determine whether an alleged contract in the answer is written or
oral. Code Civ. Proc., § 430.20.
Defenses should be relevant to a plaintiff’s legal claims
and averred carefully, and with as much detail as the facts constituting the
corresponding causes of action in the complaint. FPI Development, Inc.
v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384 (FPI Development). They
should not be proffered in the form of “terse legal conclusions.” (Ibid.)
Mansour has corrected the deficiencies identified in the
Court’s order on the previous demurrer by adding factual allegations to the
affirmative defenses in the Answer. Mansour has pled sufficient ultimate facts
to support the affirmative defenses at the pleading stage.
Plaintiffs’ demurrer fails to specifically identify any
affirmative defenses that are deficient. Plaintiffs appear to be mistakenly arguing
against the affirmative defenses in the separate answer filed by defendant Luzelba
Lozano Mansour (“Luzelba”)– a different party – rather than the Amended Answer
of Zaki Mansour which is at issue here.
For example:
·
Plaintiff argues that the second affirmative
defense alleges that third parties are responsible for Plaintiffs’ damages. But the second affirmative defense in
Mansour’s Amended Answer does not contain such an allegation. Rather, the second affirmative defense in
Mansour’s Amended Answer is Failure to State Sufficient Facts. It may be that Plaintiff is referring to Luzelba’s second affirmative defense (third-party
responsibility), but that is not the answer at issue in the current
demurrer.
·
Plaintiff argues that there is a problem with the
twelfth affirmative defense allegation of setoff. Mansour’s Amended Answer, however, alleges
privilege, not setoff. By contrast, Luzelba
Lozano Mansour’s twelfth affirmative defense alleges setoff.
The Court is not obligated to comb through the Amended Answer
to rationalize Plaintiff’s arguments.
The Court overrules the demurrer.