Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 22STCV29871, Date: 2023-08-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV29871    Hearing Date: November 2, 2023    Dept: 72

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DEPARTMENT 72

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Royal LLC (“Royal”) moves to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiffs Teodora Vasquez, Gladyz Perez, and Scarlett Vasquez (collectively, “Plaintiffs”).

As set out in this order, Royal’s demurrer is OVERRULED.

Background

          From February 1, 2017 to October 27, 2020, Plaintiffs lived at 5937 S. Avalon Boulevard, Unit 6, Los Angeles, CA 90003 (the “Property”). Plaintiffs rented the property from Royal. Plaintiffs allege that Royal failed to maintain the property, resulting in a number of conditions including plumbing problems, lack of hot water, lack of working heating facilities, pest issues, mold issues, other sanitation problems, and structural problems with the building. These conditions continued until they caused Plaintiffs to vacate the property on October 27, 2020.

Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on September 13, 2022, alleging (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (3) nuisance; (4) negligence; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (6) wrongful eviction; and (7) violation of Civil Code section 1942.4.

The Court sustained a demurrer as to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract, negligence, and IIED claims on the basis of the statute of limitations. The FAC, which is now the operative complaint, was filed on September 7, 2023 and alleges the same causes of action as the complaint.

Royal demurred to Plaintiffs’ breach of contract, negligence, and IIED claims on September 13, 2023. Plaintiffs filed an opposition and Royal filed a reply.

Legal Standard

As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)

Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).

“In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows merely that the action may be barred.” (McMahon v. Republic Van & Storage Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 871, 874.)

Discussion

Royal demurs on the grounds that the statute of limitations has run for Plaintiffs’ breach of contract, negligence, and IIED claims.

“[A]t common law, a cause of action accrues when it is complete with all of its elements[.]” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) This is known as the “last element” accrual rule: ordinarily, the statute of limitations runs from the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action. (Ibid.)

The Court previously sustained a demurrer as to these same three causes of action on the basis that Plaintiffs alleged only that the wrongful acts occurred in April 2018, more than four years before the Complaint was filed. The FAC now alleges that the negative conditions at the Property remained until the time when Plaintiffs vacated the Property.

Negligence and IIED

          The statute of limitations for negligence is two years. (Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.) The statute of limitations for IIED is two years. (Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 356-357, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.)

Royal argues that “if continuing injury from a completed act generally extended the limitations periods, those periods would lack meaning. Parties could file suits at any time, as long as their injuries persisted. This is not the law”. (Vaca v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp. (2011) 198 CaI.App.4th 737, 745.)

First, there is the initial question of when the injuries occurred. Plaintiffs began to notice the negative conditions in April of 2018. Royal argues that Plaintiffs improperly amended their complaint to add the allegation that the negative conditions were ongoing for the remaining duration of their tenancy, thereby changing the essential facts and foregoing the FAC’s ability to relate back to the Complaint. (Scholes v. Lambirth Trucing Co. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 590, 598.) Royal argues that, as a result, Plaintiffs can only allege that the injuries happened at the time when they first noticed the conditions. This argument is unpersuasive.

“In determining whether the amended complaint alleges facts that are sufficiently similar to those alleged in the original complaint, we consider whether the defendant had adequate notice of the claim based on the original pleading. The policy behind statutes of limitations is to put a defendant on notice of the need to defend against a claim in time to prepare an adequate defense. This requirement is met when recovery under an amended complaint is sought on the same basic set of facts as the original pleading.

          (Id. at p. 599.)

          Here, the essential facts of Plaintiffs’ claims are the same. Plaintiffs have not contradicted any factual assertions from the Complaint. Plaintiffs allege the existence of the same conditions that Royal received notice of through the Complaint. Furthermore, Royal had actual notice that the conditions were ongoing because Plaintiffs repeatedly notified Royal by letter and in person of the ongoing conditions to request that they be fixed. (FAC ¶ 12.) Thus, the relation back does not subvert the purpose of the statute of limitations here.

The Court now evaluates when the statute of limitations began to run under these facts.

Under tort law, where a tort involves a continuing wrong, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the date of the last injury or when the tortuous acts cease. (Birschtein v. New United Manufacturing, Inc. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 994, 1003; Pugliese v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452.)

          Here, the tortious act alleged is Royal’s failure to maintain the property. This is not a “completed act” (Vaca, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 745), but rather an ongoing failure of a landlord to meet its duty to maintain a property. Royal argues that each violation was a discrete act, obfuscating the fact that each of the alleged violations formed a continuous stretch of inaction that was necessarily non-discrete. A landlord leaves an apartment in severe disrepair for long enough does not find his hands washed clean at the two-year mark; rather, the extended length of time.

          The Court therefore OVERRULES the demurrer as to Plaintiffs’ negligence and IIED claims.

Breach of Contract

          There is a four-year statute of limitations for breach of contract. (Code Civ. Proc. § 337.)

          Royal argues that the initial breach occurred in April 2018, which is more than four years before the Complaint was filed on September 13, 2022. Plaintiff responds that the ongoing conditions at the property triggers the continuous violation doctrine, and that claims over all of the harm encompassed by the negative conditions are timely as long as some of the conditions existed within the statute of limitations.

“The continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192.) The continuing violation doctrine is intended to make actionable a series of small harms, any one of which may not be actionable on its own. (Id. at pp. 1197-1198.) However, where a plaintiff alleges a series of discrete, independently actionable wrongs, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply. (Id. at p. 1198.) Similarly, where a course of wrongful conduct only becomes apparent through the accumulation of a series of harms, the continuing violation doctrine will apply – but not where a plaintiff was aware of the harm and recognized it as wrongful early on. (Ibid.)

Conversely, “under the theory of continuous accrual, a series of wrongs or injuries may be viewed as each triggering its own limitations period, such that a suit for relief may be partially time-barred as to older events but timely as to those within the applicable limitations period.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.)

The Court has been unable to find clear law as to whether the contract action should be decided under the continuing accrual or continuous violation theory of limitations. It would be helpful to the Court to further develop the factual record relating to the contract claim before deciding whether the contract claim, or any portion of it, is time-barred. Furthermore, because the Court overrules the demurrer as to the tort causes of action, which contain the same factual nexus, there is no practical reason to decide this issue at the pleading stage. Because the defect must “clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint” (McMahon, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 874), the Court will overrule the demurrer on the contract cause of action, leaving to a later stage in the litigation the question of whether the earlier wrongs should be considered timely or not under the applicable statute of limitations.

The Court therefore OVERRULES Royal’s demurrer as to the contract claim.