Judge: Joseph Lipner, Case: 22STCV35771, Date: 2024-12-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV35771 Hearing Date: December 17, 2024 Dept: 72
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
DEPARTMENT 72
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
10869 DRURY LANE PROP, LLC, Plaintiff, v. ALEY & L GROUP, CORPORATION,
et al., Defendants. |
Case No:
22STCV35771 Hearing Date: December 17, 2024 Calendar Number: 8 |
Defendants Luis Del Cid (“Luis”), and Maria Del Cid
(“Maria”) demur to the second, third, fourth, and fifth claims in the First
Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff 10869 Drury Lane Prop LLC (“Plaintiff”)
(the Court uses the parties’ first names for clarity only, and means no
disrespect).
The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the second claim.
The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to
the third and fourth claims. Plaintiff
shall have 20 days to amend the complaint.
The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to
the fifth claim.
This is a landlord-tenant case between Plaintiff 10869 Drury
Lane Prop LLC and Defendants Aley & L Group, Corporation (“Aley”); Luis Del
Cid; Maria Del Cid; and Monzon & Son Enterprises, Inc. (“Monzon”)
(collectively, “Defendants”). The following facts are taken from the
allegations of the FAC, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of the
demurrer.
This case concerns the commercial real property located at
10869 Drury Lane, Lynwood, California 90262 (the “Property”).
On May 18, 2020, Drury Lynwood LLC (“Drury Lynwood”),
Plaintiff’s predecessor in interest, entered into an industrial/commercial
single-tenant lease (the “Lease”) with Monzon whereby Monzon rented the
Property from Drury Lynwood. (FAC, Ex. 1.)
On June 1, 2020, Monzon entered into a sublease agreement
with Aley, which is owned by Luis and Maria. (FAC, Ex. 2.) The Lease provides
at paragraph 12.1(a) that Monzon shall not sublease or assign any part of its
interest in the Lease or in the Property without the lessor’s prior written
consent. Neither Drury Lynwood nor Plaintiff has ever given Monzon express
written consent to allow Monzon to sublease the Property.
On March 11, 2022, Plaintiff acquired the Property from
Drury Lynwood.
On March 15, 2022, Plaintiff served all Defendants with a
30-Day Notice of Termination of Tenancy (“Notice to Quit”) instructing the
Defendants to vacate the Property by the end of the day on April 14, 2022.
Defendants
did not vacate the premises by the end of April 14, 2022.
On
April 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action against Defendants.
On
August 21, 2022, Defendants were evicted from the Property.
Since
it purchased the Property, Plaintiff has not received any rental payments from
any Defendants or occupants of the Property at any time.
Plaintiff filed this action on November 14, 2022.
On September 6, 2024, the Court continued the trial that was
then scheduled for September 23, 2024 to July 14, 2025 and granted Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to amend to file a First Amended Complaint adding Monzon as a
defendant and adding a claim for breach of lease against Monzon.
On September 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed the FAC, which is now
the operative complaint. The FAC raises claims for (1) breach of written lease
(against Monzon only); (2) trespass (against Aley, Luis, and Maria only); (3)
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; (4) negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage; (5) unjust enrichment
(against Aley, Luis, and Maria only); and (6) abuse of process (against Aley,
Luis, and Maria only).
On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal
without prejudice as to the sixth claim for abuse of process. Dismissal of the
claim was entered on October 21, 2024.
On October 17, 2024, Luis and Maria demurred to the FAC.
Plaintiff filed an opposition and Luis and Maria filed a reply.
On October 21, 2024, Aley filed a demurrer and motion to
strike against the FAC. Plaintiff filed an opposition to each. Aley filed a
reply in support of the demurrer.
“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has
been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to
the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds:
(a) The court has
no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading.
(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the
legal capacity to sue.
(c) There is
another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action.
(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties.
(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
(f) The pleading is
uncertain. As used in this subdivision, “uncertain” includes ambiguous and
unintelligible.
(g) In an action
founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the
contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct.
(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)
As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects
must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial
notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins.
Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleading
alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged.” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants,
Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth
of the complaint’s properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is
concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of
action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.)
Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed
where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335,
348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be
amended successfully. (Ibid.;
Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f
there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause
of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist.
(1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245).
Plaintiff argues that, under Code of Civil Procedure,
section 430.41, subd. (b), Luis and Maria waived their arguments by failing to
demur to the original Complaint.
“A party demurring to a pleading that has been amended after
a demurrer to an earlier version of the pleading was sustained shall not demur
to any portion of the amended complaint, cross-complaint, or answer on grounds
that could have been raised by demurrer to the earlier version of the
complaint, cross-complaint, or answer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (b).)
Here, no demurrer was filed or sustained to the original Complaint.
As a result, section 430.41(b) does not actually apply. The demurrers are
therefore procedurally proper.
To set forth a cause of action for trespass, Defendants must
allege (1) Defendants’ lawful possession or right to possession of real
property; (2) Plaintiffs’ wrongful, intentional, reckless, or negligent act of
trespass on the property; (3) Defendants did not give permission for the entry
or scope of permission was exceeded; and (4) damage to Defendants caused by the
trespass. (Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory
Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 262.)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged lack of
permission because the FAC admits the existence of a sublease. Here, Defendants
retained possession of the Property after the termination of the Lease and
against Plaintiff’s express request that they vacate the Property. Because the
sublease could at most assign Monzon’s existing right to possess the Property,
the right of the sublessees to enter the Property terminated with Monzon’s
right to the same.
Luis and Maria argue that Plaintiff has not adequately
alleged alter ego in order to hold them liable for the actions of Aley.
However, Plaintiff has alleged that Luis and Maria also acted to occupy the
property following the notice of termination. (FAC ¶ 48.)
The Court therefore overrules the demurrer to this claim
with leave to amend.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants interfered with
Plaintiff’s economic relationships with actual and prospective tenants.
As to actual tenants, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged
interference. Monzon only subleased the property that Monzon itself – and not
another tenant – leased from Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not alleged how this
interfered with any other tenants.
Further, as to potential tenants, Plaintiff has not
alleged an existing relationship as required by the first element.
The Court therefore sustains the demurrer to this claim with
leave to amend.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants interfered with
Plaintiff’s economic relationships with actual and prospective tenants.
As to actual tenants, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged
interference. Monzon only subleased the property that Monzon itself – and not
another tenant – leased from Plaintiff. Plaintiff has not alleged how this
interfered with any other tenants.
Further, as to potential tenants, Plaintiff has not
alleged an existing relationship as required by the first element.
The Court therefore sustains the demurrer to this claim.
“The elements for a claim of unjust enrichment are receipt
of a benefit and unjust retention of the benefit at the expense of another. The
theory of unjust enrichment requires one who acquires a benefit which may not
justly be retained, to return either the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved
party so as not to be unjustly enriched.” (Lyles
v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759, 769, quotation marks and
citations omitted.)
Notably, “[u]njust enrichment is not a cause of action”; it
is simply “a restitution claim.” (Hill v.
Roll International Corp. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1307; see also Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793 [“there is no cause of action in California for unjust
enrichment”].)
Plaintiff argues that it can recover under this theory on
the basis that Luis and Maria occupied the property for eight months without
paying any rent to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subleased the
property to other third-party occupants and collected rent from them during
this time.
“ ‘As between [the landlord] and ... [the] sublessees there
was neither privity of estate nor privity of contract.... [The landlord],
therefore, could not sue the undertenants upon the original lessee's covenant
to pay the rent, unless the undertenants had assumed the lease, nor could an
action be maintained for the use and occupation of the premises, unless there
had been an agreement for the use of the premises express or implied between
the lessor and the sublessee....’ [Citation.] ” (Recorded Picture Co. v.
Nelson Entertainment, Inc. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 350, 364 [emphasis added].)
Here, Luis and Maria were sublessees. Thus, while Plaintiff
may be able to allege an unjust enrichment claim against Monzon, the original
lessee, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the sublessees.
The
Court therefore sustains the demurrer without leave to amend.